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REVISTA DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS



Pontifícia Universidade
Católica de Minas Gerais

**Programa de Pós-Graduação
em Relações Internacionais**

Belo Horizonte
ISSN: 2317-773X
v. 8 n. 2
junho 2020

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Estudos Internacionais a partir de 2020

Javier Vadell
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Conselho Executivo – Estudos Internacionais

No início de 2013 o Departamento de Relações Internacionais da PUC Minas se propôs um novo desafio: a criação de um novo periódico de Relações Internacionais que fizesse jus às características do próprio Departamento: plural, multidisciplinar, inovador e atento às necessidades da academia e da sociedade brasileira. Assim, em um contexto caracterizado pelo crescimento consistente da área de Relações Internacionais no Brasil, bem como pela necessidade de ampliação da produção de conhecimento e de pesquisas nessa área (Sombra Saraiva, 2013), foi criada *Estudos Internacionais: Revista de Relações Internacionais da PUC Minas*, uma publicação destinada à investigação, o estudo e a promoção do debate sobre as grandes questões internacionais nas suas várias manifestações – política, econômica, cultural e societária (Vadell, 2013).

Desde então, as repercussões têm sido significativamente animadoras: Estudos Internacionais tem se firmado na comunidade científica nacional e internacional de Relações Internacionais e da Economia Política Internacional. A título de exemplo, nos últimos 2 anos foram submetidos quase 200 artigos pelo sistema da revista, atestando um grande e constante fluxo de submissões de artigos que trazem temas e reflexões significativamente relevantes para a grande área dos Estudos Internacionais. Isso nos leva, neste momento, a dar um novo passo em busca de melhor atender aos nossos leitores e autores: a partir deste ano de 2020, Estudos Internacionais será editada trimestralmente. Com isso, nosso objetivo é aumentar o número de artigos publicados por ano bem como disponibilizar de forma mais célere contribuições relevantes para o debate teórico e empírico das Relações Internacionais.

Em tempos desafiadores como os atuais, acreditamos que essas mudanças serão bem recebidas pelos colegas, uma vez que pretendemos com isso dar mais um passo na promoção e divulgação do conhecimento científico de qualidade na área de Relações Internacionais. Agradecemos neste sentido o apoio da PUC Minas, em geral, e ao Departamento de Relações Internacionais, ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais e à Biblioteca da PUC Minas, em particular. Isso inclui colegas professores e professoras, funcionários e funcionárias e estagiários e estagiárias que, de uma ou outra maneira, estiveram e estão envolvidos e envolvidas neste ambicioso e estimulante projeto acadêmico.

SOMBRA SARAIVA, J. F. Estudos Internacionais. *Estudos Internacionais: revista de relações internacionais da PUC Minas*, v. 1, n. 1, 29 abr. 2013.

VADELL, J. A. Porque uma nova revista de Relações Internacionais?. *Estudos Internacionais: revista de relações internacionais da PUC Minas*, v. 1, n. 1, 29 abr. 2013.



International development cooperation as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer¹

1. This article is a product of the Research Project "Proyecto Fondecyt Iniciación N° 11160363 «¿Cómo viajan las ideas? La tecnocracia chilena como agente de transferencia de programas sociales a Guatemala y Paraguay». Main Researcher: First Author. This article is also a partial result of the Research Project "Governança multinível em políticas sociais nacionalmente estruturadas: o caso da assistência social", coordinated by Dr. Renata Bichir and developed within Centro de Estudos da Metrópole (Centro de Pesquisa, Inovação e Difusão and Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo) (CEM/CEPID/Fapesp). This project is funded by Fapesp (process no. 2013/07616-7). A preliminary version of this article was presented at the International Conference on Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation, May 16th-19th, 2018 Sao Paulo-Brazil.

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A cooperação internacional para o desenvolvimento enquanto gatilho no processo de transferência de políticas públicas

La cooperación internacional como gatillante para la transferencia de políticas públicas

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DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p8

Recebido em: 02 de setembro de 2019

Aceito em: 17 de novembro de 2019

ABSTRACT

On the one hand, transfer is a process by which governments intentionally use ideas about how policies in other countries work to design or redesign their own public policies (Dussauge, 2012). On the other hand, cooperation is a process that recognizes the existence of an interdependence between states and the international arena. This article aims to discuss and clarify the relation between international cooperation and policy transfer. Drawing on the analysis of development cooperation in Brazil and Chile, we discuss how technical cooperation agreements between these countries and third parties, encourage the transfer of public policies, in particular of those considered as models in the area of social policy, namely Bolsa Família and Chile Solidario. This article demonstrates that international development cooperation facilitates the existence of processes that allow for the transfer of specific components of social policies to other contexts. The analysis is based on a literature review and on information gathered through interviews conducted with relevant actors.

Keywords: Transfer. Cooperation. Cash transfers. Brazil. Chile.

RESUMO

Por um lado, a transferência de políticas é um processo no qual os governos utilizam intencionalmente informação sobre políticas de outros países para desenvolver ou redesenhar as suas próprias iniciativas (Dussauge, 2012). Por outro, a cooperação é um processo que reconhece a existência de interdependência entre os estados e a arena internacional. Este artigo visa discutir e aclarar a relação

entre cooperação internacional e transferência de políticas públicas. A partir de uma análise da cooperação para o desenvolvimento promovida pelo Brasil e pelo Chile, debatemos como os acordos de cooperação técnica assinados entre estes dois países e terceiros contribuem para a transferência de políticas públicas, em particular daquelas que são tidas como modelos na área de política social, tais como o Bolsa Família e o Chile Solidario. Este artigo demonstra que a cooperação internacional para o desenvolvimento facilita a existência de processos que permitem a transferência de componentes específicos de políticas públicas para outros contextos. A análise baseia-se na revisão de literatura e em informação recolhida por meio de entrevistas conduzidas com atores relevantes.

Palavras Chave: Transferência. Cooperação. Programas de Transferência Monetária Condicionada. Brasil. Chile.

RESUMEN

Las transferencias de políticas son, por un lado, un proceso por el cual los gobiernos utilizan intencionalmente información sobre políticas de otros países para diseñar o rediseñar sus propias iniciativas (Dussauge, 2012). Por otro lado, la cooperación es un proceso que reconoce la existencia de interdependencia entre los Estados en la arena internacional. Este artículo tiene como objetivo discutir y aclarar la relación entre la cooperación internacional y la transferencia de políticas públicas. A partir de un análisis de la cooperación para el desarrollo promovida por Brasil y por Chile, debatiremos como los acuerdos de cooperación técnica firmados entre estos dos países y terceros contribuyen para la transferencia de políticas públicas, en particular de aquellas que son tomadas como modelos en el área de las políticas sociales, tales como “Bolsa Familia” y el programa “Chile Solidario”. Este artículo demuestra que la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo facilita la existencia de procesos que permiten la transferencia de componentes específicos de políticas públicas para otros contextos. El análisis está basado en la revisión de literatura e información recopilada por medio de entrevistas a actores relevantes.

Palabras clave:

Transferencia. Cooperación Internacional. Programas de Transferencia Condicionada. Brasil. Chile.

Introduction

This paper aims to discuss the relation between international cooperation and policy transfer in the context of a policy diffusion process. On the one hand, transfer is understood as a process by which governments intentionally use ideas regarding the functioning of existing policies in other countries for the design or redesign of their own public policies (DUSSAUGE, 2012). On the other hand, cooperation is a process that recognizes the existence of an interdependence between states and the international arena, this means that there would be mutual and reciprocal dependence between the various actors, where the actions of some would affect the political-economic conditions of others (KEOHANE; NYE, 1977).

The links between cooperation and policy transfer have already been discussed (CONSTANTINE; SHANKLAND, 2017; STONE, 1999) and the literature on the circulation of ideas has debated this topic both theoretically and empirically. However, and in spite of the recent advances, we believe that the relation between cooperation and policy transfer

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deserves more attention. To begin with, studies often mention cooperation as a type of transfer, but offer no explanation on how to proceed with the empirical application of the concepts, that is how to recognize the specific characteristics of each one.

There is still something of a “missing middle” between the micro (in-country) and macro (geopolitical) levels, since there is as yet little research that has used a diffusion or transfer lens to analyse the role played in less coercive forms of transfer by the international-level institutional and policy architecture of development cooperation itself (CONSTANTINE; SHANKLAND, 2017, p. 101).

Furthermore, we argue that the discussion concerning the actors involved in a cooperation process can be enriched identifying the diverse range of actors and instances where they interact. Lastly, we expect to contribute to the debates by focusing on Latin-American countries, where “the phenomenon of ‘voluntary’ policy transfer (...) under the rubric of South-South Cooperation (SSC) has received far less attention, despite its long history and growing importance” (CONSTANTINE; SHANKLAND, 2017, p. 100). Finally, as Stone, Porto de Oliveira and Pal (2019) argue:

[b]y analysing development cooperation and policy transfer together, new mechanisms operating within these processes can be seen. Policies need inevitably to be translated to adapt to such contexts, informal cooperation is often displayed among countries, and there can be different forms of resistance such as peasants fighting against agricultural technology transfers.” (STONE; OLIVEIRA; PAL, 2019, p. 13).

Considering the former, our research question is: what is the contribution of international cooperation to policy transfer? We argue that cooperation is one of the channels through which policy transfer might occur. In that sense, the existence of cooperation between states allows the circulation of information, policy makers and models of public policies, creating an environment that enables transfer to occur. In addition, cooperation agreements indicate specific actions and activities, thus contributing directly to policy transfer.

In order to illustrate our views, we analyze Brazilian and Chilean cooperation in the area of cash transfers between 2002 and 2015, a period that encompasses the creation and implementation of *Chile Solidario* (CHS) and *Bolsa Familia* (BF) programs⁵. These cases were chosen because both countries have recently developed policies that are considered to be best practices and, thus, have attracted international attention⁶. The Chilean and Brazilian programs are relevant in terms of their components and in what concerns the presence of cooperation and social development agencies.

The information on the cases was gathered through the analysis of the research produced on the topic and of official documents. Additionally, a total of 34 semi-structured interviews were conducted between October 2015 and October 2018, with academics, bureaucrats, and international organizations’ representatives. These individuals were selected because of their involvement with the Brazilian and the Chilean programs and/or because of their participation in cooperation strategies developed within the field of social policies involving Chile and/or Brazil. The interviews were conducted in person in different sights – Chile (2016 to 2018), Brazil (2015 to 2017), Paraguay (2018), Colombia (2018) and Guatemala (2018). When the contact in person was not possible, the interviews were

5. In Brazil, cash transfer programs have been implemented at the local level since 1995 and the first national program dates from 2001. However, we will focus only on BF program, which is why we are considering this specific period of time in our analysis.

6. Another relevant case of social policy exported to other countries is the Mexican program Progresas/Oportunidades/Prospera (BANEGAS-GONZÁLEZ; MORA-SALAS, 2012; PECK; THEODORE, 2015; VALENCIA, 2008). However, for this study we have decided to focus on two cases since a reduced number allows us to do a more detailed study and also because these two programs have different designs, whereas there is a greater similarity between the Mexican and the Brazilian programs.

conducted via Skype. The goal was to clarify some of the information that was already provided by other sources and to collect additional information.

The article is divided in three sections. In the first part we critically review the literature on policy transfer and cooperation. Secondly, we analyze Brazilian and Chilean cooperation related to cash transfers. The final section is dedicated to the discussion of the relation between cooperation and policy transfer, considering the evidence of the cases.

Transfer and cooperation

A first step to discuss policy transfer and cooperation is to clarify what we understand by the two concepts. Firstly, it is important to mention that the study of policy transfer is part of a growing body of literature on the circulation of ideas and policy models. An increasing awareness of the interconnection between different units and of the impact of external influences in the development of policies has led to a recent growing interest for these topics, producing important theoretical and empirical studies (for example, DOLOWITZ; MARSH, 1996, 2000; DUSSAUGE, 2012; EVANS; DAVIES, 1999; LEVI-FAUR, 2005; STONE, 1999; SUGIYAMA, 2011; PORTO DE OLIVEIRA; FARIA, 2017).

It is important to distinguish between the main streams in the literature. Porto de Oliveira and Faria (2017, p. 13) suggest to differentiate along these lines:

[p]olicy transfer deals with rather restricted processes involving a few political units and their interactions, while policy diffusion is seen as a process that encompass several states, eventually from distinct continents. Policy circulation is a term that has been employed to frame rather diffuse and multidirectional processes, as we will see ahead.

Diffusion is a process “by which the adoption of innovation by member(s) of a social system is communicated through certain channels and over time, and activates mechanisms that increase the likelihood of adoption by other members who have not yet adopted it” (LEVI-FAUR, 2005, p. 23). It is also relevant to highlight that the dissemination of an idea or policy in a diffusion process is an uncoordinated process, when compared to transfer. Thus, countries would not act completely independently or in a coordinated manner, but in an uncoordinated interdependence (ELKINS; SIMMONS, 2005).

The term policy transfer was coined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) who define it as the “process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas of a political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (DOLOWITZ; MARSH, 2000, p. 5). Transfer is also, understood as a process by which “governments intentionally use ideas / lessons about the functioning of existing policies and institutions in other countries to inform the (re) design / implementation of their own public policies” (DUSSAUGE; 2012, p. 52). The policy transfer approach distinguishes between voluntary, negotiated and coercive forms of transfer and tries to determine what is

transferred, who is involved and under what conditions it is developed (BENDER; KELLER; WILLING, 2014). In that sense, the literature identifies diverse mechanisms of transfer such as emulation, mixture, harmonization, hybridization, assemblage, between others (BENDER; KELLER; WILLING, 2014; DOLOWITZ; MARSH, 2000; PRINCE, 2010).

According to Bennett (1997) and Stone (2001), the processes of adopting a policy, or part of it, are attributable to transfer only if this process is not the product of internal idiosyncratic factors; if during the adoption the responsible politicians are aware of the adoption of the policy or part of it in other places and if external experiences were used for the domestic debate. Finally, Jules (2015) affirms that another type of transfer is the cooperative policy transfer. This concept highlights the interest of one actor to transfer a policy among other units (MAVROT, 2017). In addition, this author affirms that the policy transfer processes should not just be viewed as unilateral movements between two units “and can be truly polycentric in nature” (MAVROT, 2017, p. 121).

The actors who take part in the processes are a key aspect that has not been taken into account when studying policy transfer. As Dolowitz, Plugaru and Saurugger (2019, p. 4) affirm, “actors make transfer possible”. Actors are those who carry out relevant actions and who intervene at some stage of the public policy process (DENTE; SUBIRATS, 2014). According to Stone (2001) in the transfer literature, the usual response to the question “who transfers the policy” is “governments”, privileging the official actors as bureaucrats, politicians and agencies. However, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) list a number of actors who might play a role in transfer that goes beyond the former – i.e.: elected officials, bureaucrats, political parties, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs/experts and supranational institutions. In addition, it is important to consider the role of other actors, such as academics, epistemic communities and think tanks. All of them are significant for their role in the production, dissemination and legitimization of knowledge and ideas which can contribute to the design of policies or for their diffusion.

As there are several types of actors, it is relevant to distinguish the different roles that they play and the channels through which they act. Evans and Davies (1999) affirm that non-state actors participate in the soft transfer of ideas that influences the public agenda; while, stakeholders are involved in hard transfer of practices that require formal decisions (STONE, 2001). Dolowitz, Plugaru and Saurugger (2019) indicate that power relations can be modified by national actors, reorienting the intended goal of a transfer. That is to say that “(...) even when actors appear to be subservient to the international, they can be in a position to change power relations, even to the point of deviating the course of the transfer process in order to frame it in accordance to their needs” (DOLOWITZ; PLUGARU; SAURUGGER, 2019, p. 6). In addition, “policy transfer generally involves a range of tactics on the part of the policy makers to make extralocal policy programmes applicable in local circumstances” (PRINCE, 2010, p. 171). Therefore, the identification of the key actor in each process of transfer is relevant to the understanding of its micro dynamics.

Furthermore, actors might use different channels to exert their influence and to operate transfer processes. We argue that cooperation is

one of the channels that they may use. Cooperation can be understood as a process that recognizes the existence of an interdependence between states and the international arena, meaning that there would be mutual and reciprocal dependence between the various actors, where the action of some would affect the political-economic conditions of others (KEOHANE; NYE, 1977). It can be seen as a relationship between partners trying to combine a set of actions and criteria to achieve common objectives at the international level. Such processes might involve actors such as states, supranational organizations, international organizations, national organizations, institutions, non-governmental organizations and individuals (SABAT, 2008).

Cooperation can occur within different frames⁷ (CONSTANTINE AND SHANKLAND, 2017; ACGI, 2017; INSTITUTO CAMÕES, N/D). Bilateral cooperation is carried out between two countries that follow patterns and behavioral guidelines defined jointly and it is generally established within a governmental sphere and through formal channels. Triangular cooperation takes place when two or more countries or a multilateral organization join efforts to share experiences, knowledge and resources, according to their comparative advantages, for the benefit of a third country or group of countries. Finally, multilateral cooperation is carried out through schemes, programs and projects whose bases and guidelines are accepted by a group of countries within the framework of an international forum or agreement.

Historically, international cooperation is characterized by the preponderance of North/South relations, but new players from the South are becoming more and more active. This has led to the rise of a brand-new form of cooperation in which Southern countries are the main players. South-South cooperation is defined by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (N/D) as

[a] broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic and technical domains, it can take place on a bilateral, regional, sub regional or interregional basis. Developing countries shared knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts.

Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India and China are some of the countries that have actively engaged in cooperation. The strategies employed by these countries differ greatly, but there are some common ideas. First, there is no coercion, since cooperation between Southern countries is considered to be more horizontal. Secondly, cooperation projects are generally based on experiences that have been implemented domestically (CONSTANTINE; SHANKLAND, 2017). Finally, Constantine and Shankland (2017) draw attention to the fact that experience and learning are becoming increasingly appreciated.

Complementing these ideas, Stone, Oliveira and Pal (2019) argue that is relevant to focus on the particularities of transfer in developing countries:

government structures will be different, donors and international organisations often have the whip hand; and 'aid' is itself a specific type of policy transfer with its own agencies, networks, and professional knowledge. There are also unique circumstances around the credibility of knowledge in a development context, credibility that goes beyond mere technical expertise (STONE; OLIVEIRA; PAL 2019, p. 13).

7. There are other forms of cooperation that we do not examine in this article.

The previous discussion clarifies the definitions involved in this work and their limitations. Transfer and cooperation are different phenomena, with some common components. As we present in Table 1, transfer is process that implies the mobilization of knowledge (from a model to an idea) whereas cooperation implies a relationship and interdependence that could or not implicated that mobilization. Regarding the degree of autonomy, a transfer process could be voluntary, coercive or mixed. In the case of cooperation, willfulness is a key feature of the process. In addition, the instruments are diverse. Transfer can occur by the mechanism of emulation, mixture, learning, assemblage, between others. Cooperation agreements (bilateral, triangular or multilateral) are an example of the instruments that can be used to operate. Finally, in what concerns the actors, there is an overlap between those involved in cooperation agreements and those who can be identified as agents of transfer.

We will consider the components presented here for analyzing the Chilean and Brazilian cases in the next section.

Table 1 – Transfer and Cooperation: a comparison

	Transfer	Cooperation
Definition	Process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas of a political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system. (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 5)	Process that recognizes the existence of an interdependence between States and the international arena, this means that there would be mutual and reciprocal dependence between the various actors. (Keohane and Nye, 1977).
Level of autonomy	- Voluntary - Mixture - Coercive	Voluntary
Mechanisms	- Mixture - Emulation - Learning - Hybridization - Harmonization - Assemblage	Cooperation agreements: - Bilateral - Triangular - Multilateral
Actors	- States - Political parties - Academics - International agencies - International organizations - National institutions - Think tanks - Elected officials - Bureaucrats - Pressure groups - Policy entrepreneurs/experts	- States - Regional governments - International agencies - International organizations - National institutions - Elected officials - Bureaucrats

Source: Developed by the authors and based on Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, Prince, 2010, Bender, Keller and Willing, 2014 and Keohane and Nye, 1977.

Brazilian and Chilean international cooperation on social development

Brazilian and Chilean Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

Created in 2003⁸, *Bolsa Familia* (BF) gained considerable attention, especially after being classified as a best practice by international organizations and financial institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (WB). In order to tackle poverty, BF has two components: (1) an unconditional cash transfer directed at families in extreme poverty that is attributed regardless of its composition; and (2) a conditional cash transfer (CCT) that is awarded to families with children that fall below the poverty line. This latter transfer requires beneficiaries to comply with conditionalities regarding immunization, health care and education of children (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

Chile has implemented a series of measures in the field of social development that have been considered best practices and, therefore, have received international attention. *Chile Solidario* (CHS) and *Puente* are two of those initiatives. CHS and *Puente* - its entry program - began in 2002 and aims to promote the integration of families living in extreme poverty into the social networks of the State and their access to better living conditions. One of the most innovative components of CHS, was the psychosocial support given to the beneficiary families, which consisted of a personalized accompaniment by a professional or qualified technician, in order to (1) promote the development of the necessary personal and family skills to meet the 53 minimum thresholds required by the program; and to (2) link beneficiaries to local networks and benefits. The accompaniment was carried out for 24 months and consists of a system of regular work sessions with families or people at home (OSORIO, 2018).

Brazilian cooperation on social development

Brazil has been involved with South-South cooperation since the 60s but became an important player at the turn of the century. It has moved from a position where it used to import policies to become an actor known for exporting its domestic policies (FARIA, 2012). During Lula's government (2003-2010), Brazil has enacted several policies that have led to an exceptional reduction of poverty and inequalities and have attracted international attention. Over this period, social development became a key aspect of Brazilian international cooperation, reflecting a growing importance of this policy sector also domestically. Lula's direct involvement in the fight against hunger and poverty was also quite important in garnering support for the program both domestically and internationally. Lula acted as an "international ambassador" (PORTO DE OLIVEIRA, 2013) of BF, namely in the G8 meeting in 2003 and others such as the meetings of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (PAPI; MEDEIROS, 2015).

The Ministry of Social Development (MDS) was created in 2004 and was responsible for the management of BF, among other programs and

8. BF was not the first conditional cash transfer (CCT) implemented in Brazil. Two important experiences were created at the local level in 1995 in the Federal District and in Campinas. These CCTs were largely emulated at the local level (COELHO, 2008; SUGIYAMA, 2008a, 2008b), reaching more than 100 municipalities. The federal government created Bolsa Escola, a CCT with education-related conditionalities in 2001, and several other CCT programs were adopted between 2001 and 2003. In 2003, these programs are replaced by BF in an attempt to create a single program targeting the poor (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

9. Within the ministry, the National Secretary for Citizenship Income (Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania – SENARC) was responsible for overseeing the program and thus several of its members have been involved in cooperation projects. However, the international projects were coordinated by the Department for International Projects.

10. Cooperation agreements were signed with countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Angola, Egypt, Senegal, Lebanon, Vietnam and Pakistan (ABC, 2007, MDSA, N/D; PAPI; MEDEIROS, 2015). A cooperation project between the Ministry and the city of New York was also signed (ABC, 2007).

11. In the case of South Africa, study tours took place in Brazil, Chile, and in other Latin American countries in order to assess the possibility of adding conditionalities to their own program (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

strategies. Because of their expertise in dealing with specific issues, Brazilian ministries are able to sign agreements with other countries. MDS is thus responsible for providing international cooperation related to BF⁹. MDS provides technical cooperation and exchanges knowledge and information regarding its activities, mainly through the reception/sending of international delegations, participation in seminars and workshops, and production of information and materials on BF (LEITE, SUYAMA; POMEROY, 2013; LORENZO, 2013). Bureaucrats directly involved with the program were responsible for providing related information to other countries (interviews).

Cooperation provided by the ministry is demand-driven (PAPI; MEDEIROS, 2015), which means that countries that are interested in the establishment of cooperation agreements should request MDS to do so. More than 60 countries have shown interest in cooperating with the ministry (LORENZO, 2013) and agreements have been signed with several countries¹⁰. There seems to be a preference for the signature of cooperation agreements involving a third party – a feature also present in other Brazilian institutions (ANDRADE, 2008) – such as the WB, FAO, the British Department for International Development (DFID), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (CAIXETA; SUYAMA, 2015; MDSA, N/D). Latin America is thus the prime destination of cooperation, with more than 50% of the activities directed at it, followed by Africa (PAPI; MEDEIROS, 2015). Among the specific demands for cooperation, we can identify the following topics: targeting mechanisms, payment systems, implementation and monitoring of conditionalities, information systems (Single Registry) and information related to BF and to the Program for the Eradication of Child Labor (PETI) (LORENZO, 2013; PAPI; MEDEIROS, 2015; interviews).

The Ministry has enacted several cooperation projects in the field of cash transfers. An agreement was signed with Peru to exchange on monitoring and evaluation of conditionalities and to provide technical cooperation aiming at strengthening the Peruvian program *Juntos* and helping rethink the decentralized management of the program (ABC, 2007; MDSA, N/D). An agreement of cooperation in the field of cash transfers and the fight against extreme poverty was signed between Brazil and Chile (MDSA, N/D). Agreements that focus on cash transfers were also established between Brazil and Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, and Guatemala (MDSA, N/D).

African countries have showed particular interest in learning more about BF. Both South Africa and Mozambique, for instance, have looked at BF in order to rethink their own programs¹¹ (interviews; OLIVEIRA, 2012, 2018). The year 2006 saw the start of the Brazil-Africa Cooperation Program on Social Development, involving Brazil's MDS, the British Department for International Development (DFID), and delegations from Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Zambia. This initiative was funded by DFID and had the following goals: (1) facilitate the exchange of technical personnel; (2) foster technical assistance; and (3) the creation of an information platform (ANDRADE, 2008).

In 2007, following a first contact between the two countries in the context of the Brazil-Africa Cooperation Program on Social

Development, Ghana asked the Brazilian MDS to help in the elaboration of a cash transfer program. A cooperation agreement between these countries and DFID was signed later in that very year. Brazil has understood this agreement as a good opportunity to disseminate BF, as well as a possibility to learn about the implementation of cash transfers in a different context (SOUZA, 2007). Ghana, in its turn, has seen it as a way of getting access to technical knowledge on cash transfers and at the same time legitimize its own program (SOUZA, 2007). Brazilian delegations were sent to Ghana in three different moments in 2007 to present the Brazilian experience and discuss the following topics: Single Registry, implementation of BF, monitoring and evaluation of conditionalities, and the eradication of child labor (ANDRADE, 2008; LEITE; SUYAMA; POMEROY, 2015; IPC, N/Db). The topics discussed are a response to demands presented by the Ghanaian government to MDS (IPC, N/Db). The implementation of this agreement has faced some obstacles, namely the limited number of Brazilian representatives available, the lack of knowledge regarding the Ghanaian context and the non-definition of a well-designed strategy (LEITE; SUYAMA; POMEROY, 2015). In spite of that, this can be seen as a fruitful cooperation, since Ghana has implemented a cash transfer program with several features that mirror Brazil's BF. The Ghanaian Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) was first implemented in 2008 and aimed at reducing poverty among children and other vulnerable groups (GARCIA; MOORE, 2012). A monthly cash transfer is attributed to families that are part of the Single Registry, an information system similar to its Brazilian counterpart. The program has two branches: an unconditional one that targets elderly people (ABEBRESE, 2011), and a second one that involves conditionalities and that is directed at families with children. In order to receive payment, families with children by their composition are expected to comply with the following conditionalities: (1) children must be enrolled in school and attend classes; (2) all family members should be part of Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme; (3) children up to 18 months must attend regular medical checkups and follow the immunization calendar; (4) every form of child labor is forbidden (ABEBRESE, 2011; GARCIA; MOORE, 2012; IPC, N/Da). However, there is an incapacity for monitoring compliance with conditionalities (GARCIA; MOORE, 2012).

Grebe (2015, p. 27) states that "while Brazilian consultants did participate in the design of LEAP – and it shares certain characteristics such as the conditionalities attached to the cash grants – the claim of it being an attempt to emulate Bolsa Família within the Ghanaian context is belied by its relatively small scale and low benefit levels". Conditionalities are not a typical feature of programs within the region (OLIVEIRA, 2013), thus one might argue that they are a result of the Brazilian influence. Also, the fact that the information system is called Single Registry and shares similarities to the Brazilian system points to the existence of a transfer process. Foli *et al.* (2018) and Oliveira (2015) also acknowledge LEAP to be highly influenced by Brazil's BF.

Chilean cooperation on social development

Chile pays particular attention to South-South cooperation. The interaction with the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and with other developing countries is guided by four key components: (1) the promotion, management and implementation of the capacity of Chilean cooperation in other countries; (2) agreements focus on the demands of third countries for Chilean experiences; (3) the goal is to strengthen the capacity of professionals specialized in international cooperation management and, in addition, to contribute to the discussion on a South-South intra-regional cooperation strategy and on a common framework of cooperation; (4) the relations established should be horizontal and unconditional (VAN KLAVEREN, 2011).

The country often provides “triangular cooperation”. Chile has approximately 14 triangular partners with priority areas of cooperation: institutional strengthening and modernization; social development; economic cooperation for development; environment, natural resources and energy; agriculture and food security; territorial and local development; disaster prevention and human resources training (AGCI, 2017; interviews).

The Agency of International Cooperation (AGCI), created in 1990, is one of the main agencies responsible for coordinating international cooperation resources and carry out cooperation actions with developing countries. Since 2005, AGCI has been part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and therefore their activities are more related to national foreign policy priorities. During the period 2006-2009, the AGCI defined a group of priority countries for South-South cooperation actions. Selected countries included Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Haiti (FUENTES, 2014; ROJAS, 2011; VAN KLAVEREN, 2011).

CHS’s components, particularly the psychological support, were replicated by other countries such as Paraguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Panama and other Central American countries¹² (VALENCIA, 2008). Based on the knowledge and experience accumulated with CHS and *Puente*, collaboration, cooperation and advocacy methods were established facilitating the influence of Chilean programs in the region.

In Paraguay, the *Tekoporã*¹³ program is aimed at families living in extreme poverty in rural areas of the country. The program began in 2005 and has conditionalities related to health and education and, similar to what happens in CHS, the program incorporated “family guides” that accompany the families and provide psychosocial support services (FONSECA, 2008). The program was supported by WB and IADB, as well as technical support in the design and implementation by countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Colombia (BATTILANA, 2015; VERA SOARES; BRITTO, 2007) and Chile through AGCI (AGCI, 2013).

