MAYORS RE-ELECTION AND SCHOOL MEAL MANAGEMENT: AN EVALUATION OF BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES

Abstract

This research analyzes the behavior of Brazilian voters during the 2012-2016 electoral cycle to determine whether the performance of municipal mayors in the management of school meal policy is able to influence the decision of local voters to re-elect their agents to the next mandate. The research was based on studies on accountability and its consequences to mitigate conflicts of interest between principal and agent in a political relationship. School meals assessments were prepared based on the CGU audit reports that overseen the management of the National School Meal Program (PNAE). The study showed that Brazilian voters tend to punish mayors when the results delivered in school meals are low, suggesting the functioning of accountability to counter agency problems that occur in a political relationship. In addition, it was found that citizens have difficulties in identifying the practice of corrupt acts in the management of the PNAE. However, voters tend to punish mayors if they become aware that the elected have committed acts of corruption. The results reinforce the importance of reducing information asymmetry in combating the deviations that occur in the delegation of authority.