Between 2011 and 2014, a project called “Paraguay Among All. Strengthening the Social Policy Strategy” was developed which consisted of cooperation between Paraguay, Chile, Australia and Germany, seeking to develop a national strategy to improve Paraguayan social policies and

12. Such as Barbados, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

13. Currently *Tekoporã* had undergone improvements in management and quality and increased coverage, from 80 thousand families in 2005 to 141 thousand families in 2013 and with expectations of reaching 150 thousand in 2017 (SECRETARÍA ACCIÓN SOCIAL, 2017). It also counts on other associated programs, such as *Tenonderã*, for indigenous families and *Tekoha*, which hands over / returns property titles to indigenous communities.

programs. Some of the specific actions were carried out by the Chilean Ministry of Social Development (MIDESO), with the support of AGCI, and the Technical Unit (UTGS) of the Social Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic of Paraguay. During the period 2011-2014, seven technical missions were carried out from Chile to Paraguay, involving the training of 35 Paraguayan professionals and technicians. At the same time, 12 professionals and technicians from the institutions that serve as the gateway to Paraguay *SäsoPyahu* (*Abrazo* and *Tekoporã*) and representatives of UTGS carried out internships in Chile (AGUIRRE, 2013).

Triangular cooperation with Guatemala was established in partnership with the German *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ). This partnership started in 2003 and focused on Latin America and the Caribbean, and it aims to replicate good experiences in countries of those regions developed through cooperation between Chile and Germany. The transmission of knowledge and experiences included Chilean technicians as the experts in charge of the cooperation initiative. Paraguay and Guatemala were among the countries which benefited from this type of project (GIZ, N/D). For example, in 2007, Guatemala implemented the National Action Plan for Children and Adolescents, which became part of the CCTs *Mi Familia Progresá* in 2008. This initiative was created to respond to high levels of poverty and malnutrition, and to low levels of education and access to healthcare facilities among the rural population (CECCHINI *et al.*, 2009). Thus, the program seeks to improve the living conditions of families in extreme poverty through economic support, so that they can invest in health, education and food¹⁴.

In Colombia, *Familias en Acción* (created in 2000) targets families with members under 18 who experience situations of poverty and vulnerability. However, it was not until 2007 that the Social Protection Network for Overcoming Poverty (JUNTOS) was created based on the Chilean experience of *Puente*. JUNTOS is composed of two operating strategies - the first corresponds to family support, while the second regards the coordination of State entities that intervene in the delivery of different benefits and monitor the compliance with 45 minimum thresholds. The cooperation between Chile and Colombia has occurred through formal and informal channels, since the presence of missions to learn about the Chilean experience was not always linked to the Colombian Ministry of Social Development.

Puente was also enacted in the Caribbean region. Created in 2007, *Puente* was a horizontal cooperation initiative which sought to improve social protection strategies in the Caribbean countries based on the Chilean model (AGCI; FOUNDATION HENRY DUNANT, 2014). Caribbean countries first learnt about *Puente* through activities organized by the Organization of American States (OAS) and then, countries requested to learn more about the program's principles and strategies. A pilot included Jamaica, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago, with Chile serving as the technical expert providing knowledge on the *Puente*. By 2009, the initiative was extended to include Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname" (AGCI; FOUNDATION HENRY DUNANT, 2014). The activities included (A) internships in Chile (1) to

14. In 2012 the program was replaced by *Mi Bono Seguro*, which maintains the formulation of the classic CCTs, with conditionalities in the area of education and health.

share information regarding the theory that informs the programs and practical information; and (2) to interact with those responsible for *Puente* and with beneficiary families; (B) training workshops; (C) mentoring by Chilean tutors who have expertise with the program; and (D) the adaptation of original *Puente* materials to enhance learning experiences of Caribbean participants (AGCI and Foundation Henry Dunant, 2014).

As we mentioned, psychological accompaniment is a specific feature of the Chilean program and since the mentioned-above countries have included it in their own programs after signing specific cooperation agreements regarding this topic with Chile (and sometimes with a third party), we can argue that this component was transferred from Chile to new contexts and that cooperation agreements can be understood as an instrument that facilitated the transfer process.

Final Remarks

Cooperation is one of the mechanisms through which the transfer process can occur. In the last section we have analyzed Brazilian and Chilean cooperation in the field of cash transfers. These two case studies have shown that policies – or at least specific elements of them – are adopted by other countries and that this is facilitated by the establishment of cooperation agreements. Indeed, we can clearly identify the replication of Brazil’s BF components and Single Registry¹⁵ – the system used to identify families in poverty – in Ghana. Transfer can also be observed in the case of CHS, since its psychological component has been adopted by other countries, such as Paraguay (see Table 2)

15. Brazil’s Single Registry is also very influential in the design and redesign of information systems elsewhere (interviews).

Table 2 – Cooperation and Transfer from Brazil and Chile, 2002-2015

Cooperation and Transfer from Brazil and Chile, 2002-2015		
	Brazil	Chile
Actors involved in cooperation processes	MDS (Senarc) MDS (Sec. Interacional) ABC	AGCI Fosis MDS
Recipient countries	- Latin American countries - African countries	- Latin American countries - Caribbean countries
Topics that are object of cooperation	CCT – discussions based on the experience of Bolsa Família - Information and monitoring systems (Single Registry) - How to design and implement conditionalities - How to monitor and evaluate compliance with conditionalities - PETI (Child Labour Eradication Program)	CCT – discussions based on the experience of Chile Solidario - How to design and implement psychosocial support interventions
Evidences of transfer	In the case of Ghana: - Conditionalities in the fields of health and education - Single Registry – information system	In the case of Paraguay and Guatemala: - Implementation of the psychosocial support component
Mechanisms	Bilateral, triangular and multilateral cooperation	Bilateral, triangular and multilateral cooperation

Source: Developed by the authors.

Both countries have shared knowledge that they have accumulated through the implementation of their own programs. The ministries responsible for providing cooperation are the ones that host the programs and the bureaucrats involved in cooperation agreements are the very same that are involved with the programs back home (interviews). These two countries give strong emphasis to technical cooperation, which confirms the argument of Constantine and Shankland (2017) that knowledge and experience are growing in importance when it comes to developing cooperation projects. The preference for triangular cooperation also illustrates this point, as Brazil and Chile are providing the experience and technical information, whereas funding to enact the projects comes from elsewhere. This is the case of the cooperation agreement signed between Brazil, DFIF and Ghana - the funding to put the project in place came from a traditional donor, but the expertise is provided by Brazilian bureaucrats who are part of Brazil's MDS and who have worked in BF or in related topics and thus have considerable experience in the matter to advise Ghana on how to develop its own program. This is also the case of the triangular cooperation established between Chile, Guatemala and GIZ. The German agency contributed to the dissemination of the program by mobilizing Chilean experts who have knowledge and experience due to their involvement with CHS. Finally, the presence of Puente in the Caribbean is a good example of cooperative policy transfer (JULES, 2015; MAVROT, 2017). Here, it is relevant to highlight the numerous actors involved: transfers are not unilateral movements between two units; they are polycentric. The role played by OAS, linking Chilean experts to a group of countries, is relevant to understand how transfers occur in the frame of cooperation initiatives.

Regarding the actors, when analyzing cooperation processes, it is crucial to pay special attention to governments since they are able to generate the necessary commitments to carry out cooperation agreements, be they bilateral or triangular. In addition, it is necessary to discuss further the role of the experts, who can be “officially” part of a cooperation initiative, but later, can be also convened as an “independent” expert legitimized by the experience obtained as a national policy maker.

As already mentioned, the process of transfer does not occur separately from diffusion process. When we look at Latin American countries, we can identify the presence of an epistemic community that has established a consensus on the importance of cash transfers as a means to tackle poverty (OSORIO, 2018). The activities of this epistemic community have led to the dissemination of programmatic ideas regarding cash transfers and have created room for these initiatives to be implemented in almost all countries in the region. Howlett *et al.* (2018) study the process of CCT diffusion and the process of implementation of a CCT in the Philippines and identify instrument constituencies – groups similar to epistemic communities that gather around a specific policy instrument – as important actors in the dissemination of information and models. Foli *et al.* (2018) also identify the existence of a transnational instrument constituency concerned with CCTs and argue that the transfer of components that are present in BF to Ghana was made possible due to its presence.

When specific information on how to operate the program or when information on policy instruments related to the program is needed, a different type of relation between the adopting country and the country of origin has to be established. In other words, transfer is needed. This transfer process can take place through cooperation agreements. The examination of cooperation agreements signed by Chile and Brazil with third parties reveals that the recipient countries present very precise demands on specific topics or instruments. In the case of Brazil, there is an interest for conditionalities, monitoring of conditionalities and the Single Registry. Ghana's government was interested in getting information on all of these topics and LEAP's design reflects the existence of a learning process that has resulted in the adoption of very similar features to the ones of BF, namely the Single Registry and conditionalities (although they are not effectively monitored). However, learning processes made possible by cooperation might not always lead to the transfer of policies, since they can be judged somehow inadequate to the new context. In other words, sometimes learning might result in "negative lessons" (ROSE, 1993). South Africa was interested in learning more about the Brazilian experience of CCTs – it was part of Brazil-Africa Cooperation Program on Social Development and bilateral study tours took place-, but has made a clear decision not to add conditionalities to the unconditional cash transfer program already in place¹⁶ (OLIVEIRA, 2018). Chile, in its turn, is well-known for having innovated when developing the psychological component and this specific characteristic of the program is the object of several cooperation agreements. This can be demonstrated by studying the components present in CCTs in a comparative way. In the case of Chile, the bilateral and triangular cooperation processes led to a scenario that allowed the incorporation of CHS and Puente program components. Particularly when studying the case of Colombia, there was a predominantly formal cooperation process that allowed the exchange of information and experiences, which are reflected in the creation of the Red Together - delivery of social support through managers and the fulfillment of 45 basic thresholds, very similar to Puente's design. On the contrary, in the case of Paraguay, despite the cooperation agreement signed in 2009 with AGCI that installed the Social Protection System in Paraguay, the process of implementing the system has not been completed until today and it is expected to be in operation by the year of 2023 (OSORIO; VERGARA, 2019).

If diffusion results in the spread of ideas and models, transfer allows for the particular elements of the public policy and to policy instruments that are required to implement the programs to circulate. Diffusion, as an uncoordinated process, is related to the circulation of ideas that are considered to be "macro". In other words, it corresponds to the circulation of more general and programmatic ideas and models. International cooperation is often based on the discussion of specific policy instruments. Thus, we argue that diffusion allows for the circulation of programmatic ideas, whereas transfer gives countries the mechanisms to operationalize them. Puente in the Caribbean provides a good example of that. Countries learnt about the Chilean program through a tradi-

16. School attendance rates are already very high and therefore the government has understood that adding conditionalities would produce very little result (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

tional activity of exhortation developed by international organizations and members of the epistemic community. Later, Caribbean countries requested more information related to the programs and the cooperation initiative driven by the OAS, with specific tools of transfer of knowledge, was created.

The Brazilian and Chilean cases allow us to show that international cooperation can be used as a transfer mechanism. Further research regarding this issue is needed, particularly, in what concerns the detailed discussion of whether transfer implies learning, hybridization, emulation or other denominations proposed by the literature. Additional research could focus, for example, on the role of the diverse actors, the domestic capabilities and the object of transfer, both from a theoretical and methodological perspective. All of them are future questions that emerge from this present work.

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¿Aumenta la participación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas



Does the participation in peacekeeping increase the capacity of the armed forces to interact with civilian actors? An evaluation of learning in the case of the Chilean Armed Forces

A participação em operações de paz aumenta a capacidade das Forças Armadas de interagir com atores civis? Avaliação do aprendizado para o caso das Forças Armadas chilenas

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DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p27

Recebido el 13 de junio de 2019
Aprobado el 17 de octubre de 2019

RESUMEN

Generalmente se supone que la participación en operaciones de paz aumenta la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas para interactuar con distintos actores civiles. Este artículo presenta evidencia del caso de la participación de las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile en el mantenimiento de la paz, principalmente la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en Haití (MINUSTAH, 2004–2017). En base de un estudio cualitativo, se evalúa si las operaciones de paz tuvieron efectos a través de procesos de aprendizaje institucionalizados o individuales. La evidencia demuestra que la participación en operaciones de paz condujo a distintos aprendizajes en las personas individualmente. No obstante, estas lecciones tuvieron una trascendencia limitada en el conjunto de la institución militar. En conclusión, las operaciones de paz no han conducido a cambios fundamentales en la auto-percepción de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas de su función frente a los actores civiles.

Palabras Clave: Operaciones de paz. Cooperación civil-militar. Ayuda humanitaria. Gestión del riesgo de desastres. MINUSTAH.

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ABSTRACT

It is generally assumed that participation in peacekeeping increases the ability of the armed forces to interact with different civilian actors. This article presents evidence from the case of the Chilean Armed Forces and their participation in peacekeeping, specifically in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004–2017). Based on a qualitative methodology, the study assesses whether the participation in peacekeeping led to learning effects through either institutionalized or individual learning processes. The evidence shows that participation in peacekeeping effectively produced learning experiences in individual members of the military. However, these lessons had limited transcendence in the military institution as a whole. Consequently, peacekeeping has not led to fundamental changes in the Chilean Armed Forces' self-perception with regards to their role vis-à-vis civilian actors.

Keywords: Peacekeeping. Civil-military cooperation. Humanitarian aid. Disaster management. MINUSTAH.

RESUMO

Existe um pressuposto geral que frisa que a participação em operações de paz aumenta a capacidade das forças armadas de interagir com diferentes atores civis. Este artigo apresenta evidências sobre o caso da participação das Forças Armadas do Chile na manutenção da paz, principalmente na Missão de Estabilização das Nações Unidas no Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004-2017). Partindo-se de um estudo qualitativo, avaliou-se se as operações de paz chilenas conduziram a efeitos nos processos de aprendizagem institucional ou individual. A evidência mostra que a participação em operações de paz levou ao aprendizado entre pessoas quando consideradas individualmente. Porém, essas lições tiveram um significado limitado sobre a instituição militar como um todo. Em conclusão, as operações de paz não operaram mudanças profundas na autopercepção das Forças Armadas chilenas em relação ao seu papel frente aos atores civis.

Palavras-chave: Operações de paz. Cooperação civil-militar. Ajuda humanitária. Gestão de risco de desastres. MINUSTAH.

Financiamiento: Este artículo es parte del Proyecto No. 11170387, Programa Fondecyt de Iniciación Etapa 2017, financiado por la Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica de Chile (CONICYT).

Agradecimiento: Este trabajo contó con el apoyo de numerosas personas que han participado en la investigación, por lo que quiero agradecerles por su tiempo y su buena disposición. En especial quiero expresar mi gratitud a Alejandro Atán, Andrés Fuentealba y a Mauricio Valdivieso, cuya ayuda y fe fueron fundamental para poder implementar el proyecto. Gracias también a Camila Bertrou por su excelente trabajo como ayudante de investigación y a María Emilia Manríquez Ponce por su aporte a la redacción del artículo en español.

Introducción

Generalmente se cree que las operaciones de paz internacionales producen efectos transformadores en la institución militar (MOSKOS; WILLIAMS; SEGAL, 2000). Tanto los responsables políticos como los académicos comparten la opinión de que las operaciones de paz tienen efectos, y que estos efectos son casi exclusivamente positivos (CHEYRE, 2011). Se supone que la participación en operaciones de paz aumenta

en los militares el respecto a los derechos humanos, la democracia y el mando civil bajo un estado de derecho. También se espera que las operaciones de paz elevan el estatus internacional de un país y conducen a mejores relaciones con otros estados. Otro supuesto efecto que ha cobrado importancia es la capacitación de las fuerzas armadas en trabajar con distintos actores civiles, dado que los cascos azules en las operaciones de paz contemporáneas típicamente tienen a su cargo una serie de tareas civiles y de policía y, además, trabajan junto a las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONGs), agencias humanitarias y otros actores civiles que forman parte de las operaciones de paz (MOSKOS; WILLIAMS; SEGAL, 2000, p. 2).

Este artículo tiene como objetivo someter al escrutinio empírico el supuesto que la participación en operaciones de paz mejora la interoperabilidad entre civiles y militares. Específicamente, se busca responder a la pregunta cómo y si es que la participación en las operaciones de paz reformó a las fuerzas armadas chilenas con respecto a su interacción con actores civiles. Estos comprenden autoridades gubernamentales, burócratas, organizaciones de la sociedad civil, ONGs, y no menos importantes las poblaciones locales. Es preciso notar que el estudio no parte de la premisa que una reforma sea o no sea necesaria. Se busca, más bien, evaluar si la participación en operaciones de paz lleva a cambios en la institución militar, como académicos y políticos lo tienden a asumir (ARBUCKLE, 2006). Esa presunción radica en que las relaciones entre civiles y militares suelen ser más frecuentes en operaciones de paz que en otras misiones militares. Por eso, la hipótesis generalmente asumida es que la participación en ellas tuviera un efecto en las fuerzas armadas (CURRAN, 2017).

En términos metodológicos, el caso de Chile es un caso permisivo, en el sentido de que las operaciones de paz se convirtieron en un tema político relevante como consecuencia del proceso de democratización. En el contexto de la reforma militar que se dio sucesivamente, esperaríamos que las condiciones para el aprendizaje basado en las operaciones de paz como una misión nueva fueran favorables, convirtiéndolo en un caso útil para explorar el contexto específico de posibles renovaciones, tal como en el área de la interacción civil-militar.

Para evaluar los efectos de la participación en operaciones de paz, se utiliza un marco de análisis de aprendizaje organizacional que privilegia el aprendizaje a través de la práctica. Según este, para que las experiencias individuales se conviertan en lecciones para la institución militar en su conjunto, deben constituir una masa crítica o deben difundirse a través de canales formales y/o informales en toda la institución. Para examinar si tales procesos han estado operando en las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas, la metodología combina un análisis histórico-institucionalista del marco en el que ocurren las experiencias en operaciones de paz, junto con la evidencia de diversos métodos participativos. Estos fueron casi exclusivamente dirigidos a miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas, dado que los diferentes mecanismos de aprendizaje son propios a la institución militar. Los métodos participativos fueron implementados en 2018 y comprendieron cinco grupos focales, más de 40 entrevistas y una encuesta digital. La mayoría de los entrevistados fue personal acti-

vo de las Fuerzas Armadas con experiencia en al menos una operación de paz. Además, se entrevistó a un pequeño número de civiles y militares en retiro que ocuparon posiciones en el aparato estatal que influyen sobre las posibilidades de aprendizaje con respecto a las relaciones entre civiles y militares. El estudio recibió la aprobación de la Comisión de Ética de la institución patrocinante.

Las conclusiones con respecto al aprendizaje son variadas. A nivel individual, el personal desplegado en las operaciones de paz adquirió nuevos conocimientos sobre cómo relacionarse y cooperar con actores civiles, dependiendo de sus respectivas tareas. Sin embargo, debido al hecho de que hay pocos mecanismos a través de los cuales se transmite este conocimiento, las lecciones aprendidas han tenido un carácter trascendental limitado. Por lo tanto, no se puede evidenciar que las operaciones de paz hayan producido nuevos conocimientos institucionalizados en el área de interacción civil-militar en las tres ramas de las Fuerzas Armadas. Las instituciones militares mantienen una autopercepción como garantes de la seguridad nacional donde los actores civiles definen su mandato, pero no constituyen una parte integral del éxito de su misión. Por lo tanto, la visión que sigue primando es una que separa el papel de las fuerzas armadas en sus distintas funciones del papel de los actores civiles, en lugar de apreciar a ambos como parte de la misma misión.

La pregunta sobre los potenciales aprendizajes en operaciones de paz es relevante para el rol y desempeño de las fuerzas armadas generalmente. La capacidad de lograr una buena interacción entre civiles y militares ha sido destacada en el contexto de las operaciones de paz ya que se considera necesaria para la efectividad operativa militar (DE CONING, 2016, p. 14). Además de las operaciones de paz, la cooperación civil-militar también ha ganado importancia en el contexto de otras misiones militares distintas a la guerra (MOOTW, por sus siglas en inglés), como la contrainsurgencia y varias misiones internas, incluidos los desastres naturales y el desarrollo comunitario. Algunas de estas misiones subsidiarias internas tienen una larga tradición en América Latina, donde los militares han intervenido para compensar la falta de instituciones estatales. Asimismo, muchos países de la región han ampliado el papel interno de los militares en la última década, ya sea por el aumento de la inseguridad pública en los países andinos y en México, por la ideología política como en Venezuela, o por la percepción del riesgo cada vez menor de desobediencia militar que llevó a los políticos a asignar tareas de seguridad interna a las fuerzas armadas que, de lo contrario, no se cumplirían satisfactoriamente. Por lo tanto, es relevante preguntar si los militares cambiaron su actitud y mejoraron su capacidad para interactuar con actores civiles a través de su participación en las operaciones de paz. Sin duda, el éxito de las relaciones entre civiles y militares depende tanto de los militares, como de los actores civiles. Este artículo se limita a solo un lado de la relación, sin embargo, se ofrecen algunas reflexiones sobre la parte civil en las conclusiones. La siguiente sección describe los desafíos de las relaciones civil-militares, antes de presentar el marco teórico de aprendizaje organizacional y la metodología.

Discusión teórica: los desafíos en el relacionamiento entre civiles y militares

En general, se supone que las operaciones de paz introducen un elemento civil en la cultura militar, ya sea debido a la naturaleza de las tareas civiles y policiales asociadas con las operaciones contemporáneas de mantenimiento de la paz (MOSKOS; WILLIAMS; SEGAL, 2000, p. 2), o porque se requiere que las fuerzas armadas trabajen de la mano con actores civiles. Estas experiencias representan una oportunidad para aumentar la capacidad de los militares para trabajar en forma cooperativa, si no integrada, con actores civiles basado en el conocimiento y el respeto mutuo. Tales aprendizajes beneficiarían una gama de tareas internas de las fuerzas armadas, especialmente en ayuda humanitaria y ayuda en desastres.

Las operaciones de paz institucionalizan la relación entre militares y actores civiles. En este contexto, los actores civiles son: el liderazgo civil de la misión, otras agencias civiles como UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), ONGs internacionales, organizaciones de la sociedad civil y la población local. Las diferencias básicas entre las culturas organizativas civiles y militares son ampliamente documentadas en la literatura relevante (FRANKE, 2006; FRERKS *et al.*, 2006, p. 35; WINSLOW, 2002). En términos operacionales, las agencias civiles están organizadas horizontalmente y tienen mayor flexibilidad que la institución militar, que se estructura verticalmente. Las relaciones jerárquicas en las fuerzas armadas no solo estandarizan la velocidad y la ejecución de los procedimientos operativos, sino que también crean un entorno de comunicaciones diferente.

Los actores civiles y militares también tienden a tener objetivos distintos incluso bajo el mismo mandato de la misión. Generalmente, los actores civiles permanecen en la misión para periodos más largos, lo que les brinda la posibilidad de desarrollar estrategias a más largo plazo y una mayor flexibilidad para alcanzar sus objetivos. Los militares, por otro lado, exhiben una actitud más ejecutiva para maximizar su impacto en un período de despliegue de un solo año o incluso seis meses, como fue el caso de los contingentes chilenos en Haití. Varios efectivos que habían participado en operaciones de paz expresaron que los distintos enfoques pueden generar irritación e incluso depreciación. Como explicó un piloto de la fuerza aérea, “muchos empleados civiles de Naciones Unidas no están necesariamente interesados en mejorar la situación, sino que quieren mantener su trabajo. Terminan su día de acuerdo con la hora de trabajo y no cuando la tarea está terminada” (Oficial FACH, 2018, entrevista).

Por último, las interacciones entre civiles y militares se definen por el hecho de que los militares confían en el poder coercitivo para llevar a cabo su mandato tradicional de ganar guerras. En consecuencia, el entrenamiento militar ha puesto poco énfasis en las habilidades de “contacto” que generalmente se valoran en las organizaciones civiles y que son necesarias al tratar con civiles (DIEHL, 2008, p. 212). Estas incluyen habilidades interpersonales e intergrupales, en particular comunicación y negociación. Aunque generalmente son consideradas habilidades de sentido común, incluso por muchos de los entrevistados para este estudio, están lejos de ser evidentes y requieren concientización y capacitación.

Un marco teórico para el aprendizaje organizacional

El marco aplicado para examinar el aprendizaje dentro de la organización militar combina dos enfoques de aprendizaje, el enfoque en el comportamiento y el enfoque cognitivo. Mientras que el enfoque conductual se centra en el cambio en los procedimientos, la doctrina y las instituciones, la visión cognitiva ve el aprendizaje “como cambios sistemáticos en los modelos mentales compartidos y las cogniciones de los miembros de la organización” (HOLAN; PHILLIPS, 2004, p. 1604). Los dos enfoques son combatibles dado que ambos asignan un papel central a la transformación del conocimiento en el proceso de aprendizaje. Sobre la base de Haas (1990, p. 23), para el propósito de este estudio, el aprendizaje organizacional se puede definir como “un proceso mediante el cual el conocimiento consensual se utiliza para especificar las relaciones causales de nuevas maneras, a modo que el resultado afecte” a la percepción de los militares sobre sus propias funciones vis-a-vis los actores civiles.

Las organizaciones están formadas por individuos, que se encuentran al comienzo de un proceso de tres pasos de aprendizaje organizacional, los que son observables. En el primer paso, el individuo externaliza nuevos conocimientos. Para que ocurra el aprendizaje organizativo, en un segundo paso este conocimiento es confirmado por una coalición dominante dentro de la organización (RIETJENS, 2016), que puede ser una masa crítica o una coalición de líderes. Finalmente, el conocimiento se devuelve del nivel agregado al nivel individual, por ejemplo, mediante la instrucción o la enseñanza. Producto de esta retroalimentación, el individuo internaliza el nuevo conocimiento como parte de un conjunto más amplio de significados sobre las funciones de las fuerzas armadas.

¿Cómo obtienen los individuos y las coaliciones dominantes nuevos conocimientos? Entre las diferentes formas de aprendizaje, este artículo se centra en la experiencia práctica. Eso se justifica en base de los análisis existentes. Los estudios de gestión muestran que la competencia en el trabajo proviene principalmente de la experiencia (70%), y de partes relativamente más pequeñas de las relaciones con compañeros, gerentes y mentores (20%) y del aprendizaje formal (10%) (THYNNE; CHERNE, 2016, p. 69). La importancia del aprendizaje a través de la práctica se ha demostrado también con respecto a las instituciones militares (MOSKOS, 1976, p. 96–97; O’TOOLE; TALBOT, 2011, p. 51–52). Para que las experiencias individuales se plasmen a nivel institucional, es necesario considerar tanto los canales formales como los informales. Si la experiencia se transmite solo a través de canales informales, es posible que no lleguen a difundir nuevos conocimientos a toda la organización (CATIGNANI, 2014). No obstante, bajo ciertas condiciones, el uso de mecanismos de aprendizaje formal implica costos de reputación que pueden desalentar la notificación de problemas que desencadenaron nuevos conocimientos (HARDT, 2017). Por lo tanto, se prestará atención tanto a los canales formales como a los canales informales a través de los cuales se pueden transmitir nuevos conocimientos adquiridos mediante la práctica.

Metodología

El caso: las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas en operaciones de paz

El estudio se basa en un caso único, cuyas conclusiones no pueden ser generalizadas sin comprobar si las condiciones relevantes son similares en otros casos. Como se demostrará más adelante, el caso chileno es un caso permisivo que representa condiciones generalmente favorables para el aprendizaje. En este sentido, y considerando la escasa evidencia empírica sobre la pregunta a responder, es un caso útil para explorar bajo qué condiciones la participación en operaciones de paz aumenta la capacidad militar de interactuar con civiles. Si los resultados de aprendizaje no se dan en un caso permisivo, es más difícil aún que se produzcan en otros casos con condiciones menos favorables.

La trayectoria de Chile en las operaciones de paz refleja en gran medida el patrón global. Durante la Guerra Fría, las operaciones de paz fueron limitadas en número y alcance (véase BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2010, p. 83–91). Estas operaciones de primera generación se restringían generalmente a la verificación y supervisión de los acuerdos de paz entre los estados, con contribuciones modestas de los países en desarrollo, incluido Chile. Esto comenzó a cambiar después del año 1990, cuando las operaciones de paz experimentaron cambios cualitativos y cuantitativos. El sur global empezó a contribuir una proporción de personal uniformado cada vez mayor a las operaciones de paz, que ahora eran típicamente de naturaleza multidimensional y comprendían actividades de reconstrucción post-conflicto y de construcción del Estado. Además de los pocos observadores que Chile había proporcionado de manera continua desde 1949, en 1991-1992, el país envió su primera unidad de helicópteros a la Misión de Observación de las Naciones Unidas en Irak-Kuwait (UNIKOM). Un año más tarde, la Armada participó con 53 infantes de marina, observadores y una unidad de fuerzas especiales en la Autoridad de Transición de las Naciones Unidas en Camboya (UNTAC). En este momento, las operaciones de paz eran más una política sectorial impulsada por las Fuerzas Armadas que una política de estado integral. Sin embargo, las bases para la participación se empezaron a desarrollar gradualmente, tanto en el marco legal como práctico, creando así las condiciones para recoger las experiencias de operaciones de paz de forma sistemática para transformarlas en aprendizajes. En 2002, el Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC) comenzó a impartir sus primeros cursos preparando a futuros cascos azules.

En los años 1990, las contribuciones chilenas a operaciones de paz fueron aún limitadas, con no más de unas pocas docenas de efectivos desplegados. El patrón cambió en 2004, cuando el Consejo de Seguridad de la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU) autorizó una Fuerza Interina Multinacional en Haití (MIFH) y, tres meses después, la Misión de Estabilización de la ONU (MINUSTAH). Chile, que integró la MIFH junto con los Estados Unidos, Canadá y Francia, fue el único país cuyos cerca de 350 desplegados se quedaron para participar en MINUSTAH. En esta última Chile

tenía un batallón mixto con infantería mecanizada del Ejército e infantería naval, una compañía de ingenieros del Ejército, un grupo de helicópteros, seis oficiales de personal en la sede de la misión y unos 40 policías. En su punto máximo, el contingente chileno ascendió a más de 500 personas. Cuando la misión terminó en octubre de 2017, habían participado cerca de 12,000 chilenos. Sin embargo, desde entonces la presencia del país en las operaciones de paz se ha reducido a menos de 50 expertos en misión, tropas individuales y policías en diferentes operaciones en todo el mundo.

Condiciones de fondo para el aprendizaje: intereses y motivaciones

El aprendizaje está inherentemente conectado al interés; cuanto más fuertes son los incentivos externos y las motivaciones intrínsecas, más probable es que el aprendizaje tenga lugar (CERASOLI; NICKLIN; FORD, 2014). Aunque esta investigación no puede vincular de manera concluyente el interés del individuo a sus experiencias de aprendizaje, se ofrece una reflexión general sobre los posibles factores motivadores del personal chileno en operaciones de paz, específicamente en MINUSTAH. La evaluación de las condiciones de fondo indica que no hubo ningún obstáculo obvio para que se produjera la transformación del conocimiento nuevo obtenido en operaciones de paz. Generalmente, las condiciones fueron favorables para que se dieran aprendizajes en base de la participación en el mantenimiento de la paz.

Los cascos azules chilenos fueron generalmente recibidos positivamente por las poblaciones locales. En el caso de MINUSTAH, eso se debió en gran parte a que operaban en áreas relativamente tranquilas, distinto a los contingentes brasileños, por ejemplo, que fueron destinados a pacificar la capital donde enfrentaron a bandas criminales. Solo en algunas, pocas excepciones el contingente chileno en Haití fue atacado directa o indirectamente (CHIBAT, 2017, p. 50–51). Los participantes informaron pocas demostraciones de hostilidad y en su lugar sintieron que el uniforme con la bandera chilena les trajo simpatías (Participante Grupo Focal 3). La actitud acogedora e incluso agradecida del país receptor de la misión es importante para que los cascos azules sientan que tienen un impacto. Es altamente probable que eso mejore su valoración de la misión, creando así condiciones más favorables al aprendizaje que si la misión es poco valorada.

Además, la situación de las fuerzas armadas en general hizo que el aprendizaje fuera más probable. En parte dado su aislamiento durante la dictadura, para la mayoría del personal el despliegue fue su primera experiencia extendida en el extranjero y, como tal, muchos la describieron como un momento decisivo. Un participante de un grupo focal se refirió a la MINUSTAH como “la experiencia más linda de mi vida,” y nadie en el grupo discrepó (Participante Grupo Focal 1, 2018). Un alto oficial en retiro, después de una exitosa carrera en el Ejército, describió su designación como observador militar en India-Pakistán como “la experiencia más importante de mi vida” (Arancibia, 2018, entrevista). Profesionalmente, los cascos azules valoraron la experiencia de servir en una misión real y, por ende, puede suponerse que al menos estaban abiertos a la posibilidad de aprender de las nuevas experiencias.

Otro incentivo para el aprendizaje son los recursos: la remuneración y el equipamiento. El estado chileno otorga un reconocimiento institucional del desempeño de los cascos azules a través de pagos comparablemente altos. Al ser desplegados, los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas pueden obtener hasta el triple de su sueldo habitual.² A modo de ejemplo, un teniente en la misión en Chipre recibió casi US\$ 5.500 mensuales en 2018,³ cuando el ingreso promedio mensual de la población trabajadora en Chile es inferior a US\$ 1,000 (INE, 2019). Es probable que esta forma de reconocimiento refuerce la moral de los efectivos, lo que debería aumentar su disposición a aprender.

Por otro lado, los recursos son importantes con respecto a las condiciones en que se despliegan los cascos azules. Disponer de equipamiento adecuado es relevante para mantener la moral de los militares (véase por ejemplo GAUB, 2013), y Chile estaba bien preparado en este aspecto. Como relató Mariano Fernández (2018, entrevista), quien se desempeñó como Jefe de la MINUSTAH entre 2011 y 2013: “La contribución de Chile fue muy valorada debido a su disposición en todo momento, a diferencia de otros contingentes que por problemas materiales no podían hacer muchas cosas”.

Además del equipamiento, el personal chileno contaba con condiciones de vida aceptables, si no cómodas. En MINUSTAH, el estado chileno pagaba rotaciones de tropas cada seis meses, mientras que el periodo habitual de la rotación que financia la ONU es de un año. Aunque las condiciones para los primeros contingentes eran aún deficientes, estas mejoraron rápidamente según lo dicho por un cabo que desplegó en 2014-2015: “Sabía que estaba fuera de Chile solo porque no estaba con mi familia, pero el resto lo tenía. Todas las regalías que uno tiene en Chile también las tuve ahí” (Participante Grupo Focal 1).

En conjunto, el respaldo generalmente positivo que el personal de las operaciones de paz chileno recibió por sus servicios tanto a nivel interno como externo, muy probablemente reforzó la apertura hacia nuevas experiencias y, por lo tanto, creó condiciones favorables para el aprendizaje.

Métodos

La metodología empleada combina un análisis histórico-institucional del marco en el que ocurren las experiencias en operaciones de paz, junto con la evidencia de distintos métodos participativos con miembros del sector de seguridad y defensa de Chile. Estos comprendieron cinco grupos focales con miembros de las fuerzas armadas que participaron en al menos una operación de paz; una encuesta digital, a la cual respondieron 505 miembros de las fuerzas armadas con y sin experiencia en operaciones de paz, y más de 40 entrevistas con militares, activos y en retiro, además de civiles con experiencia en el ámbito de operaciones de paz, como por ejemplo instructores de pre-despliegue y personal del Ministerio de Defensa. El enfoque en los actores militares se justifica por el hecho de que los mecanismos de aprendizaje son propios a la institución militar. El estudio fue autorizado por la Subsecretaría de Defensa y el Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO).

Tabla 1 en el Anexo detalla el número de participantes en cada instrumento según institución y rango. Los datos demuestran la dominancia del Ejército en la muestra, seguido por la Armada, específicamente la Infantería

2. Para el caso de MINUSTAH véase KAUER TAPIA, 2006, p. 127 citando DFL-1 (1999), Ley de presupuesto sector Público No 19.915 (2003) y Ley No 18.948 Orgánica Constitucional de las Fuerzas Armadas; SOTOMAYOR, 2004, p. 296.

3. Información obtenida con el Comando de la Armada, 31. 7. 2018.

de Marina que participó en el batallón mixto de Chile en MINUSTAH. Con un número de participantes muy reducido, para el caso de la Fuerza Aérea (FACH) las conclusiones que se derivan del estudio deben de leerse con cuidado. No obstante, si ya en los casos del Ejército y de la Armada los aprendizajes individuales no llegaron a traducirse en nuevos conocimientos institucionales, es altamente probable que eso tampoco ocurrió en la FACH dado que su participación en operaciones de paz ha sido relativamente menor.

Aprendiendo de operaciones de paz.....

En base de las entrevistas y grupos focales realizados para esta investigación, las experiencias de aprendizaje individuales en relación con los actores civiles en operaciones de paz se pueden dividir en dos tipos que serán analizados consecutivamente. El primero es un cambio en la percepción a modo que los civiles dejen de ser una variable que influye en el teatro de operaciones, y se conviertan en el centro de atención en las misiones militares. El segundo conjunto de experiencias de aprendizaje se relaciona con la interacción de los militares con los distintos actores civiles.

Civiles como parte integral de la misión militar

En 2017, el Ejército chileno adoptó la doctrina de Asuntos Civiles y Administración Territorial (ACAT). Según un oficial que participó en el proceso de cinco años para desarrollar el marco regulatorio, a través de ACAT “los diferentes actores y la población civil en general adquieren un papel central, por lo tanto, la relación con los civiles es esencial para que la fuerza desplegada pueda cumplir la misión y alcanzar el objetivo final deseado” (Oficial Ejército I, 2018, entrevista). En línea con la nueva doctrina, poner a los civiles en un rol protagónico fue una de las experiencias de aprendizaje que el personal desplegado en diferentes puestos en operaciones de paz informo. La novedad no fue, como se podría pensar, que los militares se preocuparan por los civiles; de hecho, un número significativo de los cascos azules que participaron en este estudio lamentó que podrían haber hecho más en términos de ayuda humanitaria. En cambio, las lecciones aprendidas fueron que a los civiles se les asignó un lugar central dentro del marco de la misión militar, precisamente la base necesaria para una relación integrada o al menos cooperativa, que es la relación deseada en las operaciones de paz, gestión de riesgo en desastres, y otras.

Los militares chilenos sostuvieron ideas sobre su función en las operaciones de paz y el papel de los civiles en ellas que cambiaron a través de su experiencia en terreno. Un general del Ejército quien se desempeñó como Comandante Adjunto y durante un periodo como Comandante de la Fuerza multinacional de la MINUSTAH, tenía la percepción antes de la asignación que “los procedimientos utilizados en las operaciones de paz, podrían no ser útiles para el entrenamiento militar convencional” (Peña, 2018, entrevista). No fue la experiencia internacional en sí misma lo que lo hizo cambiar de opinión –había estudiado años atrás en los Estados Unidos–, sino su servicio en la misión que acercó las operaciones de paz a lo que él sentía era la esencia de las fuerzas armadas:

Me pude percatar de que uno, como militar, puede hacer mucho en operaciones de paz empleando los medios y las capacidades de los militares como, por ejemplo, el entrenamiento de nuestros ingenieros del Ejército en un país como Haití donde la infraestructura vial es deficiente. Los procedimientos de empleo, también apuntaban a mejorar un entrenamiento convencional de las tropas por el detalle de su instrucción y la mantención de un alto grado de alistamiento. En definitiva, al emplear estas capacidades, se beneficia el país y uno mismo, por la experiencia de ayudar, sentirse útil y enfrentar situaciones complejas en condiciones reales (Peña, 2018, entrevista).

Los integrantes de la Compañía Chileno-Ecuatoriana de Ingenieros del Ejército para la Construcción Horizontal (CHIECUENGCOY) también llegaron a tener nuevas percepciones sobre el papel de los militares en las operaciones de paz y su relación con los civiles. Como informaron participantes de un grupo focal, se habían marchado de Chile “pensando que íbamos a ayudar a los haitianos, pero en realidad estábamos allí para apoyar el componente militar de la misión” (Participante Grupo Focal 1). La necesidad de MINUSTAH de confiar en sus recursos centró la atención de CHIECUENGCOY en los civiles y su entorno, aunque de una forma diferente a la que habían pensado. Los efectivos se desplegaron en Haití, no como trabajadores humanitarios o de desarrollo, sino como una ayuda directa para facilitar las tareas humanitarias a través de sus funciones militares, lo que les permitió traer a los civiles al centro de su atención y ampliar su propia percepción de los roles militares.

Con los civiles en condiciones difíciles de ignorar, la actitud de que los militares podrían “hacer algo” en el marco de su propia misión, es decir, ir más allá de la mera coexistencia con actores civiles, no fue un hecho dado sino se desarrolló a través de la experiencia en la misión (CARRASCO GONZÁLEZ, 2005, p. 136). Esto se refleja también en que el concepto de CIMIC⁴ era básicamente desconocido en el Ejército chileno al menos hasta en los primeros años de la MINUSTAH. CIMIC, que hace hincapié en la integración de tareas civiles para alcanzar el objetivo de las fuerzas de seguridad, es hoy en día un término comúnmente referido dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas.

Para los fines de este estudio, la relevancia de CIMIC radica en el enfoque del concepto en los civiles desde una perspectiva militar. Tradicionalmente, CIMIC tiene funciones tanto humanitarias como de apoyo a la guerra, aunque en términos prácticos está orientado a reducir la interferencia civil en los objetivos militares. Al menos en cierta medida, esta visión se ha incorporado gradualmente a las percepciones de roles de los participantes en las operaciones de paz.

Los primeros oficiales del estado mayor designados para CIMIC (U-9) tuvieron que “buscar en google qué era CIMIC” (Atán, 2018, entrevista; Serrano, 2018, entrevista). La compañía CHIECUENGCOY inicialmente ni siquiera implementó las actividades CIMIC a través del oficial U-9, aludiendo a la falta de personal adecuadamente capacitado (DIVISIÓN DOCTRINA, 2016, p. 109). La mayoría consideró que CIMIC era una acción humanitaria de segundo orden más bien ajena a la misión militar. Esta idea comenzó a cambiar a medida que los contingentes en Haití implementaban actividades CIMIC y una cantidad considerable de personal fue expuesto a los cursos de CIMIC durante la preparación de

4. En el marco de Naciones Unidas, CIMIC es sinónimo de *coordinación civil-militar*, mientras que CIMIC en las doctrinas de la OTAN (Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte), la Unión Europea y Estados Unidos significa *cooperación civil-militar*.

pre-despliegue. “El batallón pensó que yo era una ONG uniformada”, recordó uno de los primeros oficiales CIMIC en MINUSTAH. Sin embargo, hacia el final de su turno, tuvo la impresión de que ya no pensaban que él “estaba inventando actividades de ayuda humanitaria y divirtiéndose mientras ellos patrullaban” (Serrano, 2018, entrevista).

Aquí, el efecto de aprendizaje radica precisamente en el énfasis en los civiles dentro, más que afuera de la misión militar. La misma experiencia de aprendizaje se refleja en el informe final de CHIECUENGOY, que concluyó que las actividades CIMIC habían llevado al “desarrollo personal y profesional” de la unidad” (DIVISIÓN DOCTRINA, 2016, p. 123).

Las actividades CIMIC no fueron la única forma que provocó cambios en las percepciones del rol militar frente a los civiles. Un infante de marina que trabajó en una unidad de reconocimiento en Haití describió cómo llegó a “ver a la población civil no al final de una cadena de actuar, sino como enfoque principal. Empiezas a preguntarte: ¿quién es este actor? Comienzas a tener interés por la gente y sus preocupaciones” (Atán, 2018, entrevista). De manera similar, un oficial del Ejército se refirió a las relaciones entre civiles y militares como la experiencia de aprendizaje más importante de lo que había experimentado en operaciones de paz en Bosnia y República Centroafricana: “Lo que funcionaba bien en Bosnia es un gran desafío aquí [en la República Centroafricana]; hay que generar confianza para que la población local converse con la misión, hay que tramitar el mensaje ‘ayúdenos para que te podemos ayudar, la misión depende de ti’” (McCarthy, 2018, entrevista). Común a ambos casos es que los civiles son reconocidos como centrales para la misión militar. Si bien de esto no se desprende automáticamente un compromiso cualitativamente mejor con las agencias civiles o la población en general, es la condición previa necesaria para el éxito de las relaciones civil-militares.

La creciente participación de Chile en las operaciones de paz, sobre todo su participación en Haití, ocurrió paralelamente a reformas en las Fuerzas Armadas que condujeron a mayor regulación y formalización. La modernización afectó a todas las áreas, incluida la relación de los militares con civiles dentro del país, como por ejemplo a través de la adopción de doctrinas sobre las Reglas para el Uso de la Fuerza (RUF). Si la experiencia de participar en operaciones de paz afectó la incorporación de los nuevos marcos regulatorios, es probable que fuera reforzada por el hábito de los cascos azules de seguir las reglas escritas de Naciones Unidas, que la mayoría de los participantes en este estudio percibían como “minuciosos” y “estrictos”. Si bien podría debatirse si los nuevos conocimientos adquiridos se transfieren de un despliegue internacional al contexto nacional 1:1, al menos, la exposición a las regulaciones de Naciones Unidas en las operaciones de paz aumentó la conciencia de los militares respecto a los civiles en el contexto de su misión.

En conjunto, la evidencia presentada en esta sección muestra que la participación en operaciones de paz ha llevado a aprendizajes individuales en lo que concierne a la importancia de integrar a los civiles como parte de las misiones militares. A continuación, se examina cómo y si es que las experiencias de las operaciones de paz afectaron la forma en que los militares se relacionaban con las poblaciones civiles, agencias civiles y ONGs, respectivamente.

Modo de interacción con la población civil

En las operaciones de paz y especialmente en las llamadas misiones multidimensionales, los militares cumplen tareas -involucrando a poblaciones civiles- que habitualmente no realizan en su país de origen. En el caso de Chile, estas fueron la realización de *check points* y la interacción con detenidos, entre otros. Dado que no son rutinarias y considerando que las operaciones de paz desempeñan solo un papel secundario para las Fuerzas Armadas, estas tareas reciben poca o ninguna atención en los programas de entrenamiento y educación militar. Sí existe hoy día una capacitación previa al despliegue para el futuro personal de operaciones de paz, y hay evidencia de que un proceso de aprendizaje mediante la práctica mejoró la capacidad de los cascos azules para relacionarse con la población civil.

La falta de preparación y la reticencia que esto causó fue descrita por un suboficial que participó en la misión de la ONU en Camboya, una de las primeras misiones donde Chile había desplegado tropas:

En Chile, nos dijeron que esa era una misión donde hay selva y guerrilla, y dijimos 'qué bueno, vamos'. Cuando llegamos y nos dijeron que teníamos que trabajar con la población no nos gustaba, queríamos ir a patrullar la selva, para eso estábamos entrenados (Suboficial, 2018, entrevista).

Las expectativas no satisfechas causaron una actitud negativa hacia la misión, pero los desafíos de la tarea eventualmente estimularon un proceso de aprendizaje "a golpes":

Al principio cuando nos tocó entrar en una villa entramos demasiado como militares, muy duro y gritando órdenes. Esto causó muchos problemas, así aprendimos que lo teníamos que hacer de otra forma. Luego entramos con una bolsa de dulces para los niños, conversando con la gente (Suboficial, 2018, entrevista).

Común a las lecciones aprendidas en relación con los civiles es la idea de que la proximidad con la población no afecta negativamente a la autoridad del militar, sino que incluso puede beneficiarla. Un oficial explicó que su experiencia en MINUSTAH tuvo el efecto de que en un segundo despliegue como observador militar:

Mi aproximación con la gente fue distinta. Sin mi experiencia previa en mantenimiento de la paz, habría seguido las reglas más estrictamente. No es que haya actuado en contra de las reglas, sino que las reglas no dicen nada sobre las oportunidades situacionales que pueden ser beneficiosas, como entrar en contacto con las personas, bajarse del vehículo y tomarse un café con ellos (Serrano, 2018, entrevista).

Existe evidencia de que las experiencias obtenidas en misión viajaron al contexto nacional. Un oficial a cargo de cuatro batallones desplegados en la ciudad de Concepción para responder a la emergencia del severo terremoto que azotó a Chile en 2010 encontró que:

Uno se dio cuenta claramente quién había estado en Haití y quién no. Los que tenían experiencia de MINUSTAH eran más eficientes en su trabajo, tenían un balance entre autoridad y respeto. Los que no tienen experiencia pueden o aplicar demasiada fuerza, o carecer de autoridad (Atán, 2018, entrevista).

Es necesario tener en cuenta que el diseño de esta investigación no capta las experiencias negativas en las relaciones civil-militar ni tampoco las experiencias de aprendizaje perdidas. Lo que mostró esta sección es que el mantenimiento de la paz efectivamente *puede* mejorar la capacidad de los militares para relacionarse con las poblaciones civiles.

Modo de interacción con ONGs y otras instituciones civiles

Las relaciones con los actores civiles en las operaciones de paz son en su mayoría relevantes para los puestos de mayor rango y, en cierta medida, para comandantes y oficiales del estado mayor. Chile ha ocupado pocos puestos de liderazgo en las misiones de la ONU, con la excepción de MINUSTAH, donde cinco militares chilenos ocuparon el puesto de Comandante Adjunto de la Fuerza. Para estos y para otros participantes en la misión, la relación de trabajo menos conocida fue la interacción con ONGs internacionales, algunas de las cuales son conocidas por una actitud más bien distante hacia los militares (BYMAN, 2001, p. 103–104). Sin embargo, en parte debido al cuidadoso proceso de selección de los Comandantes Adjuntos, estos encontraron generalmente pocos problemas e informaron que fueron “buscando formas de actuar que minimizaran inconvenientes y asegurando que ambos lados pudiésemos cumplir con los respectivos roles” (Toro, 2018, entrevista).

Ricardo Toro (2018, entrevista), quien se desempeñaba como Comandante Adjunto cuando ocurrió el devastador terremoto de 2010, informó que su experiencia en MINUSTAH le sirvió más tarde cuando fue nombrado Director Nacional de la Oficina Nacional de Emergencia del Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública (ONEMI):

Reconocí la importancia de coordinar en la fase de prevención el cómo buscar potenciar las capacidades entendiendo los objetivos de cada uno [civiles y militares], con el objeto que cuando ocurra una emergencia se tenga claro la forma de actuar y las restricciones por ambos lados que ello conlleva. Ahora me adelanto a los probables escenarios que pudiesen ocurrir.

Sin embargo, según el propio Toro, en su postura sobre las relaciones entre civiles y militares si bien fue importante su experiencia en Haití, ello se complementó con el haber realizado un programa de maestría en recursos humanos en una institución civil años antes:

En un momento de mi vida militar me di cuenta que era muy ‘milico’. Además de prepararme para la guerra, necesitaba obtener otras capacidades que me permitieran relacionarme más directamente con el mundo civil (autoridades, voluntariado, etc.).

Esta y otras habilidades similares fueron resaltadas también por un oficial que sirvió como comandante de contingente en MINUSTAH. Después de su regreso, supo “cómo establecer una relación con las autoridades civiles porque allí [en Haití], para cumplir la misión, tenía que interactuar con el municipio, el alcalde, el hospital, etc.” (Urzúa, 2018, entrevista). Si bien en este caso la necesidad parece haber desempeñado un papel, hay otros ejemplos en los que el personal de las operaciones de paz simplemente se dio cuenta de los beneficios de cooperar con actores civiles. Uno de los oficiales CIMIC en MINUSTAH recordó reuniones semanales con representantes de distintas agencias humanitarias en el área de responsabilidad del contingente. “En lugar de ir y reclamar un asiento en frente de la mesa, nosotros [los militares] nos sentamos atrás como si fuéramos simplemente otra parte invitada”, explicó (Serrano, 2018, entrevista). Según su juicio, poner a los militares a cargo de la reunión se ha-

bría encontrado con resistencia, y habría impedido el intercambio abierto de “información a menudo útil”.

Para que las distintas experiencias individuales de aprendizaje descritas se difundan, el vínculo con el nivel institucional como conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas es crucial. La siguiente sección discute los límites de los mecanismos de aprendizaje formales e informales.

Del aprendizaje individual al organizacional: los límites de los mecanismos de aprendizaje

Desde la publicación del llamado informe Brahimi en 2000 (UN, 2000), la ONU ha puesto énfasis en las relaciones entre los actores civiles y el componente militar en las operaciones de paz. En el contexto chileno, este aspecto se trata durante la preparación de pre-despliegue en CECOPAC, certificado por la ONU.

Como punto de contacto entre el personal de operaciones de paz pasado y futuro, CECOPAC ha demostrado flexibilidad para adaptarse a los requerimientos específicos de las distintas misiones. Después de la experiencia de los primeros contingentes en Haití, CECOPAC comenzó a introducir en sus cursos sesiones sobre negociación y mediación, así como el tratar con los medios de comunicación (DIVISIÓN DOCTRINA, 2016, p. 52). Sin embargo, dado que estos cursos son de corta duración, solo pueden proporcionar una introducción al tema. En una encuesta digital implementada en el marco de este estudio, la mayoría de los encuestados con experiencia en operaciones de paz (en total 251) reportó que la interacción con distintos actores civiles generalmente no implicó conflictos y que sus unidades fueron preparadas para llevar a cabo acciones CIMIC. Sin embargo, de un total de 449 militares (con y sin experiencia en operaciones de paz), un 94 por ciento se mostró de acuerdo con la afirmación que es necesario mejorar la interacción entre las fuerzas armadas y actores civiles en las misiones que requieren la participación de ambos.⁵

El tema de las relaciones civil-militares ha sido lento en encontrar el camino hacia el entrenamiento y la educación militar (Arancibia, 2018, entrevista). La reciente adopción de la doctrina ACAT descrita anteriormente es un paso en esta dirección, al igual que los ejercicios de simulación anuales VOLCANO practicados desde 2008 en el marco del Sistema Nacional para la Protección de los Civiles. Los ejercicios consisten en simulaciones de desastres nacionales y situaciones de emergencia que requieren que las autoridades civiles y militares cooperen en la toma de decisiones a nivel regional. No obstante, las relaciones entre civiles y militares no forman parte del plan de estudios en las escuelas militares de las tres ramas, excepto para el nivel de oficial superior.

A parte de la capacitación y la educación, los mecanismos de aprendizaje formales incluyen canales para elaborar lecciones aprendidas. Como autoridad coordinadora en el área del mantenimiento de la paz, el EMCO recibe los informes semanales y los informes de finalización de misión de todas las operaciones de paz. La Dirección de Operaciones y Conducta Estratégica del EMCO identifica los problemas planteados en

5. Las respuestas fueron: “muy de acuerdo”: 204, “de acuerdo”: 218, “en desacuerdo”: 21, “muy en desacuerdo”: 4, “no sé”: 2. La encuesta fue respondida digitalmente entre agosto y octubre del 2018.

los informes y, en caso que se trate de asuntos de equipamiento, capacitación o material, lo delega a la institución correspondiente. Sin embargo, dado la falta de un enfoque específico en la interacción civil-militar, no se ha realizado ningún esfuerzo sistemático para identificar las fortalezas y debilidades de los cascos azules chilenos en este ámbito.

Desde 2016, los informes proviniendo de las operaciones de paz se comparten de forma automática con las tres instituciones. Cada una tiene su propio centro de análisis, siendo el más importante en términos de tamaño y recursos, el de la División de Doctrina del Ejército. Creada en 2006, la División tiene una unidad de lecciones aprendidas que actualmente emplea a 16 personas quienes trabajan principalmente con los insumos proporcionados por personal del Ejército. En 2016, se modificaron los procedimientos de información, para evitar los riesgos de reputación para la futura carrera del informante. La unidad también envía sus propios analistas a eventos seleccionados y puede interactuar de forma proactiva con fuentes externas. A pesar de esto, es probable que no todos los problemas relacionados con los diferentes aspectos de las relaciones entre civiles y militares lleguen a la atención de la unidad de lecciones aprendidas. Los criterios para un buen estándar de interacción entre civiles y militares no están claramente definidos, y por eso son considerablemente más difíciles de evaluar que procesos logísticos o la adaptación de equipamiento en terreno, por ejemplo. Hasta el momento, no se ha propuesto ninguna modificación importante en el área de las relaciones civil-militares, aunque se optimizaron procesos y procedimientos asociados mayoritariamente al empleo de la fuerza en emergencias y catástrofes.⁶

Sin un enfoque específico en las relaciones civil-militares, los mecanismos formales para procesar las experiencias vividas tienen un uso limitado. Eso se refleja en el caso de varios oficiales que participaron en la misión de la Unión Europea en Bosnia, donde, según reportaron, fueron particularmente bien recibidos por la población (Oficial Ejército II, 2018, entrevista; Oficial Ejército III, 2018, entrevista). Los oficiales atribuyeron la facilidad de interactuar con la gente a una supuesta forma “latina” de acercarse a las personas, cuando la verdadera razón probablemente es que los chilenos hayan sido percibidos como neutrales en una misión donde la mayoría de los estados europeos contribuyentes tienen una posición clara en los conflictos de los Balcanes vinculada a sus intereses nacionales. En todo caso, sin un esfuerzo sistemático para evaluar tales experiencias, sus posibles efectos de aprendizaje se pierden.

El hecho de disponer de un número relativamente pequeño de canales formales para el aprendizaje no es necesariamente problemático si las experiencias se comparten a través de canales informales. Muchos de los entrevistados y entrevistadas informaron que tomaron contacto con la persona que anteriormente había ocupado el puesto que iban a asumir para recibir información en términos informales. Este contacto es relativamente fácil de establecer en fuerzas comparativamente pequeñas (las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas cuentan con menos de 65,000 efectivos), aunque, aparte de estos intercambios orientados a objetivos específicos, las formas institucionalizadas de intercambios informales parecen ser limitadas.

6. Información proporcionada por Guillermo Cruz Valdés, Jefe de Lecciones Aprendidas, División de Doctrina, 28. 2. 2019.

Cabe señalar que, salvo por la excepción de MINUSTAH con su participación masiva, los cascos azules chilenos generalmente han sido oficiales altamente capacitados con varios años de servicio, es decir, personas con un grado de autoridad para transmitir su experiencia dentro de la institución. Está fuera del alcance de este estudio evaluar en qué medida ellos han servido como multiplicadores de conocimiento en torno a las relaciones civil-militares a través de conversaciones personales o experiencias en el aula. Lo que sí es posible señalar en términos generales es una cultura organizacional que muestra “poca apertura a la autocrítica” (Fuentelba, 2018, entrevista). Eso se refleja por ejemplo en las relaciones conservador-jerárquicas dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas y en el carácter reservado de todo tipo de información, incluyendo a información que es de acceso público en otros países con un alto nivel de profesionalismo militar. La falta de autoridad del EMCO en relación con las instituciones individualmente refuerza la tendencia a evadir el escrutinio crítico, ya que cada una de las tres ramas busca evitar exponer deficiencias. Por ende, se llevó a cabo un único seminario conjunto sobre “Lecciones Aprendidas en Haití” después de que la misión hubiera terminado. En este encuentro cada fuerza resaltó cómo se resolvieron los problemas prácticos que surgieron en el proceso de administrar, por primera vez en su historia, un despliegue internacional de varias docenas hasta varios cientos de personas. Sin embargo, no se presentaron reflexiones más amplias sobre la preparación militar en relación con los requisitos de las operaciones de paz contemporáneas, incluido las relaciones civil-militares.

En conjunto, los mecanismos disponibles para la difusión de nuevos conocimientos sobre las relaciones entre civiles y militares parecen ser limitados. Esto sugiere que los efectos de aprendizaje individual descritos anteriormente mantenían su carácter de “conocimiento implícito” de la práctica en terreno, ya que su transmisión al nivel institucional no se produjo. Dado la falta de una retroalimentación positiva desde la institución, el tercer paso en el modelo de aprendizaje organizacional, es cuestionable también cuán persistente el aprendizaje individual será en el tiempo. A nivel doctrinal, las relaciones civil-militares han permanecido subordinadas al papel tradicional de los militares como combatientes donde los civiles son meramente una variable de entorno (véase también Jenne 2020). Al mismo tiempo, la expansión del rol militar a través de la participación en operaciones de paz no ha llevado a un cambio fundamental en la forma en que las fuerzas armadas como conjunto se perciben a sí mismos frente a los actores civiles. Eso contrasta con la imagen pública que se ha buscado crear de las operaciones de paz como misiones humanitarias. Para las fuerzas armadas, las nuevas tareas en operaciones de paz, en la forma en que se presentaron, se asimilaron fácilmente al marco conocido de la guerra donde los civiles no son centrales para la misión.

Conclusiones

La mayor capacidad para interactuar con actores civiles a menudo se incluye entre los beneficios ostensivos que obtienen las fuerzas armadas de la participación en operaciones de paz. Dentro de la misión

tradicional de guerra, las autoridades civiles, las agencias humanitarias y las poblaciones civiles han recibido poca o ninguna consideración. Sin embargo, a medida que se introdujeron cambios con respecto a los roles de las fuerzas armadas y los contextos en donde operan, la necesidad de una relación cooperativa o incluso integrada entre los actores militares y civiles ha tomado cada vez más importancia (véase las contribuciones en RIETJENS; BOLLEN, 2008). Este estudio se propuso evaluar empíricamente si el mantenimiento de la paz introduce cambios en las fuerzas armadas. Específicamente, se abordó la pregunta de cómo y si es que la participación en las operaciones de paz reformó a las fuerzas armadas chilenas con respecto a su interacción con actores civiles.

Las proposiciones que se deriven de un caso singular no son automáticamente aplicables a otros. Sin embargo, dado la escasa evidencia empírica sobre los aprendizajes a partir de la participación en operaciones de paz, en caso chileno entrega algunas primeras conclusiones generales y permite avanzar en una agenda de investigación sobre los posibles efectos transformadores derivados de las operaciones de paz. En primer lugar, se demostró que efectivamente las operaciones de paz pueden llevar a aprendizajes individuales en los efectivos desplegados. Sin embargo, en el caso chileno, los nuevos conocimientos no se tradujeron del nivel individual al nivel institucional, como ha sido el supuesto generalmente asumido. El proceso de aprendizaje organizacional ha sido incompleto dado la falta de difusión generalizada del nuevo conocimiento que haría posible la posterior retroalimentación desde la institución hacia los individuos, consolidando así los nuevos conocimientos. A nivel institucional, por ende, las operaciones de paz no dieron lugar a cambios fundamentales en las percepciones dominantes en las fuerzas armadas sobre las relaciones civil-militares. La consideración de si tal cambio es deseable no es parte de este trabajo, sino depende del rol que les adscribe el poder político a las fuerzas armadas. En este sentido, es oportuno recordar que las relaciones civil-militares dependen de partes iguales de la contraparte civil, que tiene la responsabilidad de definir los términos bajo los cuales se lleva a cabo el qué hacer de las fuerzas armadas.

Durante la última década, las operaciones de paz han ido perdiendo su posición como misión subsidiaria más importante de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas, en términos de legitimar su función y recursos. De hecho, el número de cascos azules chilenos ha disminuido dramáticamente desde que la MINUSTAH terminó a fines de 2017. Además de la defensa nacional, la misión militar más visible y prominente actualmente es la ayuda humanitaria y la asistencia en casos de desastre. Existen interesantes sinergias entre ambas misiones con respecto a la capacidad de los militares para interactuar con actores civiles. Sin embargo, si la ayuda humanitaria y asistencia en desastres se practica igual que las operaciones de paz, como otra forma de la misión tradicional, sin el énfasis necesario en desarrollar la capacidad para la cooperación civil-militar y las relaciones de trabajo integradas, los resultados de esta investigación indican que los efectos de aprendizajes en terreno podrían ser limitados.

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Anexo 1

Tabla 1 - Composición de participantes por institución y rango.

	Entrevistas	Grupos focales (5 en total)	Encuesta
Armada	6	14	147
Ejército	26	16	237
FACH	1	2	24
Civiles	13	1	-
No especificado	-	-	97
Total	46	32	505

Oficiales Generales	13	-	21
Oficiales Superiores	8	1	19
Oficiales Jefes	11	5	107
Oficiales Subalternos	1	5	32
Suboficiales Mayores	-	-	4
Suboficiales	-	6	49
Clases	-	15	161
Soldados de tropa profesional	-	-	14
No especificado	-	-	98

Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and multilateralism



Itália: uma potente potência média mediterrânea oscilando entre bilateralismo e multilateralismo

Italia: una aspirante a potencia media mediterránea oscilante entre bilateralismo y multilateralismo

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DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p47

Received in September 01, 2019
Accepted in December 16, 2019

ABSTRACT

Italy managed to be an important actor in European affairs, its status as middle power was several times called into question. Italy's domestic political instability, the frequent government crises, severe economic and financial problems hinder the country's goal to become a recognized middle power, especially in the Mediterranean region. Bilateral and multilateral tools are used alternately by government coalitions to carry out foreign policy which has been dominated by migration. Due to the afore-mentioned internal problems security and defence policy is not capable of supporting foreign policy to the necessary extent.

Keywords: Italy. Mediterranean. Middle power. Armed forces. Foreign policy.

RESUMO

A Itália conseguiu ser um ator importante nos assuntos europeus, seu status de potência média foi questionado várias vezes. A instabilidade política doméstica da Itália, as frequentes crises governamentais, os graves problemas econômicos e financeiros dificultam o objetivo do país de se tornar uma potência média reconhecida, especialmente na região do Mediterrâneo. Ferramentas bilaterais e multilaterais são usadas alternadamente por coalizões governamentais para levar a efeito a política externa que foi dominada pela migração. Devido aos problemas internos acima mencionados, a política de segurança e defesa não é capaz de apoiar a política externa na medida necessária.

Palavras chave: Itália. Região mediterrânea. Potência média. Forças armadas. Política externa

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RESUMEN

Italia logró ser un actor importante en los asuntos europeos, su condición de poder medio fue cuestionada en varias ocasiones. La inestabilidad política interna de Italia, las frecuentes crisis gubernamentales, los graves problemas económicos y financieros obstaculizan el objetivo del país de convertirse en una potencia media reconocida, especialmente en la región mediterránea. Las herramientas bilaterales y multilaterales son utilizadas alternativamente por coaliciones gubernamentales para llevar a cabo una política exterior que ha estado dominada por la migración. Debido a los problemas internos antes mencionados, la política de seguridad y defensa no es capaz de apoyar la política exterior en la medida necesaria.

Palabras clave: Italia. Mediterráneo. Poder medio. Fuerzas Armadas. Política exterior.

Introduction

Ever since the end of World War II – but more from the Risorgimento – Italy always tried to be recognized as a real European power, preferably equal to France and Great Britain, its goal has been entering the restricted club of decision maker major powers. Italy has always defined itself as a middle power, although its international ranking is constantly changing, it can be considered as “the last one amongst the big ones, first one amongst the small ones.” (BONVICINI; COLOMBO, 2011, p. 12).

The aim of this paper is to analyse the main directions of Italian foreign and security policies and the intrinsically linked development of its armed forces during the crisis of the so called “second republic”. We intend to analyse the military strength and also the foreign and security strategies of this middle power. The first chapter of the study provides a conceptualisation of middle powers and displays the main characteristics based on which we consider Italy a middle power. We provide a general outlook on how middle powers have been discussed by scholars in academic literature. The second chapter examines the main directions of Italian foreign policy, the third one analyses the most important strategic documents, then the current programme of forces development (*Documento Programmatico Pluriennale, DPP*) is displayed. The main trends of defence expenditures and Italy’s contribution to international missions are analysed in the last part of the study. Using the methodology of document analysis, this research is based on governmental and parliamentary sources, news items, speeches, interviews and reports.

Italy as a middle power

The definition of middle powers, their structure, their role and their behaviour has become subject of studies only after the end of the bipolar era when researches started to focus on the relationship between the US and its minor allies. However, the academic interest towards the concept of middle powers is still scarce, even though the bipolar system represented an exception in the history of international politics, as previous centuries were characterised by a multipolar power system, where

the most stable political entities were middle sized. Historian Paul Kennedy states that throughout the 19th century middle powers were the decisive actors in the international arena (KENNEDY, 1987). As for a long time middle powers were characterised as ‘good international citizens’ without further specifics, no commonly accepted definition exists. In our analysis we accept Adam Chapnick’s functional definition according to him middle powers are basically small powers which temporarily evolve to a middle status as a function of their contribution to a specific international issue (CHAPNICK, 1999).

Several attempts were made to classify states based on aggregated economic criteria. For example Holbraad made a classification of powers using GDP and population as indicators in his article ‘Middle Powers in International Politics’, however it resulted that both Japan and Nigeria can be defined as middle power in spite of the economical and other huge differences within these countries. As a result of these kind of analytical shortcomings, and of the fact that with qualitative tools it is hard to distinguish between regional powers and middle powers the quantitative approach has been abandoned and a qualitative approach started to dominate academic debates. Newer studies indicate that in the New World Order behavioural and diplomatic indicators are more decisive at the expense of military and economic factors, thus middle powers are defined by the dimension of their diplomatic networks and the issues promoted within the international community (BISCOTTINI, 2016). Studies using mixed methodology - combining statistical, normative and behavioural method - are the most recent attempts to redefine middle powers. J. Ping in his work *Middle Power Statecraft* aims at identifying middle powers in Asia and in the Pacific region first by collecting all the countries of the region based on the composition of international organizations then by using the following analytical tools: population, geographic area, military expenditure, GDP, GDP real growth, value of exports, GNI per capita, trade as a percentage of GDP and life expectancy at birth. There seems to be an accord among scholars about the behaviour of middle powers, many authors have defined middle power behaviour as characterized by such traits as mediation, coalition-building, multilateralism, and compromise brokerage (COOPER, 1997; COOPER; HIGGOTT; NOSSAL, 1997; HIGGOTT; COOPER, 1990; HOLBRAAD, 1971). Indeed, middle powers are most often characterized by their tactics: compromising, building coalitions, participating in international organizations, forging consensus and maintaining international order (STEPHEN, 2013).

[f]rom military point of view – based on capabilities – Martin Wright defined middle power as “a power with such military strength, resources and strategic position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it. (WRIGHT, 1978, p. 65)

Since all of the above mentioned definitions have shortcomings, we use synthetic concept of middle power as it was stated by Matthew Stephen: firstly, middle power should denote a state with middling material capabilities. Secondly, only those states with middling material capabilities and the behavioural traits of middlepowermanship qualify as

middle powers. In other words, both middle capabilities and middle power behaviour are necessary conditions for middle power status, but only simultaneous fulfilment of both criteria is *sufficient* to qualify as a middle power (STEPHEN, 2013).

Based on our accepted definition, Italy can be considered a middle power from behavioural and functional points of views. Italy is member of the G7, it is one of the oldest supporter and one of the funding members of the European integration process. Italy is an active participant of international peace keeping missions and operations According to the 2018 statistics of the International Monetary Fund Italy has the eighth economy in the world (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2018). In military strength rankings Italy has been ranked somewhere between the eighth-eleventh place for the last few years, from Europe it has been outranked only by France, the United Kingdom and Germany (GLOBAL FIREPOWER, 2018). From the fifties U.S. tactical nuclear weapons have been stationed on Italian soil. At the same time it has to be highlighted that France and the United Kingdom have always been more visible and active within the NATO and the European Union, due to several reasons: Italy's domestic political instability, the frequent government crises, severe economic and financial problems as a consequence of slow increase or stagnation of Italian economy since the middle of the nineties all hindered Italy's international activity and damaged its reputation. In spite of its internal problems Italy is actively participating in international organizations, promoting multilateralism which usually prevails over bilateralism in its foreign policy.

Main directions of Italian foreign policy

Italian foreign policy's strategic framework can be considered stable since it was formed after the Second World War. Its pillars are European integration (EU); relations with the United States and the Atlanticism of NATO; and Mediterranean relations characterised mainly by bilateral relations with countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea and by the EU framework, the so-called Union for the Mediterranean (GILLI; UNGARO *et al*, 2015).

Although the strategic framework of Italian foreign policy remained mostly intact as the Second Republic was born at the beginning of the nineties, the centre of its gravity shifted often. In the centre of the foreign policy carried out by centre-right governments from the middle of the nineties we find Atlantic values: strong ties to the U.S. and Israel, and the intensification of bilateral relations driven by personal and economic relations, as it can be seen in the cases of Libya and Russia. In the same period the foreign policy of centre-left governments focused more on deepening European integration, they had a more open attitude towards Arab states, and preferred multilateralism over bilateralism. Altogether, in spite of the shifts of focus, Italian foreign policy can be characterised by a particular combination of bilateral and multilateral relations and by the so-called 'Levante approach' (BONVICINI; COLOMBO, 2011) which focuses on external trade policy considerations.

In its traditional foreign policy and geopolitical target areas (Balkans, Mediterranean, partly the Central European region) Italy has always been slightly confronting with other European powers (e.g. France, Great-Britain, Germany) which also wanted to extend their sphere of influence there. It has to be highlighted that Italy rarely played a decisive role in the international arena and even when it did, it was only for a short period, as it can be seen in the case of Libya. Italy was hit hard by the 2008 financial crisis and due to the long-lasting economic crisis, the international marginalisation of the country increased (BONVICINI; COLOMBO, 2010; COLOMBO, 2014).

Since the beginning of 2000s one of the main challenges of Italian security and foreign policy was how to tackle illegal migration. Before the Arab Spring (2011) Italian governments, lacking a genuine European migration and asylum policy, used bilateral tools to tackle illegal migration. During the period of 2001-2006 and of 2008-2011, political parties (especially the Northern League) of the centre-right governments of Silvio Berlusconi made illegal migration a national security issue.

The Second Republic of Italy plunged into a deepening internal and external, political and financial crisis in 2011. From this period on, Italian foreign and security policy's priorities focused explicitly on dual crisis management: addressing the financial-economic problems and challenges posed by illegal migration. In 2011 the sovereign debt crisis reached Italy, and the Italian sovereign debt market was on the brink of collapse which could have meant that Italy would have to leave the Eurozone. In the same year the deteriorating security situation resulting from the Arab Spring and from the collapse of Gheddafi's system in Libya lead to the increase of illegal migration through the Mediterranean Sea. Italy's situation was aggravated by the fact that the head of the centre-right government, Silvio Berlusconi's international reputation eroded gradually and the country sank into a foreign political isolation in the second half of 2011. After Berlusconi resigned in November 2011, Mario Monti's technocratic government tried to improve Italy's situation. Even though Monti's foreign policy did not differ significantly from its predecessor's policies, the country's international reputation improved considerably after he was appointed Prime Minister. Monti emphasised the importance of multilateral relations, in contrast to Berlusconi's preference of bilateral and personal relations (MOLNÁR, 2012).

After the Arab Spring, the collapse of Libya posed new challenges for Italian politics. The Italian governments of recent years have dealt with illegal migration using both bilateral and European crisis management tools. Although the major Italian political parties have been divided over the governments' responses to illegal migration since 2013, the Italian governments have managed to balance realist (pragmatic) and "Europeanized" approaches.

Following the financial and political crisis of 2011 several coalition governments based on the cooperation of centre-left and centre-right parties tried to strengthen Italy's international role in order to avoid international marginalisation. Since 2011 several Italian diplomats have achieved key positions within European institutions: Mario Draghi in the Euro-

pean Central Bank, Federico Mogherini as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Antonio Tajani as President of the European Parliament, General Claudio Graziano as head of the EU's Military Committee. These improved Italy's negotiating power and reputation, and the country's foreign policy became more visible for the European Union. However, this trend has been reversed by the Conte administration's more Eurosceptic attitude, and Italian foreign policy became once again more confrontational.

From 2011, in the period of dual crisis management Italian governments put focus on European integration – while maintaining strong Atlantic relations – since they considered the European Union an adequate tool for crisis management and thereby for the representation of national interests. After the general elections of 2013, during the XVIII legislature three coalition governments were in power: Enrico Letta's government (from April 2013 to February 2014) was followed by Matteo Renzi (February 2014 to December 2016) and then by Renzi's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paolo Gentiloni (from December 2016 to the end of the legislature). The foreign policy of all three above-mentioned governments concentrated on addressing the challenges of economic-financial problems and migration-refugee crises. On the whole, Italian national interests were represented in a European disguise, a federalist EU policy with the explicit goal of deepening European integration was in the centre of Italian foreign policy.

After almost 400 migrants drowned near Lampedusa in October 2013, the Letta government approved 'Mare Nostrum' humanitarian-military mission (DA MARE..., 2017). The primary goal was to manage the crisis on European level, and Italy became the main advocate of EU's joint action. In 2014 during the Italian Presidency of the European Council, migration became one of the key priorities (PREZIDENZA ITALIANA DEL CONSIGLIO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA, 2014). However, the realization of the ambitious foreign policy goals was hindered by the insufficiency of human and material resources at disposal (MAGRI, 2013).

'The European Union remained the principal field of action of Italian foreign policy during the Renzi government: the country expressed itself in favour of a joint European action in order to reduce migratory pressure. By actively contributing to the EU's public discourse about migration, Italy's foreign policy goal was to avoid further marginalization and to strengthen the country's role in the integration. However, the internal structural problems (e.g. high public debt, lack of economic growth) set back Italy's efforts to carry out decisive foreign policy (GRECO, 2016).

The Italian Presidency of the Council in the second part of 2014 contributed significantly to the improvement of the country's reputation. Federica Mogherini's appointment as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy can be seen as the success of Italian diplomacy's activities. In November 2014 the unilateral Italian mission of Mare Nostrum was replaced by Frontex's Triton operation. This was an important step for Italy and even though Triton's scope and budget was remarkably smaller, it was a joint European mission. In 2015 partly due to

an Italian proposal and to the active role of High Representative Mogherini, the EU decided to enlarge the scope and budget of Triton; to start EU-NAVFOR MED joint military operation and to elaborate the main pillars of common migration and asylum policy.

Italian governments actively contributed to the debate on the future of European defence. In August 2016 the Gentiloni-government elaborated the plan of the so-called 'Schengen for Defence', a plan for a deeper integration in the field of common security and defence. It proposed two possible solutions: building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (strengthening the cooperation of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), the 44th article or the defence industry) or creating a so-called 'Schengen for Defence'. In the latter case a group of member states – first of all the founding members – would create a multinational European force with its own budget and command under the 'Schengen for Defence'. According to the plan the cooperation would be open for other member states to join. This new form of cooperation would then be transposed gradually into the EU Treaties (GENTILONI; PINOTTI, 2016; MOLNÁR, 2018a).

After Matteo Renzi resigned, Paolo Gentiloni took his position as Prime Minister. Gentiloni pursued the same foreign policy by focusing on joint, EU-level solutions and bilateral negotiations in order to address migration and refugee crisis to stop the flow of illegal migrants arriving via the central Mediterranean route. At the same time Italy supported by all possible means the internationally recognized Government of National Accord in Libya (e.g. the Hippocrates mission, deployment of two military ships to Libya and the decision to send 100 *Carabinieri* to Libya's southern border) (MINISTERIO DELLA DIFESA, 2016). Italian Special Forces have been deployed to Libya since 2016 (RAME, 2016). The first signs of reducing migration successfully emerged while the Gentiloni-government was in power. The role of Minister of Interior Marco Minniti cannot be denied in the process, since he was responsible for negotiating and concluding agreements with smaller Libyan power groups (PARAVICINI, 2017).

The decades old economic problems, the lack of expected growth, the protracted addressing of illegal migration from Libya had a negative effect on the re-election chances of the ruling coalition led by Gentiloni. Parallel to this process, the public confidence in European institutions declined significantly (EUROBAROMETER, 2018).

After the general elections of 2018 Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle gained power and made illegal migration a national security issue. The strategic planning of the new Eurosceptic and populist coalition differs considerably from the former governments', it does not follow the 'traditional' directions of the last decades. The Eurosceptic government's most spectacular foreign policy shift is the alienation from the German-French political trends.

The Conte-government's rhetorical goals are in a clear contrast with previous governments. Rome – opposed to the will of the previous government – did not support the participation in the European Intervention Initiative proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron (DIBEN-

EDETTA, 2018). The new government's position on addressing migrant and refugee crisis became more radical, as it was confirmed when Italian ports were shut down in front of the rescue ships of NGOs. Although the number of conflicts between Rome and the EU is growing, it needs to be highlighted that Italy is still interested in a European solution.

As it was shown, Italian foreign policy became gradually dominated by the tackling of illegal migration since the beginning of the 2000s. This trend was given a new impetus by the Arab Spring and the collapse of Libya, as security aspects of the problems became more evident, urgent steps needed to be taken by Italian decision-makers. The governments alternated bilateral and multilateral tools in search of an effective solution, however in the absence of a functioning common refugee and asylum policy, bilateral relations tend to be preferred in tackling migration, while multilateral relations – through the financial mechanisms of the EU – are used to handle economic and financial problems. The bilateral handling of illegal migration is strengthened by the fact that the new government coalition explicitly made migration a national security issue.

Strategic documents of Italian foreign and security policy

3. Libro bianco della Difesa

In spite of pressing foreign policy challenges, no foreign and security policy strategy was prepared on a national level until 2015. Even though a number of strategic documents existed, there was no real, comprehensive national security strategy, the White Book of Defence³, 2002 (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2002) can be considered the last one. This White Book focused on new threats - mainly ethnical conflicts - arriving from the South and South-East; in sharp contrast with the White Book of 1985 which put the bipolar world's traditional East-West confrontation in the centre of its attention. The new White Book paid particular attention to the threats emerging after 9/11 and on global war on international terrorism. In connection with the afore-mentioned threat, armed forces had new tasks: the focus of their activities shifted from direct area protection to international missions, from military personnel to infrastructure and equipment. In this period the new goal of increasing defence expenditures emerged (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2002).

Another document setting out the directions of foreign and security policy was the 'Report 2020 – choices of foreign policy' prepared in 2008 during the Prodi government. The Report emphasized three main areas of crisis zones: Western Balkans, the so-called enlarged Mediterranean (*Mediterraneo Allargato*) and Afghanistan, as a clear clarification of the fact that from the Italian point of view crises zones had moved from the East to the South. As a consequence of its geographic location, Italy is particularly exposed to threats arriving from these areas, but at the same time it has to be taken into account that these zones are economically important for Italy. This document gave priority to the tackling illegal migration coming from the Balkans and the Mediterranean Region. According to this strategy it was not enough to rely on bilateral treaties, but more international and European cooperation were needed (DASSÚ; MASSARI, 2008).

Even though no official medium- and long-term strategy was submitted, we can interpret the annual decree of the Minister of Defence about next year's security duties⁴ as a short-term strategic framework for Italian armed forces. The decree analyses international environment, security duties and financial resources needed to their realization on an annual basis.

The lack of a comprehensive foreign and security policy framework had been apparent even before the necessary reforms were started. The public and political debate in progress since the Berlusconi government about the acquisition of 90 F35 Joint Strike Fighter revealed the necessity for elaborating reform plans. After the political, public and stakeholder debate in 2014 the new White Book on Italian foreign and security policy was published in 2015 (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2015).

The White Book aimed at preparing the reorganization of armed forces and at continuing to carry out the reforms started in 2012 by then Minister of Defence Giampaolo Di Paola. Structural and budgetary reorganisation was a primary goal of the reform process. Based on this document, the first pillar of Italy's security is the European Union, the second one is NATO, however, strong ties to the countries of the transatlantic region and active participation in joint initiatives are equally important. Regarding the EU, the White Book determined Italian support to deepen Common Security and Defence Policy and emphasized the importance of cooperation between NATO and the European dimension of defence.

International organizations, responsible involvement in their initiatives and in international missions have a fundamental role in safeguarding national interests. On the whole Italy's security is based on three pillars favouring multilateral relations: 1) European integration, 2) strong transatlantic relations (NATO), and 3) Global relations (UN) (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2015). Compared to previous documents, this White Book's approach can be valued as more pragmatic, it emphasized more the importance of national interests, so that development trends in defence policy can be more easily determined. Parallel to the elaboration and approval of the 2015 White Book, Italy expressed its renewed commitment to acquire 90 F35 fighter planes until 2027.

Since 2013 the Ministry of Defence has issued annually the *Plurenial Programmatic Document* (DPP) as a framework for defence expenditure, replacing the Minister's above-mentioned annual decree. The latest DPP regarding the period between 2018 and 2020 was submitted by Elisabetta Trenta Minister of Defence with a significant delay in November 2018. The document has been eagerly awaited since it provides information about the new government's vision regarding the defence sector. Structural changes cannot be detected in this DPP since many programmes, commitments, even 2018 defence budget had already been approved by the previous DPP, submitted and approved by the previous centre-left government. The system of submitting multiannual documents regarding the defence sector (e.g. DPP) guarantees continuity in armament programmes and international commitments, since the pillars of Italian defence can be modified only in part by the often changing governments. Similarly to previous documents, this DPP also

4. Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione della Difesa

analyses international security environment as a short-, medium- and long-term strategic framework, while related tasks and necessary financial resources are also displayed (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). Even though the latest DPP is quite similar to the previous one, the new concepts and interventions of the new Minister of Defence are slightly perceptible, not only in the political priorities (Annex D), but in the frequent use of the concepts “dual use” and “resilience”, which seem to be the guiding principles of the new document, however the 2018-2020 DPP can probably be considered as a transitional document. Since the current Italian defence strategy originates from previous DPPs as well, apart from examining the 2018-2020 DPP, we also take into consideration the contents of 2017-2019 DPP.

National commitment in the reference framework (Impegno nazionale nel contesto di riferimento).....

The first part of the current DPP analyses Italy’s international environment and determines national commitments based on the main strategic directions so that the specific armament programmes could be fitted into a coherent framework. By carrying out the armaments programmes according to the strategic development directions of the DPP, Italian armed forces should possess adequate capacities to address new threats, including guaranteeing economic and energy security and migration. It should be emphasized that in the latest DPP the following are considered to be factors of instability: terrorism, migration flows, natural disasters, calamities and organized crime, whereas military competition amongst states or hybrid conflicts would be secondary.

Italian geostrategic priorities remain the Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern regions. The first two are considered as a safety net and international engagement within the security triad of NATO-UN-EU, the third and fourth are considered more of a challenge. As a consequence, Italian armed forces need to possess the necessity capacities within the state borders and in the territories of the crises zones in order to address the afore-mentioned challenges.

The Euro-Mediterranean region is the first strategic direction: it should be interpreted as an open geopolitical region, where the effects of trends and crises occurring in the Sahel, Horn of Africa and in the Persian Gulf cumulate, affecting Italy directly through the Southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. The current DPP highlights Libya, as the most important country in the region from Italian perspective: alongside their historical ties, Libya is a strategic priority for Italy due the security and energy security reasons (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). Libya is important to manage the flow of migrants and refugees arriving via the central Mediterranean route to Italy. According to FRONTEX, 170,664 people reached Italian shores mainly from Libya in 2014, while 153,946 did so in 2015, and 181,376 in 2016 and 118,962 arrived in 2017. Due to efforts of the EU and Italy only 23,485 people reached Italian shores in 2018 (FRONTEX, 2019). Italy imports oil and gas from Libya which was its sixth supplier of oil (5%) and the third

of natural gas (7%) in 2016 (ALDO, 2018; MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, 2017).

Increasing the stability of the Mediterranean region is Italy's national security interest, in this region Italian armed forces should have the capacities to lead even multinational, coalition forces. In order to successfully decrease social tensions related to illegal migration arriving through the Mediterranean Sea, it will be a decisive factor for Italy how it can conduct a decisive foreign policy in the region, in spite of its limited defence expenditures and military capabilities, which are disproportionate to the country's economic potential and size (MOLNÁR, 2018b). Niger appears in the new DPP as a fundamental country for the security of the Sahel region (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). The appearance of Niger in the document is hardly surprising, considering that the bilateral defence agreement signed in 2017 resulted in the launch of a new Italian military mission in Niger which started in late 2018, when the new government was already in power.

Syria and Iraq are the most important crisis zones in the Middle East: besides jihadist threats, proxy wars of global and regional powers raise the level of instability, the use of military power might be necessary amongst political and diplomatic actions. The decrease of Iraqi and Lebanese tensions are national priorities for Italian defence policy, the reinforcement of their autonomous defence and security forces should be supported not only on multilateral, but even on bilateral level (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018).

The DPP mentions shortly the Western Balkans and Afghanistan due to the ongoing military missions with significant Italian participation: KFOR in Kosovo and NATO-RSM in Afghanistan. The active participation in the security triad of the Euro-Atlantic region can be evaluated as Italy's contribution to international security and a safety shield for the country. Italian proactivity within the NATO is in line with the strategic priorities, since in the implementation of NATO's '*Framework for the South*' the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples plays a substantial role. Through its successful command Italy intends to strengthen its leading role in addressing crises emerging in the Mediterranean region. Regarding the European Union, Italy's responsible participation in the security of the Euro-Atlantic region equals to the realization of an actual and functioning Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), European Defence Agency and European Defence Action Plan (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). We need to highlight the fact that the renewed support for CSDP is slightly in contrast with the governing parties' Eurosceptic views.

The strategic directions of Italian security and defence policy are clearly reflected in multilateral (UN, NATO, EU) and bilateral military missions, the majority of missions are present in the countries at the shores of the Mediterranean Sea or in the African states alongside the major migration routes through the sea.

In connection with the international environment and strategic directions, it should be mentioned that the most important Italian document which can be considered as defence strategy for the country does

not mention Russia, in contrast with the so-called government contract. According to the contract between M5S and Lega – which constitutes the base of Giuseppe Conte’s government – there are three major regions to be considered priorities from the points of view of security and defence policy: NATO, Russia and the Mediterranean region (CONTRATTO..., 2018), however, the DPP does not reflect this ambition.

Development of the forces based on the current DPP (Sviluppo dello strumento militare).....

The second chapter of the document synthetizes the strategic guidelines, operational needs and the medium- and long-term development directions of Italian armed forces, furthermore analyses and evaluates the ongoing investment programmes. Even though this study does not aim at analysing the current armament programmes and projects, we should highlight the fact that the modernisation and maintenance of the materials and systems used by the Special Forces – which are more easily deployed in order to tackle new risks, such as the ones emerging the ‘enlarged Mediterranean’ region – is in progress. New equipment, such as optoelectronic devices for night vision or for the surveillance of special vehicles are to be acquired (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). Several projects, such as the modernisation of C-130J transport aircrafts, the maintenance of the operational capacities of the C27J fleet, the acquisition of 16 CH47F Chinook helicopters, or the development of the UAV platforms can be used either by Special Forces or by multinational military missions (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2017).

Defence expenditures.....

New challenges emerging after 1989 and 2001 led to changes in NATO policies and military reforms in member states. In Italy one of the first steps was the introduction of professional armed forces by the abolition of conscription in 2004 (LEGGE, 2014). Decision-makers in Italian defence sector realized that reforms are necessary in order to tackle emerging external threats. The implementation of a more definite foreign and security policy was hindered by the fact that due to the effects of economic downturn, defence expenditures have been declining since 2005 (GASPARINI; MARTA, 2008). The lack of a sound strategic framework and of political will necessary to carry out structural reforms set back the planning and the implementation of military reform; however, the economic and financial crisis of 2008 had such a disastrous effect on Italian budget that military reforms became indispensable.

After the crisis of 2011 the Monti administration started the reform of defence budget and the preparation of military reform as part of a general budget reform. In 2012 Giampaolo Di Paola Defence Minister – with the support of the Prime Minister and the political parties supporting the government – started to review armed forces, aiming not only at mili-


tary budget cuts, but even at restructuration and downsizing⁵. According to the reform, savings should be recycled into the defence budget (MARRONE, 2012).

When analysing defence budget allocations we must take into consideration that allocations were calculated on the basis of the Finance Act of 2017 which was approved in December 2016, so allocations and actual expenditure items can sometimes diverge.

DPP is supposed to provide information about the approximate defence allocations for the coming years. However, it is already known that severe interventions and fiscal efforts are to be carried out regarding the 2019 budget, meaning that previsions of next years' defence expenditures will change significantly. We have to take into consideration that defence funds come from multiple sources, as we can see in the case of the integrated defence budget, which means that more variables can change the final budget. As a consequence of the above-mentioned reasons it is hard to determine the exact defence budget of Italy. Data provided by the Ministry of Defence is often not calculated according to the approved NATO methodology.


Defence expenditures are decreasing: according to the current DPP defence expenditures account for 1.19 percent of the GDP in 2017 (20 269.1 million euros), 1.19 percent in 2018 (20 968.9 million euros), while short-term projections are the following: 1.15 percent in 2019 (21 017. million euros) and 1.1 percent in 2020 (20 646.1 million euros) (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). In the past decade, starting from the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008 defence budget decreased by 4.1 percent at current value which can be considered a severe backdrop.

5. The reform maximized the number of armed forces in 150.000 person instead of the 2012's 183.000. The number of civilians employed by Italian armed forces will decrease from 30.000 to 20.000. The 43.000 person redundancies need to be carry out gradually by 2024.



Trends: Ordinary defence budget vs. defence budget comprising all funds 2008-2018 (black: ordinary defence budget; red: defence budget comprising all funds)
Source: Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2018-2020, pp. 94.

RAPPORTO SPESE PER LA DIFESA/PIL 2008-2018




Defence expenditures/GDP 2008-2018 (green: defence budget comprising all funds; blue: ordinary defence budget; purple: ordinary defence budget excluding 'territorial security costs')
 Source: Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2018-2020, pp. 94.


From this study’s point of view, the most relevant items are the ones allocated to tasks emerging in the traditional defence area. These are divided into personnel expenses – comprising the allowance of professional soldiers and civil employees of the army -; operating costs (*esercizio*) guaranteeing the operability and efficiency of armed forces; and investment costs. This sector suffered a 2.2 billion euros decrease since 2008. The level of traditional defence expenditures stabilised around 13 billion euros, and a further decrease is hard to carry out. The 2.2 billion euros decrease is aggravated by the changes in the real purchasing power of euro: if we calculate at 2008 rates, defence expenditures shrank by 3.9 billion euros.

This area is particularly important since these contradictory trends can hardly guarantee the adequate development and maintenance of armed forces. While classic defence expenditures are constantly shrinking, the comparable ratio within cost groups is distorting: operating and investment costs are decreasing, but personnel expenses are in a constant increase. The classic proportion of the three cost groups (personnel – operating costs – investment costs) should be 50–25–25 percent, however, in spite of the redundancies of the last 20 years, personnel costs have risen, as the graph shows below, in 2017 74 percent of classic defence expenditures were allocated to personnel expenses. Personnel expenditures are growing further: in 2018 more than 10 billion euros are allocated to cover personnel costs (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018).

Investment costs are still higher than operating costs, probably because defence industry is interested more in carrying out new projects rather than maintenance projects. This means that equipment, materials and infrastructure are getting older and outdated since maintenance expenditures are lacking (DE PAOLIS, 2018).



Cost groups within the classic defence expenditures from 2008 to 2017
 Source: Martinelli, Giovanni (2007): Il bilancio della Difesa, [www.analisidifesa.it](https://www.analisidifesa.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/bildif17.pdf), downloaded: 06/10/2018



Cost groups within the classic defence expenditures from 2008 to 2017
 Source: Martinelli, Giovanni (2007): Il bilancio della Difesa, [www.analisidifesa.it](https://www.analisidifesa.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/bildif17.pdf), downloaded: 06/10/18

Given that operating costs cover the expenses allocated to guarantee the efficient and effective operation of armed forces (e.g. maintenance costs) the 52 percent decrease between 2008 and 2017 is alarming. While analysing operation costs, we must take into consideration the challenges posed by the ageing military infrastructure.

One of the primary goals of the restructuration and redundancies of the 2012 reform was to increase the efficiency of armed forces, which implies the quantitative and qualitative review and examination of the current infrastructure park. As a consequence of the lack of financial resources Italian armed forces are constrained to reduce the number of strategic objects, where the majority of resources are concentrated. This process can have counter-productive effects even in the short run on the Italian running of JFC headquarters in Naples or on the desired leading role in the Mediterranean region.

6. Ministero della Difesa

7. Insufficient investment resources in the financial years of 2014, 2015, 2016 did not allow the launch of new programmes.

8. *Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico*

Although investments provided by Ministry of Defence⁶ (MinDife) show a decreasing trend, new renovation and modernization projects started from 2017.⁷ This allowed the launch of new programmes or the completion of multiannual projects to fulfil international commitments, meanwhile the launch of high priority projects aimed at tackling critical shortages became possible as well. It needs to be highlighted that these programmes and projects are financed by Ministry of Economic Development⁸ (MisE), not by MinDife.

The gravest problem of Italian defence expenditure is not its constant reduction, but its structure: the decrease is often inconsiderate and difficult to systematize, hindering the achievement of targets. Whilst personnel expenses have been growing constantly in spite of redundancies, investment and operating costs have diminished. One of the most important goals of the defence budget reforms was to reorganize the structure of the expenditures. However, the reforms could not be completed due to the unstable political situation of the country and the frequent changes in government. It is evident that the current defence expenditures can hardly guarantee the maintenance, the modernization and the efficient development of the Armed Forces.

Referring to the otherwise well-functioning Italian defence industry we have to consider the spill-over effects of the economic downturn, since the crisis hit hard the top importer countries of Italian defence products. This led to the reduction of defence budget among others in France, Poland or Greece, adversely affecting Italian defence industry and aggravating the above-mentioned problems.

Security- and defence policy is supposed to support foreign policy goals, especially when security aspects of foreign policy – as it can be seen in the Mediterranean region – are gaining priority status, but current trends of Italian defence expenditures do not indicate this. With inadequate defence expenditures Italian armed forces will not be able to handle the new threats emerging in the Mediterranean regions, although Italy aims at taking a leading role in the stabilization of Libya, acknowledged by other powers, such as the U.S. or the old rival France. In the absence of a stable, consistent and adequately funded security and defence policy, Italian foreign policy will not be able to take up the lead in the region, in spite of the growing number of its military and civil missions in Africa. In other words, the implementation of an effective foreign policy in the Mediterranean region is hindered by the fact that Italian security and defence policy is underfinanced, since armed forces do not possess every equipment and capabilities necessary to support foreign policy.

Italian participation in international missions

In the past decades Italy tried to balance its relatively low, decreasing defence expenditures by actively participating in international missions in the most important conflict zones.

After the Cold War Italian diplomacy realized that contributing to collective security by actively participating in international missions has become a precondition of Italy's own security. Italian foreign policy used the military instrument to increase the country's international visibility by becoming 'security provider' (COTICCHIA, 2017).

The number of Italian soldiers deployed in international missions decreased as the economic crisis hit the country: while in 2005 the number of deployed soldiers reached 11 000, after 2008 this number constantly declined in spite of the high level of ambition (12 000 pp). In 2008 Italian armed forces participated in 25 different missions, but only with 8000 persons (RONZITTI; RUFFA, 2014). The majority (85 percent) of these troops were deployed in the three most important regions for Italian national interests and security: Lebanon, Afghanistan and Western Balkan, so we can affirm that it concentrated in the crisis zones affecting the country's broadly defined security.

The high number of deployed Italian soldiers was meant to compensate the country's moderate foreign political activity and the scarce defence funding. For Italy it will be a decisive question: how can this middle power with its limited defence expenditures and military capacities – compared to its economic potential – and with its often unstable internal policy carry out a dominant foreign policy? As a consequence of its continuous economic problems and the financial and political crises of 2011, its participation in international missions declined significantly. However, apart from the 2000 Italian soldiers deployed to Libya the number of Italian participants in other international missions decreased to 6500 persons by 2012, while Italy's goal is still to be present in the above-mentioned regions (MISSIONI... ano). For several years there have been more soldiers deployed to national territory than to international missions: by the end of 2018 there are about 6000 Italian soldiers deployed in international missions, while more than 7000 serve in missions in Italian territory (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2019a). Regarding missions in Italian territory, we have to highlight the fact that the biggest national mission – Operation Strade Sicure – can be directly connected to migration, since it is used as a crime prevention tool in metropolitan and densely populated areas (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2019b), when crimes committed by migrants residing legally or illegally in Italy are more and more often on the front pages of newspapers.

On the whole the strategic directions of Italian security and defence policy are clearly reflected by its participation in multilateral (UN, NATO, EU) and bilateral military missions. Correspondingly to the country's geographic position, beside the 'traditional' Euro-Atlantic orientation, the Mediterranean region, the Balkans and Africa can be considered the centres of Italian foreign policy. As the map shows the majority of the missions takes place in the countries at the shores of the Mediterranean-Sea, and in African states important for migration through the Mediterranean Sea. The relevance of the Mediterranean region and Afri-


ca has been increased by the migration and refugee crises after the Arab Spring, the fragile states of the region, religious terrorism and by the consolidation of organized crime groups. If we compare Italian military missions of the 2017-2019 DPP with the ones of the 2018-2020 DPP (see below) the number of military missions in African countries is growing, even though the largest missions with Italian participation continue to be the ones in Lebanon and in Iraq (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2019a).

Military missions with Italian participation 2017-2019



Source: Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2017-2019, pp. 12.

Military missions with Italian participation 2018-2019



Source: Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2018-2020, pp. 22.

The Gentiloni administration decided to strengthen Italian presence in Libya and Tunisia, and expressed its will to deploy a 400-person troop to support the government of Niger. However, due to the local government and probably due to the reluctance of France – which plays a decisive role in that region – the launch of the mission was delayed until late 2018. France is playing a more relevant role in Libya as well, but it disagrees with the migration policy of the Conte government, and criticizes Italian decision not to support *European Intervention Initiative* launched by French President Emmanuel Macron. Finally, the mission received green light in September 2018. Italian Defence Minister Elisabetta Trenta claimed it as an important step to tackle migration flows (MIGRANTI..., 2018). It shows that in spite of rhetorical differences, the Conte government often backs the previous governments’ foreign and security policy initiatives.

At the same time, multilateral solutions seem to be in a difficult position: even though EUNAVFOR MED is still functioning, but its mandate -which would have expired at 31st December 2018 was extended only for a three-month period, until 31 March 2019 (COUNCIL DECISION, 2018). The harder approach of the Conte government does not ease the EU’s efforts: Vice-Minister Matteo Salvini threatened that Italy would not participate in the mission, if participating ships take migrants mostly to Italian ports (UE..., 2018)⁹, demanding the distribution of migrants within member states. These three months are considered to be an extra time to find compromise within member states, since the mission’s mandate can only be modified by unanimous vote. However as European Parliament elections are getting closer, it will be more difficult to find an acceptable solution for every national government, since a general anti-migration attitude can be observed within member states.

9. According to the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED rescued migrants should be taken to the nearest port available, which is mainly Italy due to its geographical vicinity to Libya.

While multilateral relations seem to be neglected by the Conte administration, Italo-Libyan bilateral relations started to intensify: after the Palermo Summit about Libya, in December 2018 Khalifa Haftar was received in Rome, then Prime Minister Conte had bilateral meetings with the most important leaders of Libya (Prime Minister Serraj, Khalifa Haftar, Khaled Al Meshri President of the Higher Council of the State of Libya, Agila Saleh, President of the Libyan House of Representatives) during his trip to Libya (CONTE..., 2018).

Conclusion

Even though Italy managed to be an important actor in European affairs, its status as major power was several times called into question. Italy has the eighth biggest economy on the world, the third GDP in the Eurozone, but it can be defined only as a weakening middle power. Due to its geographic position it tries to exert its influence on the close and important regions: Western Balkans, North-Africa and Middle East. From 2018 the Eurosceptic Conte administration tries to carry out a more confrontational foreign and security policy in order to represent national interests more radically, while multilateral relations tend to be neglected, bilateralism has become once again more central, as we can see in the case of Libya. In the current moment, the decline of multilateralism seems to

weaken the European dimension of the Conte administration, bilateral negotiations are considered to be a safer and faster way of safeguarding national interests, Italy has entered into more open and sharp conflicts with European institutions, as was seen in the case of EUNAVFOR MED. However, due to some geopolitical realities several changes in foreign policy can be observed only in the rhetoric. The Conte administration is composed by populist, extremist movements, some measures taken by the government are different from the previous governments' steps but Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Mediterranean regions will probably continue to be in the centre of Italian foreign and security policy.

As a consequence of Italian armed forces' low level of ambition and budget problems it is logical that the country concentrates its power and capacities to the region of "Mare Nostrum", but it necessitates safe and rational management of the limited budget. We find that Italy participates in too many international missions compared to its real capacities, even though the number of missions has declined in the last few years. With this active participation Italy would like to increase its international visibility, compensating the fact that it is not a member of the nuclear club. Not a quantitative, but a qualitative shift is necessary to achieve this goal.

The implementation and completion of the restructuration of armed forces – started by previous administrations – has to be carried out by a new political actor that generally criticizes the decisions of its predecessor. It remains to be seen whether the M5S-Lega coalition evaluates the reform of armed forces as a result of a multi-party agreement and continues to implement the measures of the 2015 White Book or withdraws from it. The latter would further delay the imperative modernization of Italian armed forces. Regardless of whether the new coalition carries out the reforms of the White Book or outlines new directions for the armed forces, it is clear that the current trends of defence spending do not support the implementation of an effective foreign policy, quantitative and qualitative changes would be necessary so that the aspired Mediterranean middle power role could be filled either from the foreign policy or from security and defence policy point of views.

As we demonstrated in our study even though the strategic directions have been stable since the beginning of the nineties, however, we must take into consideration regarding either foreign or security and defence policy, that not only the international political situation changes often, but Italian internal policy is unstable as well, having an effect on its defence sector and on the desired Italian leading role in the Mediterranean region. Parliamentary elections in 2018 resulted in a complex internal political situation, the new M5S-Lega coalition has to redefine Italy's role in the international community, but the operational dynamic of the coalition could slow down this process. Both parties have a strong anti-EU rhetoric which could change common security and defence policy as well, in case one of the main supporters of deepening defence integration backs out from this part of the European integration. Even though the 2018-2020 DPP recognizes the importance of CSDP based on the allocation of funds, it seems to be only a mostly theoretical support.

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Foreign investor's rights, investment promotion and facilitation agencies: a developmental and sustainable vision

Direitos de investidores estrangeiros, agências de facilitação de investimentos: uma visão desenvolvista e sustentável

Derechos de los inversores extranjeros, promoción de inversiones y agencias de facilitación: una nueva visión desarrollista y sostenible

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DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p70

Received in: September 29, 2019

Accepted in: February 05, 2020

ABSTRACT

Fifty years ago, the role of foreign investors was at the center of the political debate, with host state - investors disputes showing a geographical North-South pattern. The end of the ISI model would signal a new era, including a new relationship with foreign investors. As part of their efforts, developing and emerging countries (DECs) liberalize foreign direct investment (FDI) national policies and to provide fiscal and other incentives to foreign investors. FDI flows were seen as always beneficial: a quantitative approach. Sooner than later, however, policy-makers became aware of the scheme's pro-investment bias. FDI quality, not quantity, became the new ideal. Latin American countries' position in the issue, however, remains quantitative objectives still dominate the investment debate. Indeed, a movement towards sustainability would come to question the natural-resource led growth model followed by the region. So, the debate around the treatment of foreign investors remains open.

Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment. Investment Protection, Promotion and Facilitation. Development and Sustainability.

RESUMO

Cinquenta anos atrás o papel dos investidores estrangeiros encontrava-se no centro do debate político, onde as disputas (Inversora - Estado Soberano) mostravam um claro padrão geográfico Norte - Sul. A finalização do modelo substitutivo marcará o início de uma nova era, a qual implicou uma nova aproximação ao investimento estrangeiro. Como parte do esforço, os países em desenvolvimento e emergentes decidem liberar suas políticas de investimento estrangeiro direta (IED). Os fluxos de IED eram vistos como benéficos, sempre: enfoque quantitativo. Quanto antes, no entanto, os fazedores de política

começaram a reconhecer o forte caráter pró-investidor do esquema. E a qualidade, não a quantidade, devém o novo ideal. No entanto, os países da região seguem mantendo uma visão quantitativa. O movimento pró-sustentabilidade do desenvolvimento vem a questionar o modelo de desenvolvimento que segue a região, e baseado na exploração dos recursos naturais. Neste sentido, o debate com respeito ao tratamento dos investidores estrangeiros não só não se tem saldado: ainda não tem começado.

Palavras chave: Investimento estrangeiro direto. Proteção, Promoção e Facilitação de Investimentos. Desenvolvimento e Sustentabilidade.

RESUMEN

Cincuenta años atrás el rol de los inversores extranjeros se encontraba en el centro del debate político, donde las disputas (Inversionista - Estado Soberano) mostraban un claro patrón geográfico Norte - Sur. La finalización del modelo sustitutivo marcará el inicio de una nueva era, la cual conllevó una nueva aproximación a la inversión extranjera. Como parte del esfuerzo, los países en desarrollo y emergentes deciden liberalizar sus políticas de inversión extranjera directa (IED). Los flujos de IED eran vistos como beneficiosos, siempre: enfoque cuantitativo. Más temprano que pronto, sin embargo, los hacedores de política comenzaron a reconocer el fuerte carácter pro-inversor del esquema. Y la calidad, no la cantidad, deviene el nuevo ideal. Sin embargo, los países de la región siguen manteniendo una visión cuantitativa. El movimiento pro-sostenibilidad del desarrollo viene a cuestionar el modelo de desarrollo que sigue la región, y basado en la explotación de los recursos naturales. En este sentido, el debate respecto al tratamiento de los inversores extranjeros no solo no se ha saldado: aún no ha comenzado.

Palabras clave: Inversión Extranjera Directa. Protección, promoción y facilitación de inversiones. Desarrollo y sostenibilidad

Introduction

Developing and emerging countries (DECs) - foreign investors' relationship experienced important and controversial twists. A multilateral agreement on foreign investment has become a long-standing effort, whose first attempt was made in the period immediately after World War II (WWII). Initially, an International Trade Organization responsible for employment, foreign investment, international commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, and services, as well as international trade, was to have emerged from the negotiations undertaken in Havana, Cuba, in 1948 at the invitation of the United States (US) Government. That aim was dashed when President Truman did not even present the negotiated draft to the US Congress aware that it would not be approved because of the international commitments that it entailed. Since then, the articulation of the new international trade and foreign investment architecture became an exercise in provisional initiatives and second-bests, which reflected more the evolving relative negotiating strengths of the major players (the US and Europe) rather than any well-conceived master plan. However, on the other hand, the early post-WWII was, also an era of rising nationalizations, first by communist takeovers in China, Eastern Europe, and Cuba, then during the 1960s and 1970s by numerous developing countries which expropriated foreign investments in their terri-

tories, especially in the natural resource sector (mostly petroleum and mining). Resource nationalism momentum would come with the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, and referred to a wide range of trade, financial, commodity, and debt-related issues.

Whereas geopolitical alliances reflected a West-East political divide, economic disputes were instead following a geographical North-South pattern, and the chances for a multilateral scheme agreement were practically null. A different route was undertaken at the bilateral level, particularly after the signature of the bilateral investment treaty between Germany and Pakistan on November 25, 1959. Bilateralism proliferated in the nineties, following DECs' governments decided to liberalize their foreign direct investments (FDI) regimes. Institutionally the new era encompassed the signature of international investment agreements (IIAs) and the adherence to the World Bank's International Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Tough the promotion, protection, and liberalization of foreign investment has mostly occurred under this bilateral framework, multilateral initiatives also flourished. DECs' policy space for development was further reduced at the Uruguay Round, whose trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights agreement (TRIPS) came to prevent sovereigns from introducing technology transfer clauses. Developmental policies were also affected other two World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements: the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on trade in services (GATS). Finally, in May 1995 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member governments launched the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) at the Annual Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial level².

2. . The MAI was a first attempt to combine in one multilateral agreement the disciplines in three critical areas of foreign direct investment rule-making – specifically, foreign investment protection, foreign investment liberalization, and dispute settlement.

3. IIAs encompass bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as well as investment chapters within regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTA). The term might also include other special schemes dealing with investment issues, as the double - taxation treaties.

The resulting emerging global legal framework rests on the twin foundations of customary international law and national laws and regulations. It relies on its substance on a multitude of IIAs and other legal instruments. Towards the same goal, some DECs governments decided to create individual offices: Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agencies (IPFAs), basically directed to administrate incentives. Leaving aside institutional differences, if any, the new legal and administrative entities started to flourish³. IIAs growth was astonishing, rising from 396 agreements in 1990 (MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2009), to more than 3,300 as of 2017 (MOHAMADLEH, 2019). IPFAs have also prospered and actually counting with more than 200 IPFAs at the national level (HARDING; JARVONIC, 2012).

Meanwhile, a significant *tectonic, geopolitical* shift emerges reconfiguring global FDI flows. Lead by China, an increasing number of Emerging joined the (formerly, a Northern exclusive) league of capital exporter countries. Meanwhile, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) environmental began to plead international organizations for changing towards a more holistic perspective on growth: development should be socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable. As development moves from a narrow economic towards a more holistic vision, a new vision is required for installing a sustainable finance - development model (SCHOENMAKER, 2017). By analogy, foreign investors should now be ask [by host countries] to excel the sustainable test. Henceforth, controversies around the

role of foreign investors in long-term development is not longer a Southern countries' issue (as observed in the sixties and seventies) but a concern being shared by affluent societies too. New claims for re-regulate foreign investments are listen, almost everywhere - even among US policy makers. Likewise, as the sustainable development debate deepens, the concern over the sovereign right to regulate is turning global.

Theoretical foundations of foreign investors' special protection involve several arguments, going back and for but always returning to the old rules versus discretion discussion. Whereas in the 1990s, those favoring rules were in the majority, nowadays, the pro-investor bias became under scrutiny. The presence of information asymmetries, on the other hand, explained IPFAs irruption and dissemination. Whereas the IA problem persists, however, IPFAs goals have changed: originally designed to attract investors (a quantitative mandate), nowadays investments are expected to match SDGs (a qualitative mandate). What explains developed countries' transformation, from being fiercely opposed to regulating capital inflows (including FDI flows) to suddenly start advocating for more screening and control over foreign investors? Which forces explain IPFAs new qualitative appraisal? How can this ideological shift be explained? Why the change seems not to be affecting Latin America (FDI related) institutions?

The paper discusses first the economic foundations behind the [FDI] legal protection scheme, as well as those supporting the introduction of promotion and facilitation agencies. The second section turns attention to the multilateral fora, asking why an international agreement on investment facilitation could now be approved and whether it remains favorable for the DECs long-term sustainable development. The third section list a series of characteristics host countries policy toolkit could list if the government's intention is to made FDI inflows compatible with sustainable development. Thereafter, some conclusions follows.

Foreign investors treatment: what protection, promotion,
and facilitation means

Foreign direct investments might present positive contributions to development, but benefits should be not taken for granted. Neither costs underestimated. Spill-overs on the local economy might relate, among others issues, to technology transfer, managerial best practices, skill developments, and research and development activities. The arrival of long-term flows might not be rewarding, and they may even be not desirable for sustainable development (CLAESSENS *et al.*, 2003; GODA; TORRES, 2013; IBARRA, 2011; RAY, 2016; RAY *et al.*, 2017; RODRIK; SUBRAMANIAN, 2009; SABOROWSKI, 2009; TIENHAARA, 2009).

Short of funds, however, host countries embraced neoliberalism in the nineties, including new (pro-investor) legal rules and the establishment of new offices (agencies) directed to seduce foreign investors to (and helping them after) arrival. From a policy perspective, the government duties were straight and simple: to eliminate discretion and reduce informational asymmetries, and to follow robust and straightforward rules. The rules versus discretion debate help us to understand the legal discussion; the informational bias would be introduced to delineate the agency issue.

Rules versus discretion

Discretion in the hands of DEC's policy-makers was then blame as preventing the arrival of foreigners. After years of mutual mistrust, developing countries decided to take the first step and expand their legal guarantees: to fix the rules of the game. The signature of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) was an essential step in this direction, as it expanded investors' legal guarantees and, henceforth, helped to reduce their political risks (STANLEY, 2004). In the search for investments, however, the host government started to leave away policies that, in the past, permitted them to link FDI to development.

An overwhelming majority of investment agreements concluded since 1990 were traditional. In the sense that they admitted foreign investments of the other contracting party only if such investments conformed to the host country's legislation (MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2006, 2009). This represents the so-called "admission model", which was common in European BITs with developing countries, and emphasized investment protection. A relatively small group of investor countries, led by the USA, took advantage of the unique historical events in the 1980s and 1990s to implement a strong push towards foreign investment liberalization, particularly in developing countries and economies in transition. BITs further enlarged foreign investors' rights, whose legal challenge remained unknown by the time of the signature. Sooner than later, US BITs influence disseminate among Western allies, with the European Union (EU) introducing a new agreement template in the 2000s (STANLEY, 2018).

Unexpectedly, BITs benefits proved minimal, whereas damages for alleged breaches started to boost (CCSD, 2018; JOHNSON *et al.*, 2018)⁴. The push against this type of agreement starts to go further, admitting that if "there were a link between investment treaties and FDI flows, investment agreement and their protection can potentially undermine investment and its intended benefits" (JOHNSON *et al.*, 2018, p. 7).

After observing how lean benefits were, policy-makers started to interrogate on the substantial costs the scheme bring with it. The loss of flexibility would suddenly transform into a leading issue, as treaties pushed sovereigns to cede control over their policy space⁵. The government loss of flexibility arises on several clauses, for example, on those restricting the use of "performance requirement" objectives (JOHNSON *et al.*, 2018)⁶. The extensive definition of investment, for instance, permitted Argentina's bondholders to challenge the debt renegotiation process (MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2006). The inclusion of the "indirect expropriation" concept was behind investor's spurious claims, preventing governments to fulfill their regulatory duties. The standard of government treaty of foreign investors (e.g., "fair and equitable treatment," "national treatment") was also under question, as its wording remains vague and open to interpretation by arbitral panels (GORDON; POHL, 2015; JOHNSON *et al.*, 2018; SINGH; ILGE, 2016). Finally, all the controversies around the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. Initially designed to ensure a neutral, a-political forum, the mechanism would sooner than later be under criticism as it favored investors the most (CCSD, 2018; GORDON; POHL, 2015; JOHNSON *et al.*,

4. As of July 31, 2017, 817 known ISDS claims had been filed, and at least 114 states had faced formal complaints (JOHNSON *et al.*, 2018)

5. As claims against sovereigns began to flourish, the original group of Latin America challengers (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) enlarged. New voices were now coming from the global South (South Africa, Indonesia, India), but also high-income countries (Norway, Australia, the Netherlands). Critical voices towards the ISDS scheme were also coming from Germany, France, and Italy (VIDIGAL; STEVENS, 2018).

6. Whereas provisions like this were affecting many LDCs around the world, some EMEs have strategically avoided to include them in their IIAs (e.g., China)

2018; MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2009; VAN HARTEN, 2016)⁷. There is a predominant, shared concern that the ISDS system has been used to prevent the realization of a “global” public interest (VIDIGAL; STEVENS, 2018).

Not only the IIAs pro-investor bias generated a hot political issue, but policy-makers were also called to include sustainability issues in the agenda. This reflects the emergence of a new consensus, which introduces a qualitative (not quantitative) perspective on FDI and asking development to be sustainable. This new vision certainly challenges the old, Washington Consensus approach over IIAs design as to the role played by the ICSID scheme (SAUVANT, 2019a, b). How to integrate sustainable development objectives in the IIAs, however, remains the single most relevant challenge for the IIAs system as a whole (GORDON *et al.*, 2014; ZHAN, 2018)⁸, as the status quo prevents countries from advancing with the necessary rebalancing of rights and obligations between partners.

Information

Asymmetric information has often been blamed as another clear (contractual) disadvantage, preventing deals to be made among unknown partners. Informational asymmetries were mainly observed as “to constitute a significant obstacle to capital flows across international borders” (HARDING; JAVORICK, 2012, p. 2). By providing information, governments alleviate the burden of bureaucratic procedures as well as reduce investors’ transaction costs. IPFAs incentive the arrival and permanence of foreign investors.

IPFA design, however, remains controversial: some insisting in separate agencies, others preferring to bring promotion and facilitation activities under the same roof. Others might conceive it as a dual process: starting with the design of the target sectors (promotional stage), then continuing with those activities directed to facilitate investors’ radication (facilitation stage) (HESS *et al.*, 2018). Promotion associates with incentives, including “any measurable advantages accorded to specific enterprises or categories of enterprises by (or at the direction of) a government, to encourage them to behave in a certain manner” and include “measures...designed to increase the rate of return of a particular FDI undertaking either to reduce (or redistribute) its costs or risks” (CASS, 2007, p. 30). The facilitation stage, in turn, is mainly directed to assist investors in dealing with local rules and bureaucracy. It is usually considered to conform a continuous task and bringing assistance (at both, at the pre-establishment and after establishment), and incentivizing foreigners to expand their local operations.

Agencies’ goals have also experienced a structural transformation: from quantitative to qualitative goals (VCC - WAIPA, 2010). Highly popular in Latin America, first-generation agencies associated with liberalization and deregulation measures (SAUVANT, 2019b). A second generation continued to promote the entry, but it also started to include some other activities directed to help investors in their installation phase. Beyond the institutional scope, however, first and second-generation structures both shared a general, quantitative objective: to attract foreign direct investment. Agencies, third-generation design, start to focus actions towards some specific sectors.

7. The ISDS system involves two main forms: the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank International Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Both the UN and the World Bank, have recently decided to examine the hottest issues (BERGER *et al.*, 2018).

8. The liberalization push has produced a massive legal transformation. As observed in the WTO - Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), affecting host countries’ policies on FDI as it prevents them from introducing local content requirements. Notice that which prohibited trade-related investment measures, such as obligatory requirements of locally-acquired inputs (“local content”) that were inconsistent with necessary provisions of GATT 1994 (MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2009)

Targeting was explained by the fact that FDI contribution to development differs dramatically depending upon the industry (MORAN, 2010). A fourth, and latest IFPA's generation is starting to flourish, basically aiming to match investments with the host country long-term, sustainable development objectives. Modern agencies consider four, different dimensions: economic (linkages, technology transfer, training), social (labor and employment standards, community health, education, training), environmental (minimizing the adverse impacts of investments, mobilizing environmental technologies for conservation) and institutional or governance (fair and efficient negotiations, contracts). Overall, agencies should be backed by a long-term strategic vision, which is not indifferent to FDI inflows: whereas in some sectors investors' should be wellcome, in some others the arrival might be better to deter. Investment targeting, henceforth, remains alive but conditional to the matching of long - term and sustainable development goals.

The structure of incentives, however, remains directed towards the accomplishment of a narrow economic vision disregarding social, environmental, and institutional dimensions (VCC - WAIPA, 2010). To be (strategically) useful, however, agencies should take the country specificities into account - including its economic, social, and environmental constraints. If the sovereign aims to profit from FDI for the national economy structural transformation, henceforth, a different design would be in mind. In the end, quality (not quantity) is what it counts for sustainable development: better and more professional agencies bring different levels of FDI into host countries (HARDING; JAVORICK, 2012; SAUVANT, 2019b; VCC - WAIPA, 2010). In particular, sovereigns should work in IFPA' design and carefully target sectors of FDI attraction (HARDING; JAVORICK, 2012; MIŠKINIS; BYRKA, 2014), to induce the arrival (and permanence)⁹ of those investments that they consider particularly desirable for the (long-term and sustainable) development (SAUVANT, 2019b). Agencies could also stimulate cooperation among foreign and local firms (as in the building of a local supply network or the transfer of technology), or interaction with local communities (as for the attainment of the project's sustainability goals). In sum, agencies could be designed in order to perform both transformative and sustainability goals. The quantity towards quality goal movement, however, is far from granted. Highly ambitious objectives which, in Latin American case, few agencies might be able to undertake. Unfortunately, in the region, agencies are taught as solving some specific (i.e.: informational) market failures but specifically directed to eliminate bureaucratic norms and rules (VOLPE MARTINCUS; SZTAJEROWSKA, 2019)¹⁰. For multilateral organizations as the IDB or the OECD, "interested parties" basically refer to private partners and multinational firms consultation.

Promotion and facilitation activities, additionally, might compromise significant amounts of resources from the host government. Fiscal and financial incentives, both directed to seduce investors' enter and to remain, are fund-burdensome for DEC's restricted budget (CASS, 2007). This should lead host countries to carefully confront FDI costs and benefits when designing the incentive package, and certainly including the project's expected social and environmental costs (RAY *et al.*, 2017; ZARSKY; STANLEY, 2013). Moreover, negative externalities could be significant and long for

9. Facilitation activities might include, among others: a) follow-up and monitoring of development of already accomplished investment project; b) the building, maintenance, and enhancement of local supply network; and, c) Investment retention and expansion (MIŠKINIS; BYRKA, 2014).

10. The pro-market vision backed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which follows an acritical analysis of how investors are being treated around the world - missing how developed OCDE countries have traditionally treated foreign investors (and are, as looking after the last announcements)

longer, particularly for those projects associated with natural resource exploitation. It implies the adoption of a new and more sophisticated approach towards FDI; a perspective aimed to induce the arrive of funds somehow alienated with the country's long-term, transformative, and sustainable development objectives (COLEMAN *et al.*, 2018, SAUVANT, 2019b). By including sustainability issues, new IPFAs agencies intents to alienate with the UN's sustainable development goals (SDGs). By screening foreign firms compromises on technology transfer or the construction of local linkages, agencies could also alienate with the developmental-transformative role.

Old constraints, new actors, and the (re) emergence of multilateralismo

In spite of accepting bilateralism, DECs' opposition to multilateralism remained fierce and widely extended [remember their stance against the so-call Singapore issues introduced in the first WTO Ministerial Conference (1996); and the Cancun Conference collapse (2003)]. The former opposition have recently permuted to consensus, with DECs now pushing for installing investment issues at the WTO 11th Ministerial Conference at Buenos Aires (2017) (DIE, 2019; ICSID, 2018; JOSEPH, 2018). A group of countries has called for closer global cooperation "to create an efficient, transparent, and predictable environment for facilitating FDI and aim at arriving at a plurilateral 'investment facilitation agreement' (IFA)" (METHA; MANGLA, 2019, p. 7). The Joint Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development (JSIFD) was backed by 70 Member States who called for closer global cooperation to create an efficient, transparent, and predictable environment for facilitating FDI. The collective aim, to arrive at a plurilateral "Investment Facilitation Agreement" (WTO - IFAs). Investment facilitation measures deal with the application of investment policy, not about the right to regulate or about investment protection (HAMDANI, 2018).

The WTO - IFA proposal considers international trade and investment as closely interconnected and facilitating DECs development (JOSEPH, 2018). This interconnection, therefore, permits to place the IFA issue within the WTO scope. On the positive side, the WTO - IFA adopts now a balanced, pro-development perspective rather than the pro-investor bias associated with old BITs (DIE, 2019; ICSID, 2018; SAUVANT, 2019). Additionally, the initiative does not include the typical legal clauses included in IIAs (fair and equitable treatment, no discriminatory treatment, indirect expropriation) neither recognize market access, investment protection, and dispute settlement issues. The proposal might undoubtedly bring some more room for developments, but still presents some disadvantages (CUTS, 2017; GHIOTTO; GAUMÁN, 2019; HAMDANI, 2018; ICSID, 2018; JOSEPH, 2018; MANN; DIETRICH BRAUCH, 2019; SINGH, 2017; TWN, 2018). One fundamental, widely expanded dissent, relates to the fact that the proposed framework goes beyond the WTO's current mandate. Of particular interest, however, relates to the absence of obligations on home countries and investors on sustainable development issues. Host country capacity building is undoubtedly needed, particularly to guarantee long-term and sustainable investment inflows (ICSID, 2018; SAUVANT, 2019). As such, the initiative remains envisioned to complement the traditional IIAs scheme.

By being active in the proposing, a group of DECAs hopes to realign themselves with the liberal order now under challenge, but also to make it work. Multilateralism is also backed by authorities in Beijing, as they realize that time has come to leave away the (defensive) bilateral stance of the past (PATHIRANA, 2018; SAUVANT, 2018; STANLEY; FERNANDEZ ALONSO, 2016; WADE, 2011). Gone are the days when China started negotiations to become a WTO member, an special arrangement which bring authorities with policy space to climb the technological ladder. Ranked as the world second-largest economy, China's global presence goes beyond international trade to expand into investment and financial flows. Going global, in particular, means new business opportunities for Chinese SOEs firms whose long-term, strategic vision bring western governments nervous (BUCKLEY, 2018; HANEMANN; ROSEN, 2018; LE CORRE, 2019; MEUNER; MONIN, 2017). The accommodate western mood was definitively particularly affected following Xi Jinping launched two strategic, long-term plans: Made in China 2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Both are raising important questions for those involved in the design of an international FDI policy regime (BUCKLEY, 2018). As hosting the 2016 G20, authorities in Beijing realized the opportunity to advance with the discussion of investment issues (SAUVANT, 2018). At Shanghai, the G20 collective proposed a new template (The Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking), subsequently endorsed by Head of States at the September Hangzhou meetings. Surprisingly, the G20 Guidelines include sustainable development and inclusive growth among the core principles (ZHAN, 2016). The proposed framework, however, remains envisioned on advising DECAs in how to enter in global value chains (GVCs) (AKMAN *et al.*, 2017)

Other proposals include the one launched by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation (the Menu). OECD Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) is the oldest one, instrumented, and on use since 2006 (NOVIK; CROMBUGGHE, 2018) being recently updated by the OECD Secretariat (OECD, 2018b). This highly ambitious proposal prioritize quality FDI flows, identifying five clusters of quality indicators: productivity-innovation, skills, job quality, gender, and carbon footprint (SAUVANT, 2019). At the regional level, the Investment Facilitation Action Plan (IFAP) introduced in 2008 by members of the Asian - Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). IFAP investment facilitation scope involves 'actions taken by governments designed to attract foreign investment and maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of its administration through all stages of the investment cycle,' and 'effective investment facilitation can make a significant contribution to the sort of broader investment climate reform efforts widely practiced by APEC member economies.' A series of bilateral, regional, and continental investment - facilitation initiatives started in Africa, including the Pan-African Investment Code (2015) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfFTA) (MBENGUE, 2018).

Opinions over schemes being revised keep increasing, but a fundamental divide among policy-makers is whether proposals should alienate local rules with SDGs (re-regulate) or instead host country efforts should be directed towards the elimination of bureaucratic rules (de-regulate). Although

some might seem this as recreating the old markets versus state discussion, the solution to this old dilemma might lie somehow in the middle center. How to conciliate rights and obligations, policy space, and compromise?

Underdevelopment is by no means just a problem of governance, to put institutions right or to reduce barriers in order to seduce investors. As prestigious institutions might be, as critical foreign funds are needed, of utmost importance for DECs is to have a plan for the long-run. Henceforth, the focus should turn on cooperation and facilitation issues employing a broader, developmental perspective that might help in the design of the answer. Besides investors and states, this expanded perspective is asking for the involvement of civil society in shaping a new investment template (BUCKLEY, 2018; RAJAN, 2019). The increasing political relevance of new issues (civil society, social and environmental claims) [cooperative, stakeholder vision] is forcing leaders around the world towards the recognition of broader social and environmental rights until recently neglected.

From this perspective, the Brazilian Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA) template might be taught as a helpful starting guide (BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER; DIETRICH BRAUCH, 2015; HEES *et al.*, 2018; HEES; ROCHA PARANHOS, 2018; PERRONE; ROJAS DE CERQUEIRA CÉSAR, 2015; VIDIGAL; STEVENS, 2018). The CIFA framework does not include the ISCD mechanism but introduces a hybrid system of dispute prevention and state-to-state arbitration. It explicitly includes substantive obligations to investors, but it brings them help in dealing with local authorities (through the establishment of national focal points or ombudsman figures). The CIFA framework, besides, recognizes local regulation preeminence over foreign investors. But the Brazilian initiative remains silent on voice: how civil society enters in the investment template discussion?

Institutional change in perspective: what lies behind
the recent transformation?
.....

As noted, once the commodity price cycle reversed, the postwar development model starts to vanish and DECs' negotiation power scale down. Whereas in the past too much weight was attached to bring incentives to investors, nowadays, an increasing number of sovereigns are demanding foreigners to share benefits and to accept investments only if they contribute to sustainable development goals.

What explains DECs transformation, from being fiercely opposed to regulating capital inflows (including FDI flows) to suddenly start advocating for more screening and control over foreign investors? Which forces explain the movement from a regime biased in investor's favor to another aimed to share investment benefits over an equal basis? How can this ideological shift be explained?

On the one hand, civil society pressure on governments towards the implementation of social and environmental development goals. [FDI] quality (not quantity) is becoming mainstream among academic circles and, as pressured by their constituencies, mandatory for several governments around the world. On the other hand, the rise of South FDI

flows - but China, as their companies come to dispute their Western competitors' supremacy in global markets. The movement towards a qualitative approach, in this case, might be masking fears over Chinese firms' technological leapfrogging and technological catch - up but also growing protectionism amidst Western governments.

Nevertheless, the movement from quantitative to qualitative approaches should be appreciated on its own. A sizeable institutional shift, indeed. To made this happen, however, a broad coalition is undoubtedly needed - particularly among DECs, whose formal institutions are often weak and capture by entrepreneurial coalitions. To ensure a broader "sustainable" vision the voice of social actors becomes critical and, increasingly listen by global firms as the Peter Buckley (2018) comment:

[t]he increase in shareholder activism, stakeholder pressure, the importance of confirming to (global) standards, the increase in ethical consumerism and public and social pressure, in general, requires MNEs, in particular, to pay increasing attention to moral standards in business behavior, not just in "Corporate Social Responsibility" or "Shared Value" but as a means of long term sustainability and survival (BUCKLEY, 2018, p. 10).

In a recent paper, Karl Sauvart and Howard Mann (2017) list a series of characteristics for each of four different dimensions of sustainability in order foreign direct investment in qualifying as sustainable (see table below). To be clear, the listing shows which FDI flows might qualify as sustainable according to the SDGs as to meet the challenges imposed by the climate change commitments. Whereas the indicative list might be a useful transition, however, is far from simple. It requires host countries to adopt a long - term, sustainable vision on development.

Table 1 - The four dimensions of sustainability FDI and their sustainable characteristics

Dimension	Characteristic	Dimension	Characteristic
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment • Local linkages • Technology transfer • Infrastructure • Community development • Equitable distribution of wealth • Tax accountability • Promote research & development (R&D) 	Environmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource management • Pollution controls • Low carbon/greenhouse gases footprint • Waste reduction • Biodiversity protection • Climate change • Water • Renewable energy
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labor rights • Skills enhancements • Public health • Workplace safety • Non-discrimination • Fair wages • Benefits • Human rights • Indigenous rights • Gender • Resettlement • Cultural heritage protection/diversity 	Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transparency • Local management • Supply chain standards • Consumer protection • Stakeholder engagement • Anti-corruption • Legal compliance • Risk management systems • Environmental management systems • Environmental impact assessment/ social impact assessment • Human rights due diligence • Corporate governance

Source: Sauvart and Mann (2017; page v)

DECs should undoubtedly be pleasant by the recognition of all these dimensions and attributions, as they collectively ensure a more balanced and sustainable development path. Sovereigns should accomplish to insert them in new, refined, and more sustainable legislation (FDI rules). Remarkably, the topics listed by Sauviant and Mann (2017) goes beyond the Millenium Developmental Goals (MDGs), including a significant number of issues [and, accompanying policies] which might allow the host country to perform a developmental, and transformative model. Consider the introduction of technology transfer clauses or specific rewards for those establishing research and development activities. Both are policies aimed to transform the local productive base, going beyond institutions and incentives to seduce investors. Development involves a sustainable, structural transformation of the national economy. Pursuing one but lifting the other side is like to envision Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark (CHANG, 2010).

Host (DECs) countries could undertake this perspective (globally either partially) when drawing their legal framework as when negotiating IIAs. What matters for BITs, and FTAs is not the presence of guarantees per se but about how investors and host states might end with sharing costs and benefits (STANLEY; 2018). In other words, the objective should go beyond the idea of attracting as much FDI as possible but to induce the arrival of investors, which could raise the standards and welfare of the country (MIŠKINIS; BYRKA, 2014; SAUVANT, 2019b). Towards this end, policy coherence is undoubtedly needed. As for matching investment legislation (protection) with agencies dealing with promotion and facilitation goals (ZHAN, 2016). Better coordination would permit, above all, to achieve the country's long-term sustainable development objectives.

Conclusions

Once antagonists, developing and developed countries, both started to move towards the center: recognizing the relevance of foreign funds for development but also claiming sovereign rights for flexibility and policy space. Whether the change in position responds to the rise of China or follows social actors' legitimate claims is beyond the scope of this paper. Independently of the source, however, the change reflects a new, more holistic vision linking development and sustainability.

As sustainability becomes a global issue, it forces sovereigns to modify old investment treaties and to advance with the necessary rebalancing of rights and obligations between partners. Legal updating, however, remains a necessary but not sufficient condition to began to transit a new era. Policy coherence is also needed between investment policies and other public areas, including those dealing with the design of promotion and facilitation agencies. IPFAs design, however, should be in line with the host country's developmental goals. In this sense, what matters for sustainability ideas to become politically accepted is how local elites and societies perceive them. Both issues start to be taken into consideration by policy-makers, and included in all revised multilateral proposals. The "one-size-fits-all" prescription is not longer valid, DECs have

now more room at choosing their developmental path. Even DCs have recently decide to leave old “institutional constraints” away, notably the anglo-saxons ones. At the end, what matter when chosing a particular (developmental) path are how it fits with local ellites ambitions and civil society expectations.

For countries in the region, the problem lies in matching the current export-led model with sustainability issues. The matching, however, remains hard to accomplish. Overall, the regional view on the FDI issue remains, to some extent, old-fashioned, with a quantitative perspective dominating the investment debate. The current debate is well-known among political and economic elites, but they still refuse to move away from the status quo. Take, for example, the energy transition debate. Despite leaders’ environmental compromise on the Paris Agreement on climate change, governments continue to provide sweetheart loans, guarantees, and other forms of preferential financing to fossil fuel projects. Foreign funds are also, by and large benefiting the non - renewable sector. In other words, if economic growth continue to rely upon the appropriation of rents then elites would keep sustaining the model. This explains why the above mentioned quantitative paradigm remains alive at Latin America, and why elites prefer to embrace Milton Friedman motto (“the Business of Business is Business”) and refuse to openly discuss environmental and social costs. Civil society, however, is starting to challenge the natural-resource growth model. To discuss externalities, and how to cope with them. The spread of social unrest movements all around the Americas is showing that the debate started. In orser to achieve this, is necessary to bulid up new alliances and to expand the consensus for the attainment of the long-term development.

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El Pragmatismo en la CSS de China: integración del genio histórico y elementos modernos

*China's Pragmatism in the South-South Cooperation:
integration of the historical gene and modern elements*

*O pragmatismo da China na Cooperação Sul-Sul:
integração do gene histórico e dos elementos modernos*

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DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p86

Recibido el 15 de septiembre de 2019

Aprobado el 01 de marzo de 2020

RESUMEN

Durante los últimos setenta años, China ha sido una estrella fulgurante en el campo de la cooperación internacional. El factor principal que contribuyó al ascenso exitoso del gigante asiático es el pragmatismo reflejado en sus estrategias de Cooperación Sur- Sur (CSS). El desarrollo de las estrategias tiene tres fases- el período de Mao Zedong (1949-1976), la época y la post-época de Deng Xiaoping (1978-2012) y la nueva etapa de Xi Jinping (desde 2013)- y en cada una observan reformas dirigidas, en vez de por las ideologías, por los intereses del Estado en diferentes contextos internacionales. Consecuentemente, el progreso de la CSS de China cambió la estructura política internacional, y ofreció experiencias y lecciones útiles para otros países en desarrollo. El presente trabajo va a analizar desde el vínculo de continuidad del pragmatismo las estrategias de la CSS de China a lo largo de las tres fases, y durante un período de tiempo que va desde la década de 1950 hasta la actualidad.

Palabras clave: China. Cooperación Sur-Sur. Pragmatismo. Iniciativa de “una Franja y una Ruta”.

ABSTRACT

During the last seventy years, China has been a shining star in the field of the international cooperation. The main reason that contributed to the asian giant's successful rise is the pragmatism reflected in its South-South Cooperation (SSC) strategies. The development of the strategies has three stages- the Mao Zedong period (1949-1976), the Deng Xiaoping era and the post Deng Xiaoping era (1978-2012) and the new Xi Jinping age (from 2013)- and in each stage can we observe reforms guided, instead of by the ideologies, by the interests of the State in different international contexts. As a result, China's progress in the SSC changed the international political structure, and offered

useful experiences and lessons for other developing countries. The present article will analyze from the link of continuity of the pragmatism China's SSC strategies in the long term of the three stages, and during a period of time that goes from the 1950 decade to the present.

Keywords: China. South-South Cooperation. Pragmatism. "One Belt One Road" proposal.

RESUMO

Nos últimos setenta anos, a China tem sido uma estrela relevante no campo da cooperação internacional. O principal fator que contribuiu de êxito do crescimento do gigante asiático é o pragmatismo refletido nas estratégias da Cooperação Sul-Sul (CSS). O desenvolvimento das estratégias tem três fases – o período de Mao Zedong (1949 – 1976), a época e pós-época de Deng Xiaoping (1978 – 2012) e a nova etapa de Xi Jinping (desde 2013)- em cada uma das fases se observam reformas dirigidas, em vez de ideologias, pelos interesses do Estado em diferentes contextos internacionais. Consequentemente, o progresso da CSS de China mudou a estrutura política internacional, e ofereceu experiências e lições úteis para outros países em desenvolvimento. O presente trabalho analisa desde o vínculo de continuidade do pragmatismo as estratégias da CSS de China ao longo das três fases, e durante um período de tempo que vai desde a década de 1950 até a atualidade.

Palavras chave: China. Cooperação Sul-Sul. Pragmatismo. A iniciativa 'Um Cinturão, Uma Rota'.

Introducción

El pragmatismo no es una nueva idea para los chinos, más bien ha formado parte de su cultura milenaria. A lo largo de sus setenta años de historia, la República Popular de China (RPC) lo ha implementado con determinación, aunque no se haya generado una escuela de pensamiento reconocida como tal. Históricamente, la idea de pragmatismo se remonta a la Dinastía Han, cuando el historiador más prestigioso, Sima Qian (a.C.145-?)², escribió en su obra maestra *Registros Históricos* (2013, p.3256) lo siguiente "Todos los seres humanos bajo el cielo nos movemos activamente por intereses"³. En cierto sentido, este argumento coincide con la perspectiva básica del Realismo (MORGENTHAU, 2006), respecto al motivo profundo de las actividades de los Estados nacionales modernos ante los asuntos de las relaciones internacionales.

Después de largos años de introducir las ideas del pragmatismo en la cultura china y más las lecciones aprendidas de las luchas contra los japoneses y el Partido Nacionalista, el Partido Comunista de China (PCC) obtuvo un mejor entendimiento sobre lo que era el pragmatismo. Sin embargo, la aplicación inicial en las políticas internas no trajo los resultados esperados como para ser el principio rector metodológico de un país inmenso y heterogéneo en casi todas sus dimensiones. A pesar de que en el presidente Mao Zedong y en su gobierno predominó la perspectiva del pragmatismo, dentro de su administración política aparecieron ciertos movimientos desviacionistas de extrema izquierda (el Gran Salto Adelante y la Revolución Cultural) que menospreciaron el pragmatismo. Los resultados negativos de dichos movimientos advirtieron al PCC de la peligrosidad de estar desvinculado de la realidad, y por eso, después de

2. Sima Qian, historiador y prosista de la Dinastía Han, se encargó del estudio de la astronomía, el diseño del calendario lunar y el registro de la historia en la corte. Se estima como "el padre de la historia", cuya obra maestra *Registros Históricos* fue el primer libro biográfico de la historia china completa de más de tres milenarios. La gran obra se considera la primera de "Las 24 Historias" porque fue tan influyente que las historias sucesivas tomaron el género biográfico como el estilo formal. Ocupó una posición importante también en la historia de la literatura china.

3. Tian Xia Xi Xi Jie Wei Li Lai, Tian Xia Rang Rang Jie Wei Li Wang

4. Shi Shi Qiu Shi

la muerte del presidente Mao, Deng Xiaoping decidió abandonar las ilusiones impracticables para ir en busca de un “socialismo con características chinas” y siempre recordar que se debe “cruzar el río sintiendo las piedras” (QIN, 2008). En este sentido, la locución “buscar la verdad en los hechos”⁴ se convirtió en un lema esencial dentro del discurso del presidente Deng Xiaoping, quien también mencionó: “sea negro o blanco, si puede atrapar ratones, es un gato bueno”. Este es un ejemplo típico del espíritu pragmático que cubrió a toda China (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2017).

Respecto a la cooperación internacional, tras la III Sesión Plenaria del XI Congreso Nacional del PCC, donde se sintetizaron las experiencias y lecciones de la Revolución Cultural, se reconfirmó la línea ideológica marxista y pragmática. Es así que, el PCC llevó a cabo una serie de profundas reformas políticas a nivel interior y exterior (QIN, 2008). A pesar de ello, en el campo de la cooperación internacional se mantuvo una coherencia básica en los principios de la ayuda al exterior (ZHOU *et al.*, 2013).

En este sentido, es pertinente definir el concepto de Cooperación Sur-Sur. La Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas define la Cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS) en su documento final de la conferencia en Nairobi (21 de diciembre de 2009) como:

La cooperación Sur-Sur es una empresa común de los pueblos y los países del Sur, surgida de experiencias compartidas y afinidades, sobre la base de unos objetivos y una solidaridad comunes, y guiada, entre otras cosas, por los principios del respeto de la soberanía y la implicación nacionales, libres de cualquier condicionalidad. La cooperación Sur-Sur no debería considerarse asistencia oficial para el desarrollo. Se trata de una asociación de colaboración entre iguales basada en la solidaridad ... La cooperación Sur-Sur comprende la participación de múltiples partes interesadas, incluidas las organizaciones no gubernamentales, el sector privado, la sociedad civil, las instituciones académicas y otros agentes que contribuyen a hacer frente a los problemas y alcanzar los objetivos en materia de desarrollo de conformidad con las estrategias y los planes nacionales de desarrollo (NNUU, 2010).

Respecto a la Unidad Especial de Cooperación Sur-Sur del Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (2009), adscrita al Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) (UNOSSC en inglés), define:

la Cooperación Sur-Sur es un marco amplio de colaboración entre países del sur en el ámbito político, económico, social, cultural, ambiental y tecnológico que involucra a dos o más países en desarrollo y que puede tomar la forma de cooperación bilateral, regional, subregional o interregional (UNOSSC, 2009)

La CSS del país asiático inició desde cero en 1950 (THE STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 2011), justo un año después de la fundación del país, en octubre de 1949. Por ende, la CSS de China, que se basa principalmente en el comercio internacional, la inversión directa y la cooperación financiera, casi ostenta setenta años de vida, en los cuales ha ganado peso en el campo de la cooperación internacional. Esta CSS ha pasado por tres fases: el período de Mao Zedong (1949-1976), la época y la post-época de Deng Xiaoping (1978-2012) y la nueva etapa de Xi Jinping (desde 2013). Cada fase tiene diferentes contextos internos y externos, motivos, objetivos, instrumentos y mecanismos administrativos (HU; LIU, 2012; HUANG; HUANG; REN, 2012; TANG, 2013a; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013).

El presente trabajo va a analizar desde el vínculo de continuidad del pragmatismo las estrategias de la CSS de China a lo largo de las tres fases, y durante un período de tiempo que va desde la década de 1950 hasta la actualidad. Todo esto con el fin de adquirir lecciones empíricas y ofrecer varias sugerencias para las reformas futuras de la estrategia de la CSS en las nuevas circunstancias mundiales. Para ello, las preguntas de investigación que se pretende contestar son dos: ¿por qué la CSS de China se desarrolló tan rápido? y ¿cuáles son los factores principales que afectaron el diseño de las estrategias de CSS?

Este trabajo se divide en cuatro capítulos. El primero cuenta el contexto en que nació la CSS de la RPC y los principios primordiales que guían al país asiático e impactan en el Tercer Mundo. El segundo capítulo habla de las características de la CSS en el período de la presidencia de Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989), al ser una época donde la CSS sufrió cambios significativos. La tercera parte corresponde a las transformaciones de la CSS de China bajo las nuevas circunstancias mundiales posteriores al despegue de la economía de China. El cuarto apartado sintetiza la tradición milenaria del pragmatismo que ha impregnado la CSS China. El artículo cierra con las conclusiones.

Primera fase: en busca del reconocimiento internacional y
establecimiento de los principios de la CSS

La RPC anunció al mundo el establecimiento de su gobierno central en 1949 (MAO, 1949). Este hecho marcó la llegada de una cierta paz interna al país, una paz que había estado esperado el pueblo chino por 17 años, catorce años de la resistencia contra la invasión de Japón y luego tres años de guerra civil que terminó con la retirada, de una parte, del Partido Nacional Kuomintang (KMT) a Taiwán, sin embargo, la otra parte del KMT que permaneció en China continuó el conflicto a menor escala, pero el PCC pudo imponerse finalmente. Asimismo, en los primeros años de vida del país, sucedieron algunos conflictos en las fronteras, por ejemplo, la guerra entre China e India (JIANG, 2016). Y al mismo tiempo, China estuvo amenazada por el conflicto de la Guerra Fría. En este contexto, la alianza inestable con la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS) y la lucha ideológica del comunismo contra el capitalismo hicieron que el poder asiático recién nacido tuviera que caminar por el filo de la espada. Por esa razón, en esos momentos lo más importante para el PCC fue la consolidación de su poder y conseguir el reconocimiento de la sociedad internacional mediante el fomento de la CSS, la cual se basó en dos aspectos esenciales: primero, el apoyo político y militar a las luchas de independencia y una ferviente oposición al imperialismo en Asia, África y América Latina. Y segundo, la ayuda financiera a los países del Tercer Mundo, esta ayuda era unidireccionalidad y su fin primordial era aliviar la presión externa de las dos potencias (Estados Unidos y URSS) y comenzar a crear un ambiente favorable para el desarrollo económico entre China y los países del Tercer Mundo (DOMÍNGUEZ MARTÍN *et al.*, 2019; HU; LIU, 2011; HUANG; REN, 2012; YAN, 2016; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013).

Después de 14 años de combates, el país que había sido el más rico y avanzado durante un período bastante largo, se encontraba en ruinas (ZHANG, 2019). El PCC, cuya fundación se había inspirado en el PCUS y la Revolución de Octubre, fue naturalmente miembro del bloque de la Unión Soviética y se posicionó en contra de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), liderada por los Estados Unidos (EEUU). Sin embargo, a finales de la década de 1950, China rompió relaciones con la URSS y a partir de ese entonces la ideología pasó a un segundo plano y fueron los intereses del Estado Chino los que determinaron las políticas estatales (SHEN, 2007; SONG, 1995). En este sentido, para China, en vez de depender de una amistad frágil de los soviéticos, la opción fue ampliar el campo de relaciones internacionales. En 1954 el primer ministro de China, Zhou Enlai, propuso por primera vez los denominados “Cinco Principios de Coexistencia Pacífica” con el fin de salir del aislamiento impuesto por la URSS y los EEUU. El objetivo esencial de estos principios era crear más lazos con los países en desarrollo. Posteriormente, a partir de los principios mencionados, se establecieron en 1955 los “Diez Principios de Bandung” y más tarde en 1964 se crearon los “Ocho Principios de la Ayuda Económica y la Asistencia Técnica al Exterior” (AYLLÓN, 2013; DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019; HUANG; TANG, 2013a; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013). Vale mencionar que a partir de la creación de los principios de Coexistencia Pacífica, el espíritu de mutuo beneficio y la igualdad pasaron a formar parte fundamental de la CSS de China (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2017; HU; LIU, 2011).

Debido al aislamiento que sufría China por parte de las dos superpotencias de la época y gracias al éxito de las luchas independentistas de los países coloniales de Asia y África en los años 50 y 60 Mao formuló gradualmente una de sus más famosas teorías. En concreto, en 1948 Mao planteó por primera vez la teoría de “la zona intermedia” que hace referencia a la existencia de un extenso espacio entre los dos bloques de la Guerra Fría en el que se situaban diversos países con características distintas (países de Asia, África y América Latina) (1962). Posteriormente, Mao replanteó su teoría y estipuló que existían “dos zonas intermedias: una incluía Asia, África y América Latina mientras la otra, estaba conformada por Europa, Canadá, Oceanía, y Japón” (1963). La primera zona intermedia mencionada se convirtió en la génesis del término posterior “Tercer Mundo”. En el año 1974, Mao habló por primera vez de la clasificación de “tres mundos” en su conversación con el presidente de Zambia: el Primer Mundo compuesto por EEUU. y la URSS (“tigres de papel” del imperialismo capitalista y del socialimperialismo), el Segundo Mundo integrado por los poderes intermedios –Europa, Canadá, Oceanía y Japón– y el Tercer Mundo formado por Asia, África y América Latina. El criterio de clasificación que usó Mao fue el “poder” y no la “ideología” o “clase social” de los países. Por ende, tanto la clasificación de los tres mundos y la ubicación de China en el Tercer Mundo indicaron un cambio realista de la estrategia internacional de Mao (COOK, 2010; DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019; HE, 2005; HE, 2010; MORGENTHAU, 2006; SHEN, 2007; SONG, 1995; SUN, 2005; YAN, 2016; ZHANG, 2010).

Sin embargo, cabe recordar que durante los diez años de la Revolución Cultural (1966-1976) el principio de la “lucha de clases” dominó en casi todos los campos del país, excepto en el campo de la diplomacia pues

aquí solo dominó tres años. Además, este principio al estar dirigido por las ideologías del anti-imperialismo y anti-revisionismo provocó conflictos en las fronteras con la URSS en 1969, llegando al límite del estallido de la guerra. Más tarde, la distensión de las relaciones con EEUU. dejó más incómoda la política exterior antigua. Pues en este sentido, la República salió de la lucha ideológica poniendo por encima los intereses de la nación china. La estrategia pragmática resultó correcta cuando China logró los votos decisivos de 26 países africanos a favor de la legitimidad de la RPC como la única representante ante las Naciones Unidas excluyendo a Taiwán en 1971 (NNUU, 1971) y más tarde, en 1979, estableció relaciones diplomáticas con los EEUU (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019; HU; LIU, 2011; YAN, 2016; YAN; HE, 2017).

El núcleo del pragmatismo de China es la eficiencia al realizar reformas cuando cambian las situaciones. Las reformas –que se refieren a los ajustes correctos de la política– a tiempo y realmente llevadas a la práctica por las entidades de base son muestra del liderazgo político del PCC, lo que ha permitido la reemergencia de China (YAN; ZHANG, 2018; ZHANG, 2014, 2019). En concreto, si bien en la primera fase de desarrollo, el objetivo de la CSS era obtener el reconocimiento internacional del país, dejando de lado a Taiwán, los instrumentos que se usaron fueron distintos en cada etapa y la política de la CSS cada vez se volvió más pragmática. Después de obtener un asiento en las Naciones Unidas, hubo un giro de la política exterior del apoyo a las luchas independentistas en los países coloniales al soporte del NOEI (siglas de Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional) propuesto por el G77 en 1974 (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016, 2019; DUBEY, 2014; SAUVANT, 2014), cuya causa, aparte de “descolocar profundamente a la URSS” (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019), se trató de un cambio de la meta en el siguiente paso tras la consolidación de su poder: desarrollar la economía china.

La terminología de *self-reliance* fue una de las orientaciones esenciales en el pensamiento de Mao que nació en el período de la lucha contra la invasión japonesa. Frente a una doble presión de las tropas de Japón y KMT, Mao promovió un movimiento de producción del ejército y el Pueblo para “tener suficientes ropa y alimentos con las propias manos” (MAO, 1991, p.1270) en las bases de apoyo (LU, 1965; MAO, 1991; ZHU, 1994). El movimiento no solo proporcionó la base material del triunfo de la resistencia, sino también consiguió experiencias económicas preciadas y fue una formación práctica para un grupo de personas calificadas para la construcción de la economía de la República futura (LI, 2001). Luego, en la época de la Guerra Fría, la *self-reliance*, integrada con la independencia, se consideraba el espíritu dirigente de todos los asuntos estatales e individuales para los chinos. Cabe señalar que el término de *self-reliance* tenía que ver con el pensamiento materialista dialéctico de Mao: “La causa externa es la condición de cambio mientras la causa interna es la base. La externa funciona por medio de la interna” “la causa determinante de la evolución de una cosa no reside en el exterior sino en el interior, en la contradicción de la misma” y “Pueblo, solo el Pueblo puede ser la fuerza motriz de crear la historia”. (LI, 2001; LU, 1965; MAO, 1991; ZHU, 1994). En este sentido, el desarrollo de un país se supone determinado por el afán y los esfuerzos de construirlo por su propio pueblo. Pero deben de-

stacar que la *self-reliance* no significa rechazar la ayuda exterior. Por el contrario, tanto Mao como Deng subrayaron que la ayuda exterior fue un factor imprescindible para el desarrollo, pero lo más importante fue cómo recibirla. Es decir, “la revolución del Pueblo no se puede ganar sin la ayuda exterior” (DENG, 1994), sin embargo, “esperamos la ayuda exterior pero no podemos depender de la ayuda. Dependemos de nuestros esfuerzos, de la creatividad del ejército y el Pueblo” (Mao, 1991).

Además, la orientación también presentaba la característica pragmática. Por un lado, superó al marco ideológico señalando que “tenemos que aprender todas las ventajas de todos los Estados y de las naciones, siempre que sea buena” “sin tener en cuenta de que el país sea capitalista o socialista” y “estudiar los fracasos extranjeros para escarmentar” (LI, 2001; LU, 1965; MAO, 1991; ZHU, 1994). Por otro lado, esta orientación, como experiencia exitosa compartida por China con el Tercer Mundo, luego en 1970 se convirtió en la *collective self-reliance* bajo los Cinco Principios de Coexistencia Pacífica que principalmente ponían el énfasis en la cooperación económica y técnica a favor del NOEI, buscando “el desarrollo endógeno con cambio estructural” (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019) y negando la nueva colonización de los países del Norte en nombre de la “ayuda económica” atada por condiciones políticas (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2019; LIN; WANG, 2016; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013).

La primera etapa de la CSS fue clave porque en este período China construyó los principios básicos de la cooperación internacional que actualmente aún dirigen las actividades del país en este campo, lo cual muestra que la ambición del primer grupo líder del país no se limitó a lograr éxitos en su mandato; en cambio, ellos tuvieron programas aplicables en el próximo siglo, o incluso siglos, con la meta de realizar el gran resurgimiento de la nación china. Como señaló Confucio (a.C.,551- a.C., 479) (2013, p.)⁴ “si uno no tiene plan a largo plazo, tendrá preocupaciones a la vista”, así que hacer plan a largo plazo ha sido la costumbre para los sucesores del gobierno chino.

4. Confucio (a.C.,551-a.C.,479), gran pensador y educador de la China antigua. Su obra “Las Analectas de Confucio” es uno de los libros más clásicos y conocidos chinos. La obra está disponible en: <https://ctext.org/analects/zhs>.

Segunda fase: desarrollo económico y la estrategia de bajo perfil

Bajo la orientación de *self-reliance*, la economía y los índices sociales iban mejorando notablemente. En ese momento, el sistema de planificación contribuyó a resolver eficazmente los problemas surgidos en la realización de la ayuda y arreglar la producción doméstica, lo que en cierto sentido promovió la producción interna (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013). No obstante, en el primer quinquenio de los años 70, el crecimiento de la ayuda al exterior fue demasiado rápido que la ayuda sumó el 5,88% de los gastos financieros generales en aquel período llegando en 1973 a alcanzar el 6,92% (ZHOU *et al.*, 2013). Teniendo en cuenta el impacto negativo en la economía de las políticas de extrema izquierda (el Gran Salto Adelante y la Revolución Cultural), la ayuda al exterior se convirtió en una carga pesada para un país todavía pobre, así que se efectuaron ajustes de los medios, la administración, las políticas y el enfoque de la CSS de China al dar por cerrado el período de la Revolución Cultural. Por ello, el presidente Deng Xiaoping propuso una orientación general de reforma y apertura al exterior en la III Sesión Plenaria del XI Congreso Nacional

del PCC (1978) con el objetivo de transformar la economía planificada de China en una economía de mercado y realizar el objetivo estratégico de las “Cuatro Modernizaciones”, las cuales implicaban la modernización de la agricultura, la industria, la defensa nacional y la tecnología científica del país. (CAI, 2010; HU; LIU, 2011; HUANG; REN, 2012; HUANG; TANG, 2013a, 2013b; LIU, 2013; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013).

La política exterior en la época de Deng se hizo más pragmática con el fin de crear un ambiente internacional cómodo para el crecimiento de la economía china, ya que existía una posibilidad muy reducida de que ocurriera una Tercera Guerra Mundial entre los dos bloques (DENG, 1994; YAN, 2016). En 1982, durante el XII Congreso Nacional del PCC se planteó oficialmente, por primera vez, que los intereses de la nación china serían la base del trabajo diplomático y se confirmó la política de no-alineamiento para evitar conflictos internacionales. Posteriormente, en los años 90, con el fin de la Guerra Fría, se aplicó una estrategia de “bajo perfil” para hacer frente al imperialismo de EEUU. Se debe mencionar que el cambio de la política exterior china coincidió con las demandas internas del Pueblo, el cual exigía “una sociedad modestamente acomodada” y la distensión de la situación internacional. En este sentido, como señaló Deng, los dos temas más relevantes de la época fueron la paz y el desarrollo (DENG, 1994; HE, 2010; YAN, 2013, 2016, 2018).

Mediante la transformación del sistema económico, las reformas de la CSS de China se fueron profundizando en muchas dimensiones. Primero, se incorporó a las relaciones internacionales el principio de “buscar la verdad en el hecho”, subrayando que “todo debe partir de la realidad” y se observó una coherencia en la “igualdad y el mutuo beneficio”. Segundo, se redujo la cantidad de proyectos para evitar gastos fuera de la capacidad económica de China. Tercero, se ajustaron las formas de ayuda, por ejemplo, se dejó atrás las inversiones de proyectos productivos y se comenzó a invertir en proyectos simbólicos como estadios, hospitales, centros de congresos, etc., proyectos que eran más fáciles de manejar y permitieron aliviar la carga económica de China. Estos proyectos eran de tamaño pequeño y medio y todavía muy heterogéneos. Cuarto, el mercado se convirtió en un factor significativo en las reformas del régimen administrativo tratando de transformar la función del gobierno. Desde el año 1982, se efectuó el sistema de responsabilidad contractual y en los años 90 se estableció el sistema de subasta y licitación. El rol de los órganos de la ayuda al exterior china experimentó un cambio, ya que pasó de una autoridad ejecutiva competente a un coordinador y administrador de las actividades en el mercado, todo esto con el fin de descentralizar los órganos pertinentes a las entidades contratantes, cuyos intereses económicos se consideraban prioritarios sobre los políticos (HU; LIU, 2011; HUANG; REN, 2012; HUANG; TANG, 2013a, 2013b; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013).

En síntesis, la estrategia de “bajo perfil” coincidió con las condiciones del país –uno de los cinco países miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad pero con un escaso poder duro correspondiente– y la situación internacional de aquel momento –un mundo unipolar relativamente estable y pacífico– promoviendo en la CSS de China las reformas que incorporaron el factor mercado como el sujeto de actividades y cambiaron la función del

gobierno, es decir, dejaron los campos rentables a las empresas mientras el gobierno prestó más atención a los aspectos relacionados con el bienestar y la sociedad (HU; LIU, 2011; HUANG; REN, 2012; HUANG; TANG, 2013a, 2013b; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013). Por esto, China escogió una estrategia determinada para los países pequeños frente a las superpotencias. La humildad se convirtió en una de los aspectos esenciales del poder del país con fin de reducir conflictos diplomáticos con otros, sobre todo con los EEUU, creando un ambiente relajado para el progreso económico. En las siguientes décadas, el denominado ciclo de súper-crecimiento fue resultado de dos factores: primero, de la política de reforma que activó la creatividad de la sociedad y, segundo, de la apertura al exterior que proporcionó un referente de desarrollo (CAI, 2010; YAN, 2013, 2016).

Con el crecimiento de la economía, la CSS de China se fue ampliando. “A partir de 1995, China reformó su cooperación económica, empaquetando las donaciones a fondo perdido y los préstamos sin interés, junto con créditos concesionales, inversión extranjera directa (de sus empresas estatales) y acuerdos comerciales” (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018). El proceso se aceleró después de ingresar en la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC) en 2001 y al año siguiente se llevó a cabo la estrategia *Go Globally*, fortaleciendo conexiones aún más estrechas con el mundo mediante las inversiones de las empresas chinas (ELLIS, 2018; DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; LIN; WANG, 2013; YAN, 2018; ZHANG; SMITH, 2017; ZHOU *et al.*, 2013). El enfoque en la economía contribuyó al crecimiento imparable de China, lo que aumentó obviamente el poder y la influencia del país en los asuntos internacionales, y como consecuencia empezó a tener impacto en la construcción del orden internacional (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; YAN, 2016; ZHANG, 2019).

Hacia la tercera fase: el Gran Renacimiento de la Nación China como país responsable.....

Actualmente, estamos en la transición de la segunda fase del desarrollo de la CSS de China a la tercera. China ya es la segunda economía más importante del mundo, y próximamente será la primera. Gracias al despegue económico, el dragón asiático ya es “un elefante en la habitación”, que no puede esconder su volumen e influencia como lo que hizo antes. La sociedad internacional le pide ser más que un compañero de comercio e inversión (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; YAN, 2013; 2015; 2016; 2018). Además, con la llegada al poder de Donald Trump en EEUU, se vislumbra una reivindicación del nacionalismo en este país. Un giro a la derecha, considerado como una resistencia a la globalización, que también afecta a varios países europeos y latinoamericanos (YAN, 2016; YAN; HE, 2017).

En este contexto, la RPC, siempre etiquetada por el “proteccionismo” y la “no economía de mercado”, ya es y será, irónicamente, el país que más apoya el libre comercio y la globalización (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016a, 2017; YAN, 2018). Un ejemplo claro de esta tendencia China es su esfuerzo por integrar a la económica mundial con la creación de una nueva ruta de la seda, posteriormente, denominada “una Franja y una Ruta”. No obstante, su ambición va más allá del poder económico, pues no pretende repetir

la experiencia de la Guerra Fría, cuando China y otros países miembros del Movimiento de Países No Alineados (MNOAL, 1961) propusieron el establecimiento del NOEI (DUBEY, 2014; SAUVANT, 2014). Ahora, el objetivo primordial es crear un nuevo orden mundial que no solo se reduce a la dimensión económica, más bien se expande a todos los campos de competición con los países desarrollados. Pero el reto más difícil es que China quiere realizar su ambición por medios pacíficos construyendo un nuevo tipo de relación internacional con los EEUU (LIN; WANG, 2016; YAN, 2015, 2018; ZHANG, 2011, 2017).

El objetivo de la política diplomática de China cambia según los intereses del Estado en distintos períodos: en la época de Mao fue conseguir reconocimientos de la sociedad internacional; en la época de Deng fue satisfacer las demandas básicas de vida del Pueblo; y hoy en la época de Xi Jinping es lograr la dignidad nacional con la realización de los “dos objetivos centenarios” –construir una sociedad modestamente acomodada para el año 2021, centenario de la fundación del PCC, y convertir a China en un gran país socialista y moderno para el año 2049, cuando se cumple un centenario del establecimiento de la RPC (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2017; HE, 2016)– y el Gran Renacimiento de la Nación China (XINHUA, 2017; YAN, 2016, 2018; ZHANG, 2017). Considerando el poderío nacional integral de hoy y la tendencia de crecimiento, China es el único candidato posible para alcanzar o superar el poder de EEUU, así que la política de bajo perfil ya no es adecuada para un país reemergente. De acuerdo con el realismo moral de Yan Xuetong (2015, 2016, 2018), para cumplir el Sueño Chino, la meta del presente período se basa en crear una autoridad internacional mientras sigue siendo un gran país responsable- esto hace referencia a que China asume más responsabilidades, contribuye a proporcionar más bienes públicos globales, está logrando un amplio apoyo internacional al conseguir más países aliados y transforma la diplomacia orientada por intereses políticos.

La CSS como parte de la política exterior responde a estos cambios en diversos aspectos. Por un lado, el planteamiento en 2013 del mega-programa “One Belt One Road (OBOR)”, diseñado inicialmente para el impulso de la integración económica y el incremento regional con la creación de la Franja Económica de la Ruta de la Seda hacia Asia y Europa y la Ruta Marítima de la Seda del siglo XXI hacia Asia y África, se ha convertido en una iniciativa global en la que otros países de fuera de la región han mostrado interés y voluntad de participación. El presidente Xi ha expresado en varias ocasiones que la OBOR es una propuesta abierta para todos los países del mundo bajo el principio de igualdad, mutuo beneficio y negociación política. Esta iniciativa que pone su énfasis en el fortalecimiento de las intercomunicaciones entre países, la resolución del déficit de infraestructuras y la transformación estructural de la economía reflejan el valor chino- “quien desea desarrollarse procura ayudar a que se desarrollen otros”- en la construcción de un nuevo orden mundial (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016a, 2017; GU *et al.*, 2016; LIN; WANG, 2016; QIN; WEI, 2018; YAN, 2018).

Por otro lado, China está estableciendo su sistema financiero a favor de la CSS dejando a lado los recursos financieros multilaterales tradicionales, en concreto, el Banco Mundial y el Fondo Monetario Internacio-

nal (FMI) liderados por EEUU. Cabe destacar que la fundación del Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructura (AIIB) en 2015, como el soporte financiero principal de la iniciativa OBOR, aparte del Fondo de la Ruta de la Seda, ya ha causado impacto en el orden financiero internacional, pues esta entidad ya cuenta con la participación de 70 países incluyendo cinco países del G7, que produce una redistribución del poder en el campo internacional financiero. La fiebre del marco multilateral de la financiación de China es el resultado del descontento con el sistema financiero tradicional caracterizado por su baja eficiencia y condicionalidades extremas. (CHEN, 2015; DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016b, 2017; GU *et al.*, 2016; LIN; WANG, 2016; LIU, 2016; YAN, 2018; WANG, 2015). En resumen, en la nueva era de la política exterior de Xi Jinping, caracterizada por la “lucha por el éxito” y “ser un gran país responsable”, China intenta crear un nuevo régimen internacional de la CSS con valores diferentes de los tradicionales, todo esto en un panorama internacional de transición hegemónica de EEUU a China (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; YAN, 2016, 2018).

El pensamiento filosófico y la tradición milenaria del pragmatismo de China

China es un país único en todos los sentidos, no solo por la gran superficie y la población, sino también porque es un Estado continental precisamente solapado por una civilización ininterrumpida durante tres milenios. Se puede integrar el genio histórico y los elementos modernos en los campos donde China consigue éxitos. Por lo tanto, si se quiere entender China, hay que conocer su historia y su cultura (ZHANG, 2011, 2019).

La sustancia de la nación china se generó naturalmente mediante la integración gradual de las 56 etnias que vivían en esa tierra (FEI, 1989). A pesar de muchas guerras civiles y períodos de desunión, durante un gran periodo de tiempo China fue un país unitario y “unipartidista”, gobernado por un único grupo, la mayoría confucianista. Sin embargo, la autoconciencia de la identidad de la nación china para el Pueblo no se empezó a despertar hasta que después de la Guerra del Opio la frontera del país se volvió a abrir violentamente durante la Primera Guerra Chino-Japonesa en 1894 y luego de la Alianza de Ocho Naciones (compuesta por el Reino Unido, los EEUU, Francia, Alemania, Rusia, Japón, Italia e Imperio Austrohúngaro) en 1900 (FEI, 1989; ZHANG, 2008, 2011). Después del saqueo, el proceso de modernización que acababa de surgir se vio suspendido. No obstante, la ambición de los expoliadores nunca quedó satisfecha, así que Japón se convirtió en miembro de los Países de Eje y provocó en 1931 la segunda guerra invasora con la ilusión de colonizar China. Pues en este contexto, el Pueblo Chino no tenía nada de confianza en los países desarrollados, por ello, cuando terminó la guerra y estos describieron “una vía fantástica” hacia la utopía occidental y quisieron imponer ciertas reformas políticas “por su bien” al pueblo, China no aceptó ya que “los hechos están por encima de la elocuencia” (CAI, 2010; JIANG, 2016; ZHANG, 2017, 2019).

Aparte de los acontecimientos mencionados, la causa profunda por la que China eligió un camino propio de desarrollo tiene que ver con su concepción filosófica de la historia. Ya que la nación china ha experimentado unificaciones y divisiones, ascensos y decadencias incontables,

además, de épocas en las que compitieron cien escuelas ideológicas, a partir de ello se formó una concepción filosófica dinámica y multilineal de la historia, totalmente contraria a la occidental, la cual considera el desarrollo del régimen político de modo unidireccional (YAN, 2015, 2016; ZHANG, 2011, 2017). En otras palabras, el mundo occidental piensa que la democracia liberal es el fin de la Historia (FUKUYAMA, 2006), mientras que China cree que cada país, basado en sus propias condiciones y circunstancias, puede encontrar una vía precisamente adecuada para el desarrollo, así que las experiencias exitosas pueden ser aprendidas, pero no copiadas al pie de la letra (CAI, 2010; DENG, 1994; MAO, 1991; ZHANG, 2017). Por lo tanto, como dijo en su discurso de Zhang Weiwei sobre el modelo chino (2019): a China no importan los modelos occidentales ni pretende exportar el Modelo Chino, porque considera que “nunca se debe imponer a otros lo que no deseas para ti mismo” (CONFUCIO, 2013).

Para aprender de cualquier modelo de desarrollo, lo más importante es el pensamiento filosófico detrás de las políticas concretas (ZHANG, 2019). El pragmatismo de la CSS de China se refleja en tres dimensiones. En primer lugar, la CSS siempre sirve a los intereses del Estado sin tener en cuenta de las discrepancias ideológicas. En ocasiones específicas, China proporciona ayuda incluso a países que tienen relaciones diplomáticas con Taiwán, dejando a un lado, cuando sea necesario, el principio esencial de “una Sola China” (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2017; LIN; WANG, 2016; ZHANG; SMITH, 2017). Respecto a los intereses del Estado, aunque varían según la época, su objetivo es mejorar la vida del Pueblo. Esta doctrina del Pueblo, que hace referencia al pensamiento milenario de que el pueblo chino es la base del Estado y que la paz del Estado depende de la consolidación y la solidaridad del pueblo, ha sido ampliamente aceptada por cada dinastía hasta hoy en día. Por eso, se ha convertido en una costumbre prestar gran atención al bienestar del pueblo. Esto es, sin embargo, precisamente lo que falta en el mundo occidental, que profundiza la quiebra entre el pueblo y las élites. Aparte, en muchos casos se comete el error de prestar más atención a la forma que a la esencia. Por ejemplo, la esencia de la democracia son los pesos y contrapesos entre los poderes del Estado y la capacidad del Pueblo de criticar y corregir al gobierno con el fin de evitar el abuso del poder, empero, en varios países la democracia se ha vaciado ya que el demos solamente cumple una función electoral (MAIR, 2015). Por consecuencia, en los últimos años han aparecido *outsiders* políticos que carecen de experiencia política y ostentan un discurso populista. En este sentido, las palabras del presidente Xi pueden ser una advertencia: “las palabras huecas impiden el desarrollo del país mientras el trabajo y la práctica lo propician”. Este valor, por supuesto, se extenderá por la CSS de China cada vez más amplia y profunda (FEI, 1989; LI, 1999; LIN; WANG, 2013, 2016; YAN, 2015, 2016; ZHANG, 2011, 2017, 2019).

En segundo lugar, China efectúa reformas políticas a un ritmo acelerado y al mismo tiempo mantiene unas metas firmes a largo plazo, por ejemplo, la meta de realizar el Gran Renacimiento de la Nación China se estableció al mismo tiempo que la fundación de la RPC y se llevó a cabo mediante diversos planes quinquenales, los cuales ajustaban las políticas tradicionales al contexto de cada época. Ahora bien, debido a

la concepción dinámica de la historia, el dragón asiático considera que no existe una receta o estrategia general que perdure por siempre, más bien cree que se debe progresar continuamente con el paso del tiempo. De acuerdo con el realismo moral, la razón principal de que China sea la segunda potencia mundial y esté tan cerca de alcanzar a los EEUU es debido a las profundas y constantes reformas que lleva a cabo gracias al gran liderazgo político del PCC (YAN, 2015, 2016, 2018; ZHANG, 2011, 2017, 2019). Lo evidente en el caso estadounidense es que a pesar de que los intelectuales norteamericanos están convencidos de la capacidad de supervivencia y autocorrección del régimen democrático liberal, es obvio que la llegada de Trump al poder tendrá grandes repercusiones en todos los ámbitos (YAN, 2018).

La última dimensión y también la más importante es la insistencia en el espíritu rector de “buscar la verdad en el hecho”. En este sentido, la cultura china señala la necesidad de combinar la teoría y la realidad: “a leer miles de libros y hacer miles de viajes”, “la práctica es el único criterio para comprobar la verdad” (DENG, 1994), y que “todo debe partir de la realidad”. Asimismo, el PCC cree en las particularidades de cada país, por eso no copia sin antes considerar o probar las experiencias “avanzadas” y advierte a otros países en desarrollo que no cometan este error. Después de tantos años de aplicar uno de sus más importantes refranes –“cruzar el río sintiendo las piedras” (DENG, 1994)– y aprender de él, China comparte su experiencia en la resolución de problemas a través de la CSS. En concreto, el país primero realiza una prueba limitada en una determinada zona antes de aplicar una política general, es decir, construye Zonas Económicas Especiales o Parques Industriales en los que se lleva a cabo una serie de políticas preferenciales con fin de comprobar la viabilidad de las políticas, además, concentra los reducidos recursos en el desarrollo de los sectores prioritarios que suelen ser los sectores con más ventajas comparativas (LIN; WANG, 2013, 2016).

Conclusión

La CSS de China dispone de objetivos claros en cada etapa de su evolución, los cuales se equilibran con los intereses del Estado. En la primera fase, la ayuda al exterior tuvo como objetivo el reconocimiento internacional de la RPC, además, en esta etapa se plantearon los principios y el espíritu rectores de la CSS: los “Cinco Principios de la Coexistencia Pacífica”, los “Ocho Principios de la Ayuda Económica y la Asistencia Técnica al Exterior”, y el espíritu de independencia y *collective self-reliance*. Igualmente, en esta etapa, la ayuda exterior de China se caracterizó por su internacionalismo y anti-imperialismo, lo cual contribuye a que el país rompiera las relaciones con las dos superpotencias de la época (EEUU y la URSS) y fomentase sus vínculos con los países del Tercer Mundo. Tras el fin de la Guerra Fría, la CSS de China se centró en alcanzar un progreso económico vertiginoso ya que la situación económica de la época así lo permitía y el pueblo chino demandaba más desarrollo. Igualmente, la política exterior china se volvió más pragmática debido a su estrategia de bajo perfil. No obstante, actualmente, China, la segunda economía más importante

del mundo y país líder de la CSS, transforma su estrategia de bajo perfil por una estrategia basada en la responsabilidad y sin miedo para enfrentar a los EEUU, todo esto da lugar a que China aumente su influencia en el orden internacional y construya un nuevo régimen internacional de cooperación. En este sentido, la iniciativa OBOR y el AIIB ostentan un peso notable en la escena internacional, e incluso son relevantes para aquellos países aliados de los EEUU. En el futuro China deberá acelerar su nueva estrategia de responsabilidad si desea lograr alcanzar todos sus objetivos (YAN, 2015, 2018) y construir un sistema de monitoreo y evaluación que logre satisfacer la demanda de transparencia que solicita el pueblo y la sociedad internacional (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; LIN; WANG, 2016).

La aplicación del pragmatismo de China es el resultado de la integración del genio histórico y los elementos modernos. La historia empírica forma una base cultural para aceptar la idea pragmática y se la combina con términos modernos como la igualdad, los derechos humanos y el Estado Nacional. Además, vale mencionar que las peculiaridades de la nación China (ZHANG, 2017, 2019) –la superficie inmensa, la población enorme, la historia milenaria y la acumulación cultural infinita– también influyen y forjan su camino socialista. No obstante, otros países, con características diferentes, también pueden encontrar sus modelos ideales de desarrollo, siempre y cuando no copien los paradigmas de países desarrollados y no abandonen sus ventajas comparativas.

China se ha beneficiado mucho de la globalización y la ayuda exterior, por ello, comparte sus experiencias y lecciones adquiridas. La CSS de China se basa en la filosofía de una cultura abierta e incluyente que pretende buscar “la unidad en la diversidad” y desea que “aquellos que quieran desarrollarse procuren ayudar a que otros se desarrollen”. Es así que el país asiático no promueve ni el racismo ni el sistema de tributo (LIN; WANG, 2016; YAN, 2015; ZHANG, 2019).

En los últimos tiempos, los diversos conflictos frecuentes entre EEUU y China evidencian que EEUU se siente amenazado por el ascenso económico del dragón asiático. En este juego de poder de suma-cero la contradicción entre los dos países es inevitable. Por ende, ¿la guerra Chino- Estadounidense es evitable? China ha prometido que no provocará ninguna guerra, pero ha destacado también que no tiene miedo a la misma. En este caso, teniendo en cuenta que China no se someterá a la presión estadounidense, existe una posible línea de investigación respecto a la cooperación preventiva de seguridad con el fin de convertirse en el otro polo del mundo, pero sin caer en la trampa de Tucídides.

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The Facilitating role of sport in foreign relations of the US and Iran



O papel de facilitador do esporte nas relações externas dos EUA e do Irã

El papel del facilitador deportivo en las relaciones exteriores de EE. UU. E Irán

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DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p103

Received in: December 16, 2019
Accepted in: April 06, 2020

ABSTRACT

Attractiveness and effectiveness are the two main global features of sport; The Islamic Republic of Iran's "soft power", after fourteen years of its revolution, has been influenced by various macro and micro concepts that have been repeatedly challenged by Western countries, especially the United States. So, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in light of recent years' successes in the international field of sports, including seventeenth among the 206 countries in the Olympic 2012 can use this capacity to expand its interactions in the international arena. The purpose of the present study was initially to explore the concepts of strengthening Iran's soft power through sport and to design a favorable paradigm for the development of diplomatic relations with Western countries, especially the United States. Then, SPSS and PLS software were used to investigate the correlation between variables based on Spearman's test, exploratory factor analysis and finally structural and interpretive modeling of independent and dependent variables. The findings showed that seven factors of financial development, devout, conversion, civilization, cohesion, governmental issues and friendship were in four levels influenced by Iran's international sporting environment.

Keywords: United States. Iran. West. Sports Diplomacy. Olympic.

RESUMO

O *soft power* da República Islâmica do Irã, após catorze anos de sua revolução, foi influenciado por vários conceitos macro e micro que foram repetidamente desafiados pelos países ocidentais, especialmente pelos Estados Unidos. Assim, a República Islâmica do Irã, à luz dos sucessos dos últimos anos no campo internacional do esporte, incluindo o décimo sétimo entre os 206 países nas Olimpíadas de 2012, pode usar essa capacidade para expandir suas interações na arena internacional. O objetivo do presente estudo foi inicialmente explorar

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os conceitos de fortalecer o poder brando do Irã por meio do esporte e projetar um paradigma favorável ao desenvolvimento de relações diplomáticas com os países ocidentais, especialmente os Estados Unidos. Em seguida, os softwares SPSS e PLS foram utilizados para investigar a correlação entre variáveis baseadas no teste de Spearman, análise fatorial exploratória e, finalmente, modelagem estrutural e interpretativa de variáveis independentes e dependentes. As descobertas mostraram que sete fatores de desenvolvimento econômico, fluxo religioso, transformação e comunicação, intercâmbio cultural, unidade nacional, correntes políticas e construção da paz estavam em quatro níveis influenciados pelo ambiente esportivo internacional do Irã.

Palavras-chave: Estados Unidos. Irã. Ocidente. Diplomacia Esportiva. Olímpica.

RESUMEN

El poder blando de la República Islámica de Irán, después de catorce años de su revolución, ha sido influenciado por varios conceptos macro y micro que han sido desafiados repetidamente por los países occidentales, especialmente los Estados Unidos. Por lo tanto, la República Islámica de Irán, a la luz de los éxitos de los últimos años en el campo internacional del deporte, incluido el decimoséptimo entre los 206 países en los Juegos Olímpicos de 2012, puede utilizar esta capacidad para expandir sus interacciones en el ámbito internacional. El objetivo del presente estudio fue inicialmente explorar los conceptos de fortalecer el poder blando de Irán a través del deporte y diseñar un paradigma favorable para el desarrollo de las relaciones diplomáticas con los países occidentales, especialmente los Estados Unidos. Luego, el software SPSS y PLS se utilizaron para investigar la correlación entre variables basadas en la prueba de Spearman, el análisis factorial exploratorio y, finalmente, el modelado estructural e interpretativo de variables independientes y dependientes. Los resultados mostraron que siete factores de desarrollo económico, flujo religioso, transformación y comunicación, intercambio cultural, unidad nacional, corrientes políticas y construcción de la paz estaban en cuatro niveles influenciados por el entorno deportivo internacional de Irán.

Palabras clave: Estados Unidos. Irán, oeste. Diplomacia Deportiva. Olímpico.

Introduction

In the light of globalization, information technology has been rapidly developed and advanced, and using the aforementioned facilities and easy access to the technology has evolved the international circumstances. This structural and inherent evolution in international system converted the public diplomacy to a tool, to which the governments resort, to be able to better attain their national goals regarding other states (RAHMANI, 2015). That is, goals which essentially include political, economic, cultural, and social aspects (KESHAVARZ SHOKRI, 2013). Besides these goals, the nature of public diplomacy has also been changed. Unlike the past, where the nature of international system and its associated relationships were based on hard power and when the governments used military forces, army, conferrals, and international unities and liaisons to gain their international goals, today the countries worldwide are looking for alternative solutions and seeking a “softer” term to progress their diplomatic goals (SABBAGHIAN, 2016). Moreover, the governments try not to only focus their diplomatic system on the governing board of

the counterpart country and are trying to affect the social and mental structures of people. Thus, one of the most important characteristics of diplomacy arises. In modern diplomacy, people satisfaction and requirements have the topmost position, and the people's foreign decisions are dependent on people's opinions. Also, other alternative tools (other than hard power) are applied to realize foreign goals. Therefore, practitioners and politicians talk about sport diplomacy, because of its peacemaking and training functions, and due to the fact that sports are considered as a "soft power" (GRIX; HOULIHAN, 2014).

Indeed, sports diplomacy is the efforts of countries sport ambassadors in various fields to boost a country's picture and its soft power; for example, the presence of Dennis Rodman, the American basketball player in North Korea, and watching basketball with North Korea's president indicates the power of this part of public diplomacy. Or embracing the picture of Iranian's leader by Melvyn Douglas, the American wrestler in the crowd of 7th Iranian presidential election is another representation of sport's soft power in developing the relationships between disputative countries; this kind of diplomacy is based on cultural and social values of different countries and targets the public opinions, politicians, as well as governments. Sports diplomacy act as an elixir which, as an ingenious and intact diplomatic tool is able to remove the discrepancies and can promote development, conversation and consistency. Firms which works in the field of sports and diplomacy can enhance positive values of sports, such as mutual respects, discipline, patience and tolerance, and compassion in the rough and sharp political relations, and thus soften such an atmosphere (LI, 2013).

Sport diplomacy is intentionally and consistently employed by governmental and non-governmental actors to advance politics, businesses, development, training, image, reputation, brand name, and people to people communications and it uses sport events in this regard (MURRAY, 2013). Indeed, as the diplomats sit around a desk, the athletes are also running around a runway to realize the national goals; sport diplomacy is mostly emphasizing on the peace which is created among governments and nations, and this is the factor that increases the tendency to hold sport events. For example, 2008 Olympic games in Beijing is an indication of understanding and friendship sense boosting, as well as removing the created borders due to the end of the Cold War (JANKOVIC, 2017). Therefore, the bond between diplomacy and sports is an effective solution which in companion can enhance a brighter and more effective horizon to attain international diplomatic successes (SABBAGHIAN, 2016).

Besides the cultural areas, sports as an important and effective dimension, has played a considerable role in countries' political and economic development (NAURIGHT; SCHIMMEL, 2005). Due to the political and cultural aspects, sport has been widely recognized among countries, and today the international sport is considered as an inseparable component of nations' interrelationships and campaigns (MURRAY, 2013). In this regard, can one claim that the share of each country from the sport or the sport industries is different, depending on the cul-

tural type and their policy makers' point of view? It can be seen that the financial turnover due to the sports is different in countries which considers sports as a means of entertainment, compared to the countries which addresses sports as a part of their macroeconomics (SHARIATI FEIZABADI, 2016). For example, in United Kingdom (UK) sports industries are placed among the first 15 biggest industries, while in some other undeveloped countries, sports are not even considered as a small productive industry.

However, what is evident is that a high share of revenues in developed countries is related to the sports' industries. In other word, professional sports are no longer considered as an entertainment, but also it is in fact, a highly profitable industry which has a high capability to absorb capitals. For example, by designing a sports' decade (between 2010 to 2020), Brazil, as one of the 5 powers of evolving economies of BRICS³ tried to host various disciplines of sports, such as FIFA world cup of 2014 or the summer Olympics of 2016 in Rio. Besides using this heritage in economic development, Brazil, as such, tried to introduce itself as a standard country in international arena (SAJJADI, 2000). Thereby, paying attention to sports and sports' events can affect other employment areas as an umbrella, and can influence other people employments indirectly. Development and economic collaborations, accompanying with sports communications, cause the governments to promote the political and foreign cultures and learn lessons from each other (ŠTULAJER; ŠTULAJER, 2016). Besides this national profitability, sports diplomacy has now succeeded in making borders pale, and opening more ways to conversations, through which various people can gather altogether (KHABIRI, 2014). According to the aforementioned advantages, this kind of diplomacy causes the relationships between governments and nations to boost as time passes. As well, in the twentieth and twenty-fist centuries, that diplomacy was considered a theory, policy and culture in which international relations are based on (DEOS, 2016).

Investigating the literature, we concluded that there has been a large attention and focus on sports diplomacy as an effective solution to remove between-countries' stresses. Bakhshi Chenari *et al.* (2019) in their study, "providing solutions to enable and enhance the sports diplomacy in foreign policy of Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)", taking a qualitative and quantitative approach, have concluded that the most important solutions to enable and boost sports diplomacy in foreign policy of IRI are, as follows, according to the experts' perspective:

- Reviewing the administrative directives in sports agencies (i.e. ministry of sports, the national committee of sports, etc.);
- Holding coordination meetings between ministry of sports and ministry of foreign affairs, as the two main administrators of sports diplomacy;
- Training the political-sports managers of the country, considering the primary principles of international interactions in a worldwide level; and
- The development and execution of a comprehensive and scientific program to enhance the sports diplomacy.

3. . BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

Shariati Feizabadi and Nazemi (2017), in their study, titled “Designing the concepts of sports’ peacemaker culture in the development of international relationships” concluded that among various phenomena, sports is considered as one of the most prominent indications of peace in the 3th millennia, and could play a considerable role amongst the peacemaking programs of BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). These countries have employed sports as a lever and a mean to appeal their requirements from the global society. Islamic Republic of Iran referred to the View Plan in 2013 at United Nations General Assembly, and now it is able to employ its national sports capacity in order to realize its goals and objectives in international arena. Also, the findings indicated that the 34 frequent concepts in the field of sports can play an explanatory role in creating a peacemaker culture concept. Among these locutions, “replacing the war and military diplomacy with sports, and creating international friendship” was the most frequent locution (SHARIATI FEIZ-ABADI; NAZEMI, 2017); In another research, titled “The place of sport in domestic and international politics for peace and friendship” which has been carried out by Mohammadi Aziz Abadi (2018), he concluded that sports plays the following considerable and strategic roles in the nations and governments’ relationships (AZIZ ABADI, 2018):

- Improvement and modification of a nations’ image;
- Boosting friendship;
- Increasing the peace and developing between-countries friendship;
- Developing the business and tourism;
- Encouraging the international development;
- Unifying minorities; and
- The most important, the improvement of international relationships in order to boost the between-nations’ friendship.

Bagheri, Shariati Feizabadi and Nazarian (2016), in their study titled “Soft modeling (ISM) of sports diplomacy components” analyzed data indicated that the components were categorized in three areas of; bonding (cultural development and amicability), independence (media interactions, national unity and identification, political development and fighting isolation), and dependency (dark dimension, economic development, branding and international prestige and the development of smart prestige). Shahrezaei and Shirzadi (2016), in their study titled “The role of sports in expanding the international terms of IRI”, indicated a more emphasis and focus on the sports’ role in developing friendly relationships and collaborations with other countries and international organizations, due to the role of cultural factors, soft power and interactions in foreign policies, as well as an attention to sports as a mean to enhance the country international prestige by attaining successes and honors in international arenas of sports and power presentation.

Jankovic (2017) in his study, titled “Boosting the solutions for international debates: the role of sports diplomacy”, indicates that not only the traditional Olympic games but also the football rules show that sports can work as a supplementary mean to resolve international debates. Schneider (2018), in his research, titled “Sports as a facilitator for international

positive relationships” indicated that sports can facilitate the resolution of global issues positively by improving the international relations. Among all people and governments, the sport is considered as a proper facilitator for positive relationships, regardless of the current situation. Sport is considered as an international joint activity, which can enhance international interactions, good faith between nations, friendship, and loyalty among different nations. Boyacioglu and Oguz (2016) suggested that sport was translated into a positive approach and a big mean of sanction in international relationships and yet it continues. Thereby, increasing its impacts on the most important items from the last century up to now, will have impact on sport games and approximately all over the world and before Olympic games, and then on other organizations (especially on football). In fact, sport has played an important role in the test of power and races between two poles in a warless environment, at that time; because sport games are considered as wars which do not end in death and indicate the economic effects of globalization in sports’ industry (BOYACIOĞLU & OĞUZ, 2016).

Fozooni (2014) in his paper titled “Religion, politics, and social class: conflicts and competition in Iranian football”, investigated the religion, class, sex and race developments via football in Iran. He knows football as the representation of IRI government national construct and considered it as a result of religion power in social classes. Munt (2015) in his study titled “Game, Set, Match: Sports and the Future of Diplomacy”, indicated that sports diplomacy is considered as a legitimate base to study international relations. In his study, he argues that countries sports diplomacy provide “soft” relatively opposing relationships. However, in this research, he tries to remove the objections against this concept and highlights it by providing some samples which sports diplomacy can have. Chehabi (2011), in his research titled “The sports diplomacy between USA and IRI”, knows the victory of Seyed Mohammad Khatami in Islamic Republic of Iran presidential election in 1997 as a starting point for friendly approach against different world countries.

Either in yesterday’s overwhelming atmosphere of pre- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action period, or in the context of efforts of western countries of 5+1 today, in post-JCPOA era, Iran sports could keep alive some twinkles of hope in boosting diplomatic interactions among these countries, which can one name the presence of Iranian volleyball players in the final stage of volleyball world cup in 2019 in United States (USA), as the last sample; Since in the last decade, IRI has been attacked dramatically by media and advertisements in international public opinions (advertisements via projects such as Islamophobia, Shia-phobia, and Irano-phobia), because of its ideologies to foster revolutionary goals, ideological conflicts against the East and the West, as well as due to its behavioral differences in foreign policy field, developing an appropriate roadmap seems so necessary to frustrate these attacks and to modify the international image of IRI in the world population minds, especially in Western countries, more than ever (BAKHSHI CHENARI, GOODARZI, SAJJADI; JALALI FARAHANI, 2019). The position of USA in international system as well as the strategic role and position of IRI in the region arose mutual neces-

sities to create an appropriate relationship. IRI sports, as an Asian power could always gain a prominent position in international arena, especially in volleyball, wrestling, taekwondo, weight lifting and football, up to the point that in summer Olympic games of London in 2012, IRI stood at the 17th rank, which was upper than Brazil, Spain, Argentina, Turkey, etc. Therefore, in this study we aim to identify the diplomatic dimensions and capacities of IRI sports, and make use of this bed as a tool to start and boost the political relations with Western countries, especially USA.

Methodology.....

This research is considered a survey research in terms of data collecting method, while it is an applied research from its goal perspective. First, we tried to review the sports diplomacy literature and explore the most important locutions influencing the sports diplomacy by the Fuzzy Delphi Method (FDM) and employing 10 experts. To this end, we developed a questionnaire and it was given to the experts, so that they could screen the components and identify their importance. Finally, 33 locutions were approved as indicated in Table 2. The statistical sample in the second section was based on Cochran formula to calculate the unknown population volume. The number of people was 170 according to the 5 question Likert scale. Considering the omissions, finally, 318 questionnaires were usable among the total 320 distributed questionnaires. In the next sections, we employ Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, Spearman correlation coefficient, exploratory factor analysis, as well interpretative structural models (ISMs) to find and determine the relations between components (which are converted to variables).

Findings

In order to carry out tests in our software, the questionnaires were distributed among 318 people, whose demographics are depicted in table 1.

Table 1 - Descriptive statistics of quantitative part

No.	Demographical parameters	Choices	Frequency	Percentage
1	Sex	Male	176	55.3
		Female	142	44.6
2	Marriage status	Single	124	38.9
		Married	194	61
3	Education	BS	135	42.4
		MS	116	36.4
		PhD	67	21
4	Age	Under 30	81	25.4
		31 to 40	103	32.3
		41 to 50	75	23.5
		51 and above	59	18.5

Source: own elaboration

Before designing the conceptual model of research based on interpretative-structural modeling, first it is necessary to identify the interested components based on previous studies and experts' comments. To do so, in the first step (i.e. the identification of problem parameters), the decision-makers' comments were collected using the 5 Likert scale, and then a triangular fuzzy number was attributed to factors. Then, the suggested threshold in literatures was employed to determine each factor status (accept/reject). 33 locutions in sports were selected to design a questionnaire. Also, a free question was designed at the end of questionnaire in which the respondents were asked to mention all influencing factors that they think of them, as important factors for the research purpose. Second, the questionnaire was used to collect experts' comments in decision making groups in order to obtain the relative importance of influencing factors and their ranks. Therefore, data collection was carried out in 2 steps. In the first step, the questionnaire was given to the members of experts group, and they were asked to mention their ideas about each measure as oral parameters in the questionnaire. The fuzzy mean and the explicit fuzzy number were explored according to the mean calculation formula. Finally, the identified factors were named. In this step, we tried to answer the question "What are the influencing factors in sports diplomacy?" To name the factors, 2 general measures were used, that is "controllable/incontrollable", and "general/specific". First factor: It includes locutions 2, 3, 15, 17, 23, and 30 which constitute 13.357 percent of the total variance. These factors have the most variance. This factor includes 6 locutions, as follows:

Step 1: Identifying the problem parameters

The decision-making group comments were collected according to a 5-points Likert scale, and then the triangular fuzzy number were attributed to factors. Then, considering the threshold suggested in literatures, each item status (accept/reject) were determined. 33 locutions in sports diplomacy were selected to design a questionnaire. Also, a free question was designed at the end of questionnaire in which the respondents were asked to mention all influencing factors that they think of them, as an important factor for the research purpose. Second, the questionnaire was used to collect experts' comments in decision making groups in order to obtain the relative importance of influencing factors and their ranks. Therefore, data collection was carried out in 2 steps. In the first step, the questionnaire was given to the members of experts group, and they were asked to mention their ideas about each measure as oral parameters in the questionnaire. The fuzzy mean and the explicit fuzzy number were explored according to the mean calculation formula. Finally, 7 factors were identified and named. In this step, we tried to answer the question "What are the main factors in facilitating the relations of Iran and USA sports diplomacy?" To name the factors, 2 general measures were used, that is "controllable/incontrollable", and "general/specific". Finally, 7 factors were identified which are summarized in table 2.

Table 2 - Categorized factors using explorative analysis

Explored Factor	Locution
Civilization	Sports diplomacy is a tool to indicate a real picture of Iranians to the world.
	Sports can lead to boost world population interactions.
	Indigenous, local and traditional sports create an appropriate platform to develop revolution discourse.
	Sport is a tool with which one country people can stand against the other.
	Sport can develop the cultural relations between countries' population.
	Sport events play the main role to improve public diplomacy between IRI and USA.
	International sport events in USA are much less covered compared to IRI.
	Comprehensive and general understanding and interactions with western countries, is considered as a prerequisite for sports diplomacy development.
Governmental Issues	The governmental and state laws prohibit the realization of sports diplomacy goals in Iran.
	Sport is a tool to develop diplomatic relations.
	A country attendance in sport events can take a country out of political and geopolitical isolation.
	Sport can help to reconstruct internal agencies.
	Sport is a tool to promote power and dominance.
	Countries try to gain their broad goals via sports.
	Sport can create a platform in which the political geography can approximate natural geography.
Friendship	Sport helps to improve foreign relations and enhance between governments' understanding.
	Sports can be considered as an alternative for war and military diplomacy.
	Sports are a reason for psychological wars among governments.
	Sport is a tool against doping, race, tribal, regional and class diversity.
	Sports can soften and normalize the relationship between two countries which have cold opposing political atmosphere.
Cohesion	Sport is an appropriate atmosphere to influence public opinions.
	Sport is source for conflicts and discrepancies between countries.
	Sport diplomacy between countries requires a change in between-societies hostilities and mutual bonds.
	Sport teaches leadership, team working, respecting to rules, and mutual respects.
Financial	Sport can lead to countries' consistent development.
	Sport increases the economic outcomes.
	Sport can create mutual consistent relationships and leads to development.
Conversion	Sport is a reason for a revolution in communications and information.
	Sport plays an important role in political, social, and economic life of different countries' population.
	Sport's role is beyond a body activity and includes various social, educational, cultural, political, and economic functions.
Devout	Sports diplomacy is affected by religion and political ideology.
	Sport decreases the religion varieties.

Source: own elaboration

In the second step, we constructed the structural self-interactive matrix. It is constructed of sports diplomacy dimensions and components and their comparison, using four states of conceptual relationships.

Table 3 - Structural self-interactive matrix for factors influencing sports diplomacy

	i	j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Governmental Issues		X	V	X	X	V	V	V
2	Devout		A	X	X	X	V	V	A
3	Conversion		X	X	X	V	V	V	V
4	Civilization		X	X	A	X	V	V	V
5	Cohesion		A	A	A	X	X	X	V
6	Friendship		A	V	A	X	X	X	X
7	Financial		A	A	A	A	A	A	X

Source: own elaboration

In the 3rd and 4th steps, the primal and final matrixes were built:

Table 4 - The primal and final matrixes

	i	j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Influence power
1	Governmental Issues		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
2	Devout		1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6
3	Conversion		0	1	1	1	0	1	1	5
4	Civilization		1	1	0	0	1	1	1	5
5	Cohesion		0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
6	Friendship		0	0	0	1	1	1	1	3
7	Financial		0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
The degree of correlation			3	4	3	6	5	6	6	30

Source: own elaboration

In the 5th step, following the determination of attainment set as well as the prerequisite of each parameter, the common elements in the attainment set and prerequisite for each parameter were identified. After determining the prerequisite and attainment sets as well as common elements, it was the time for determining parameters' (elements) levels. In the first table, those parameters have the highest level, whose attainment set is equal to the common elements. After determining this (these) parameter(s), we will eliminate them from the table and will form the next table by other remained parameters. Like the first table, we determine the 2nd level parameter in the 2nd table, and will continue until all parameters' levels are determined.


Table 5 - Determining the parameters' levels

Dimension(s)	Attainment set	Prerequisite set	Common elements	Leveling
1	7-6-5-4-3-2-1	4-2-1	4-3-2-1	3th level
2	7-6-5-4-3-2-1	4-3-2-1	4-3-2-1	4th level
3	7-6-5-4-3-2-1	4-3-2-1	4-3-2-1	4th level
4	6-5-4-2-1	3-2-1	4-3-2-1	3rd level
5	7-6-5-4	6-5-4-3-2-1	6-5-4	2nd level
6	7-6-5-4	6-5-4-3-2-1	6-5-4	2nd level
7	7	6-5-4-3-2-1-7	7	1st level

Source: own elaboration

In the next step, following the determination of relationships and parameters' level, the primary model was developed. To do this, first we sort the parameters according to their level, from the lowest to the highest. In the current model, the parameters have been classified in 4 levels. At the topmost level, the economic development model can be seen, which is affected most (correlation factor). At the lowest level, are located political circles, and reforms and communications, which act as the model base. The model starts with these parameters and then leads to other ones. At the next levels, are located other components, which can be seen in figure 1.

Figure 1 - Extracted model from interpretative-structural modeling



Source: own elaboration


In the 7th step, the analysis of influencing power and the correlation degree has been carried out, using MICMAC diagram. We can define a coordinate system based on the correlation degree and parameters influencing power and divide it to 4 equal parts. In this study, some parameters are located under the driving subgroup, which has a high influencing power a low correlation power. Located in the next group are dependent parameters which are somehow the results of the product development process, and are less able to lead to other parameters. All the results are depicted in the following figure and table.

Table 6 - The level of influencing power and correlation of parameters

Parameters	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Influencing power	7	7	7	6	4	4	1
Correlation power	4	4	4	3	6	6	7

Source: own elaboration

Figure 2 - Influencing power and correlation of parameters



Source: own elaboration

Path analysis and Hypothesis tests

In order to investigate the relationship between research parameters, we first assess the relationship between these parameters using Spearman’s correlation coefficient, in order to primarily investigate the relationships. Spearman’s correlation coefficient can provide an overview of the relationship between the two main research parameters. The results of correlation test showed that all relationships are significant at 99% confidence level (0.01% error) and the change direction is the same. So, the Null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis (i.e. a significant relationship) is confirmed, and each two research parameters are correlated positively and significantly.


Table 7 - Correlation matrix for research parameters

Parameters		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Governmental Issues	correlation	1	----	----	----	----	----	----
	Significance		----	----	----	----	----	----
Conversion	correlation	0.318	1	----	----	----	----	----
	Significance	0.000		----	----	----	----	----
Devout	correlation	0.403	0.247	1	----	----	----	----
	Significance	0.000	0.000		----	----	----	----
Civilization	correlation	0.458	0.539	0.330	1	----	----	----
	Significance	0.000	0.000	0.000		----	----	----
Cohesion	correlation	0.617	0.416	0.362	0.479	1	----	----
	Significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		----	----
Friendship	correlation	0.34	0.566	0.375	0.571	0.405	1	----
	Significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		----
Financial	correlation	0.404	0.273	0.365	0.310	0.33	0.357	1
	Significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	

Source: own elaboration

After the identification of dependent and independent parameters, now we investigate the relationship between parameters, using structural equations model in PLS software. Codes can be seen in the software output, each of them indicates a parameter. The parameters are shown as follows: Governmental Issues as GI, Civilization as CI, Conversion as CO, Devout as DE, Cohesion as CO, Friendship as FR, and Financial as FI. The essential criterion for assessing the latent endogenous parameters is R^2 deterministic coefficient. The value of R^2 (0.67, 0.33, and 0.19) in path models of PLS is considerable, medium, and weak, respectively. As can be seen, this value is equal to 0.463 for friendship parameter, 0.445 for cohesion parameter, which are considerable. It is equal to 0.162 for financial which is categorized as weak. Figure 3 indicates the research conceptual model following the determination of between-parameters relationship.

Figure 3 - Research conceptual model plotted by the software



Source: own elaboration

In order to assess the validity of measurement tool, we have used the converging validation by Fournel and Larker measure (i.e. the variance mean has been explored). The least AVE of 0.5 indicated sufficient convergence. That is, a latent parameter can explain more than a half of its defining dispersion. The mean values of explored variance are reported as civilization (0.732), financial (0.809), cohesion (0.735), friendship (0.685), governmental issues (0.647), conversion (0.710), and devout (0.849). As can be seen, the explored mean value for the latent parameter in reflective model is higher than 0.4, which indicates the desired converging validity of the measurement model.



Finally, we used the PLS software  to assess the research model. We have also used non-parametric test of bootstrap (TENENHAUS *et al.*, 2005) with 500 repetitions to estimate the standard errors and testing hypothesis. The essential criterion for assessing the latent endogenous parameters is R^2 deterministic coefficient. The value of R^2 (0.67, 0.33, and 0.19) in path models of PLS is considerable, medium, and weak, respectively (AZAR *et al.*, 2012). As can be seen, this value is 0.919 for civilization, which is considered considerable, and is 0.326 and 0.2 for friendship, and cohesion parameters, respectively which are considered as medium. As well, it is equal to 0.16 for financial which is considered as weak. Each path coefficient in PLS structural model can be considered equal to a standardized beta coefficient in usual least squares regressions.


Figure 4 - Model in structural path coefficients state



Source: own elaboration

*CI: Civilization, DE: Devout, GI: Governmental Issues, CO: Conversion, FE: Friendship, CH: Cohesion, FI: Financial

Figure 5 - Model in significant numbers state



Source: own elaboration

*CI: Civilization, DE: Devout, GI: Governmental Issues, CO: Conversion, FE: Friendship, CH: Cohesion, FI: Financial

As can be seen from the research structural model, there exists a positive and significant relationship between governmental issues, devout, conversion parameters, and the cohesion parameter, according to the significance numbers and between-parameters' relationships structural coefficient. In addition, there also exists a positive and significant relationship between civilization and friendship parameters and cohesion parameter. Finally, there is a significant and positive relationship between the two parameters of cohesion and friendship, with financial.

Discussion and conclusion

According to the research findings, we explored 7 factors related to Iran sports diplomacy. Among these 7 factors, the governmental issues and civilization are inseparable components of sports diplomacy, that if are accompanied, could be considered as “*soft power*” generating factor against USA. Although some believe that sports act as a tool for politicians (NAURIGHT; SCHIMMEL, 2005), sports diplomacy can move in a separate way, so that avoid political challenges. Sports diplomacy can mitigate the political stress between IRI and USA through its valuable and popular nature, as sports promote a sense of respect and mutual happiness, *per se*. Sports diplomacy can also play a role in the evolution of micro-cultures and civilization values between the two countries. Not only by gathering different countries people altogether, and the evolution of such micro-cultures, the constructive and effective interaction between IRI and USA governments are formed, but also it provides conditions for “civilization” between the two countries’ people, and as Sabbaghian (2016) suggested, after a short while, political and cultural successes will arise between the two countries. In this regard, it seems that IRI must try to use various civilization methods and tools to take appropriate actions to distress, remove its negative images, make positive images of itself, and recognize itself for American people. With regard to sports diplomacy critical role in making peace and friendship among countries, IRI must reduce its tendency to use military and threatening tools, and open direct conversation doors in the light of sports diplomacy. On the other hand, having friendly relationships with other countries can smooth the way for the other important tool for implementing the sports diplomacy, that is hosting sports events.

Another important point of this research is that different sports diplomacy components are interrelated, and as the results of Spearman’s correlation test verified the significant and positive relationships between components, in the case of a change in one, the other will also be changed. For example, the passion of Iranians to wrestling was a key element for US policy makers to send the first Americans in a shape of wrestling team after Islamic revolution in 1997 that was concluded to “Sport Diplomacy”. Therefore, sports diplomacy may lead to gain a wide range of social, political, and economic goal in IRI.

Next, the result showed that financial factor is known as one of the most important components of sports diplomacy. Sports can be a part of Iran macro-economy and have a large share of the country revenue. Today, sport is not only considered as a body activity and entertainment, but also can boom a profitable industry. Theoretical literature indicated that many countries that holds sport events, make a lot of money for themselves besides introducing their countries to others (SAJJADI, 2000). Therefore, in the light of sports, IRI can provide opportunities to extend her collaborations with USA and so, she could exploit her right to host sport events. In this way she could partly create employment to resolve some of her economic issues, and create a positive commercial balance. Brazil, Germany, South Africa, and Russia are sample who hosted cred-

ible world games, not long time ago and as such they tried to introduce themselves as standard countries. One of the research's interested components was national unification. This parameter can both affect other parameters and can be also affected by them. Sport games are an indicative of the cohesion and empathy of different countries' people. Playing national anthems during games, especially in the case of victories, is an indicative of athletics and participants' empathy which induce the sense of national pride and patriotism. Sports diplomacy indicated that governments decide their foreign policies according to their people opinions, and only if people are satisfied, they could reach unification and integrity. Thus, one can say that not only sports diplomacy creates empathy and unification between people, but it also changes the relationship between the governments and their population.

Evidences indicate that sports have advanced the relationship between IRI and USA. For example, the USA wrestling team attendance in Takhti wrestling cup in 1998 for the first time after the interruption of the two countries' relationships, the football match between IRI and USA in the same year -which was since referred to as football diplomacy, and with the USA president message led to the nations closeness- and/or American wrestler attendance in Khalij Fars cup in 1385 -in which Iranian students welcome them- are all samples which show some opportunities to improve the relationships between these two countries. Therefore, one can say that sports diplomacy in Iran must act as a diplomatic and cultural mean to build trust, convince, and attract American athletics and people, instead of being as an advertising weapon to create credits to reach the country political objectives and goals (KHABIRI, 2014). Moreover, considering the huge negative advertisements forced by USA against IRI, leveraging sports diplomacy promotion tools, such as sports messengers, holding exhibition games as well as sports tourism can somehow reduce this huge amount of negative advertisements, and links both people and governments of these two countries. By creating a sense of peace and friendship between USA and IRI, sports diplomacy can provide opportunities to reduce stresses and negative advertisements against Iran. It can even convince world public media to induce a positive perspective to the world, in the light of sports and their valuableness and popularity.

At the end, the present study suggests to address the assessment of these two countries activities during the past 40 years, so that it could be clear that how much were these activities and actions succeed in meeting IRI goals, national interests and Islamic expedience, to realize Iran diplomatic goals. At the next step, is located the development of a roadmap for IRI sports diplomacy with regard to USA, in order to evaluate capacities, challenges, goals and Iran's foreign policy preferences as well as the current situation of sports diplomacy. At the 3rd step, it is necessary to establish an organization to organize Iran's sports activities regarding the USA and, finally, resuming formal diplomatic relationships between the two countries and employing professional and capable sports diplomats in the form of embassies, dependents, or sports consultants in these countries.

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
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Errata

O Conselho Editorial de Estudos Internacionais, Revista de Relações Internacionais do Programa de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, ISSN: 2317-773X torna públicos, para fins de citações futuras, os seguintes ajustes no artigo “*R(r)elações I(i)nternacionais, Realismo e Análise da Política Externa (APE): contextualizando a invenção da APE*”, do autor Pedro Emanuel Mendes, DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n1.p64, publicado no volume 08, número 01 em abril de 2020:

- Na página 64 elimina-se o espaço entre “análise historiográfica da invenção” e “da APE”;
- Na página 68 onde está “norte-ameri cana” leia-se “norte-americana”;
- Na página 71 onde está “deveria continuar ser estudada” leia-se “deveria continuar a ser estudada”;
- Na página 72 elimina-se o espaço entre “teoria da política internacional,” e “não era uma teoria”;
- Na página 74 onde está “associaisdo” leia-se “associais do”.

Belo Horizonte, julho de 2020.



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